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Standard finance theory portrays investors as rational utility maximisers. Persisting 
market anomalies and observed investor practice, however, have led to widespread 
recognition that the fundamental axioms of rationality are often violated. In response to 
the limitations inherent in standard theory, the Behavioural Finance approach relaxes 
the rationality assumption and takes account of psychological influences on individuals’ 
decision-making processes. Adopting the behavioural approach, this thesis, which 
includes two empirical studies, examines why, and to what extent, investors depart 
from rational or optimal investment practices.  
The thesis examines the effect of Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) suggested by 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as a response to the Equity Premium Puzzle highlighted by 
Mehra and Prescott (1985). While previous studies are almost exclusively based on 
experiments in a laboratory setting, this approach provides more compelling empirical 
evidence by investigating the effects of MLA on real individual investors’ portfolio 
allocations through the use of the Dutch National Bank Household Survey.  
For the first time, the concept of MLA is identified through the interaction of 
two separate effects, firstly, individuals’ myopia, reflected in portfolio evaluation and 
rebalancing frequencies, and secondly, loss aversion. The thesis finds that individuals 
who are less affected by MLA invest more in risky financial assets. Further, individuals 
who are less myopic increase their share of risky assets invested in their financial 
portfolios over time, although this is unrelated to their loss aversion. These findings 
support the prediction of MLA theory that short investment horizons and high loss 
aversion lead to a significantly lower share of risky investments. In summary, the high 
equity premium can be explained by the notion of MLA. If individuals evaluate their 
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investment performance over the long-term, they perceive much smaller risks relative 
to stockholding returns; consequently, they will be prepared to accept smaller equity 
premiums. The findings suggest possible interventions by policy makers and 
investment advisors to encourage individuals to remain in the stock market, such as 
providing long-term investment instruments, or restricting evaluation frequency to the 
annual reporting of investment performance.  
In response to the stockholding puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), this thesis 
also investigates individuals’ stock market returns expectations and their varying levels 
of risk aversion. Previous studies find that individuals’ heterogeneous stock market 
expectations determine variations in their stockholdings. The thesis accounts for the 
effect of risk aversion on stock market expectations, as well as on stockholding 
decisions. Additionally, the causality issue as between individuals’ expectations and 
stockholding status is controlled. The thesis finds that more risk averse individuals hold 
lower stock market expectations, and that the stock market return expectations of more 
risk averse individuals affect their stock market participation decisions negatively. The 
portfolio allocation decisions of individuals who already hold stocks are only affected 
by their expectations, with risk aversion being no longer significant. The thesis argues 
that persistent risk aversion effects cause individuals to hold pessimistic views of stock 
market returns, thus contributing to the enduring stockholding puzzle.   
The thesis reinforces existing perceptions that individuals in the real world may 
not make fully rational decisions due to their judgments which are based on heuristics 
and affected by cognitive biases. Individual investors often fail to maximise their utility 
given their preferences and constraints. Consequently, this thesis draws attention to the 
possible role of institutions, policy makers, and financial advisory bodies in providing 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Motivation for the Thesis 
This thesis investigates individual investors’ financial decision-making under 
uncertainty. According to the traditional finance paradigm, individuals are self-
interested agents and given a set of alternatives, their decision-making reflects a process 
of choosing optimal options. The optimal choice is that which maximises individuals’ 
utility or satisfaction based on their rational preferences and all relevant information. 
Rational preference theory posits that individuals are able to compare all possible 
choices in order to serve their best interests under uncertainty (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944) and, in terms of individuals’ wealth management, more is always 
better. Modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952a; 1959) is predicated normatively on 
the assumptions that investors are rational, and that all available information is reflected 
instantaneously and completely in market prices so that markets remain efficient (Fama, 
1965; 1970).  
Financial decision-making is, however, not a simple task for individuals; 
especially since they are required to pay a great deal of attention to the uncertainty 
involved in the consequences of their decisions. In particular, given their distinct beliefs 
and preferences, individuals’ financial decisions in the real world are virtually 
independent of one another. Certainly, not only their financial decisions but also many 
other decisions which individuals face in their lives require personal judgments 
reflecting their own circumstances. Furthermore, individuals often fail to maximise 
their utility and update their beliefs correctly, violating the fundamental axioms of 
rationality (Thaler, 1999a). Persistent anomalies in the markets also indicate that 
standard theories fail to explain these phenomena. In response, this thesis takes a 
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Behavioural Finance approach to describe individual investors’ financial decision-
making, taking account of psychological influences. Thus the first motivation of this 
thesis is to fill the lacuna which exists between the beliefs of standard economic 
theories as to ‘how rational investors should behave’ and those of the behavioural 
approach as to ‘how normal investors actually behave’.  
Individual investors’ financial decisions are ever more important given their 
increasing longevity. Further, the worldwide trends of abandoning defined benefit plans 
in favour of defined contribution plans and of introducing new financial instruments 
through mutual funds and retirement accounts invite, as well as expose, more 
individuals than ever before to stock market fluctuations. The recent history of the 
stock market including the dot-com bubble, and the subprime mortgage and financial 
crises of 2008, however, emphasises the need for individuals to be more responsible for, 
and aware of, the consequences of their financial decision-making. These issues are 
highlighted by the previous behavioural finance studies suggesting that individuals 
make suboptimal decisions not only due to their lack of financial understanding (Van 
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011; 2012), but also because they are often prone to 
judgment biases and mistakes (De Bondt, 1998), and because their financial decisions 
are affected by their emotional swings and sentiments (Kaplanski, Levy, Veld, and 
Veld-Merkoulova, 2012). Consequently, individuals’ decisions to invest in risky assets 
are not solely determined by their assessments of the risk-return trade-off, but also by 
many other underlying personal traits that determine their beliefs and preferences in 
terms of risk-taking.   
The second motivation of this thesis is to observe the phenomenon of how 
individuals’ investment choices differ one from another. The divergences in choice on 
whether to participate in the stock market or not, and on how much of their financial 
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assets individuals allocate to stocks are investigated by evaluating their intrinsic 
psychological characteristics. In addition, by providing insights into the manner in 
which individuals make financial decisions, the thesis seeks to draw attention to the 
role of institutions, policy makers, and financial advisory bodies in providing effective 
interventions to compensate for individuals’ judgment biases and guidelines in such a 
way that they achieve sound investment results.   
In particular, the thesis focuses on the fundamental role of individuals’ risk 
perceptions in their financial decision-making. Taking account of the effects of 
individuals’ varying levels of loss aversion and risk aversion as described by Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the thesis 
investigates how individuals’ investment decisions differ depending both on the manner 
by which they perceive the returns on their own investment portfolios and on stock 
market returns. In contrast to expected utility theory which assumes that individuals 
make consistent decisions regardless of how relevant information is presented, 
psychologists have argued that individuals’ decisions are affected by the choice of 
presentation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Loewenstein, 1988). Individuals perceive 
questions differently depending on the framing of the problem and the presentation of 
outcomes (Kahneman, 2003), as well as their personal characteristics; the well-known 
example of the glass ‘half-full’ or ‘half-empty’ demonstrates that there are apparent 
differences in the way individuals perceive the same phenomena.  
The third motivation of this thesis is to evaluate the implications of individual 
investors’ endogenous framing choices when evaluating and rebalancing their own 
investment portfolios returns, as well as the effect of their perceptions as to future stock 
market returns in determining their investment decisions. To this end, the thesis obtains 
micro-level panel data and investigates individual investors’ financial decisions over 
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time taking account of the influences of the intrinsic framings which they employ when 
managing their portfolios. The thesis particularly investigates the concept of Myopic 
Loss Aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), and individuals’ perceptions of stock 
market movements, as well as their personal preferences.   
 
1.2 Contributions and Main Findings of the Thesis 
The thesis has a specific focus on risk perceptions of individual investors, 
through developing empirical models, in order to explain the heterogeneity in their 
financial decisions. The thesis provides responses to two closely related and enduring 
market conundrums; namely, the Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) 
and the Stockholding Puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). Previous literature 
concerning these two puzzles is discussed in-depth in Chapter Two.  
Chapter Three of the thesis is entitled Myopic Loss Aversion and Stock 
Investments: An Empirical Study of Private Investors1. This chapter explains individual 
investors’ investment decisions empirically by applying the concept of Myopic Loss 
Aversion (MLA), as suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), as a possible solution to 
the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). In this chapter, we make two 
contributions in terms of, firstly, methodology and, secondly, theory. Firstly, in contrast 
to previous studies which evaluate the effect of MLA based on experiments (such as 
Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Bellemare et al., 2005; Langer and 
Weber; 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009), we make a novel contribution by evaluating the 
effects of MLA on investors’ real investment allocations.  
                                            
1
This chapter is co-authored with Professor Yulia Veld-Merkoulova (Department of Accounting & 
Finance, Business School, University of Glasgow, West Quadrangle, Glasgow University Avenue, 
Glasgow, G12 8QQ, E-mail: Yulia.Veld-Merkoulova@glasgow.ac.uk) who made a considerable 




Since the study is based on information obtained from real investors, our study 
is free from the limitations faced by experimental studies. For example, in an 
experiment the subjects may not consider the consequences of a gamble seriously as the 
monetary returns tend to be very small. As discussed by Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990), awarding subjects a reward for their choices also creates an endowment 
effect, which could distort their decisions. Subjects in most experiments are 
undergraduate students and they are untypical of the population of investors as a whole 
in terms of their experience in trading and knowledge of the market, as well as many 
other demographical and financial characteristics.  
When we study real investors, we are able to identify important variables such 
as their portfolio evaluation frequency and investment horizon without any need to 
define them exogenously. Such variables are ideally determined solely by investors 
themselves rather than artificially within laboratory settings. This approach allows us to 
identify the true effects of MLA on real investors’ decision-making processes in the 
market, while previous studies are successful in identifying the effect of MLA only in 
laboratory settings.  
Secondly, we measure MLA by identifying both individual investors’ myopia 
and loss aversion in order to account for the joint effects of these two core variables. 
We believe that the concept of MLA is centred on the interactions of the two separate 
effects, as discussed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first empirical study to identify the effect of MLA by investigating the 
interactions between investors’ myopia and loss aversion. 
Although the effect of myopia was originally measured by investors’ portfolio 
evaluation frequency alone (Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy and Potters, 1997), the 
rebalancing frequency, i.e. the frequency of adjusting the proportions of risky assets 
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held in a financial portfolio, is introduced by Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) as an 
additional proxy. Consequently, we obtain both investors’ evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies by questions submitted to the CentERdata panel at Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands in the year 2003. These questions, which measure individuals’ levels of 
myopia, are then merged with other datasets from the annual Dutch National Bank 
Household survey (DHS). Investors’ loss aversion measures are based on the 
hypothetical inter-temporal choice questions asked by the DHS over the period 1997-
2002. After obtaining the aggregate assets and liabilities set from the DHS for the 
period 1997-2010, we investigate a total of 400 investors’ portfolio allocation decisions 
over time in order to identify the effect of MLA.   
Following Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the first question we investigate in this 
study is whether those individuals who are less affected by MLA invest more in risky 
financial assets. Secondly, we evaluate the effect of MLA by considering the 
persistence effect of MLA on individuals’ portfolio allocation changes over time. We 
investigate whether those who are less affected by MLA increase their holdings in risky 
financial assets over time relative to those highly affected. In terms of methodology, 
since we observe the same individuals appearing on average for 8 years in our total 
dataset, our empirical models are based on Prais-Winston’s (1954) panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) regression models in order to correct for autocorrelations and to 
control for heteroskedasticity.  
Based on our findings, we observe that a median investor in our sample 
evaluates her portfolio quarterly, but rebalances it less often than once a year. Although 
our results contrast with the arguments of Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000; 
2001) in their studies of discount brokerage accounts, to the effect that investors tend to 
over-trade reflecting their overconfidence, our results are in line with those of Fellner 
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and Sutter (2009) who, in an experimental setting, observe a high preference on the part 
of their subjects for frequent evaluation of investments and a somewhat less 
pronounced preference for short investment horizons. We find that MLA has significant 
and negative effects, which are driven by both individuals’ loss aversion and myopia, 
on investors’ portfolio allocations to risky financial assets. Those who are highly loss 
averse and exhibit a combination of high evaluation and rebalancing frequencies hold 
relatively smaller proportions of risky assets in their portfolios.  
When we investigate investors’ portfolio allocations over time, we observe the 
effects from myopia but not from loss aversion. Investors who evaluate their portfolios 
less frequently are likely to increase their holdings over time compared to those who 
evaluate at least monthly, and this finding remains consistent after controlling for the 
effects arising from stock market fluctuations.  
Our findings are important as they are distinguishable from the relatively large 
number of prior experimental studies on MLA. We provide empirical evidence for the 
external validity of MLA by taking account of both loss aversion and myopia effects on 
individual investors’ financial decision-making. We provide support for the 
assumptions of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) that the combination of investors’ loss 
aversion together with both their propensity to undertake frequent portfolio evaluation 
and their short investment time horizon leads to a significantly lower proportion of 
risky financial assets in their financial portfolios, thereby reducing their lifetime utility. 
Investors’ alteration of their portfolios over time, however, is apparently 
influenced by myopia alone; this suggests possible interventions that policy makers and 
investment advisors can instigate to persuade investors to remain in the stock market, 
such as providing long-term investment instruments, or restricting investors’ evaluation 
frequencies by reporting investment performance only annually.   
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Chapter Four of the thesis is entitled Stock Market Expectations and Risk 
Aversion of Individual Investors2. In this chapter, the first contribution we make to the 
existing literature is that, in response to the stockholding puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 
1995), we investigate the effects of the varying levels of individual investors’ risk 
aversion, together with their stock market expectations, on their investment decisions.  
Previous studies which evaluate the relationship between individuals’ stock 
market expectations and their stock holdings do not emphasise the effects of risk 
aversion on either individuals’ stock market expectations or on their portfolio allocation 
decisions (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003; Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al., 2011). 
We believe that studying the interdependent effects of stock market expectations and 
risk aversion is crucial, as Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) and Kapteyn 
and Teppa (2011) both recognise that the heterogeneous effects of risk aversion 
significantly determine individuals’ portfolio allocation decisions.  
Following Rabin and Thaler (2001, p.210), who define risk aversion as 
“hesitation over risky monetary prospects even when they involve an expected gain”; 
we suggest that individuals’ risk aversion plays a crucial role in determining the 
heterogeneity in their stock market return expectations. Thus, we incorporate a term to 
measure the interactions between risk aversion and stock market expectations in our 
empirical models in order to explain individuals’ stock market participation decisions as 
well as their portfolio allocations.     
We make a second contribution, in terms of research methodology, through 
employing Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates to control for the endogeneity issue in 
individuals’ stock market expectations. Individuals’ expectations as to future stock 
                                            
2  This chapter is co-authored with Professor Leonard Rosenthal (Department of Finance, Bentley 
University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA, E-mail: lrosenthal@bentley.edu); Professor Chris Veld  and 
Professor Yulia Veld-Merkoulova (Department of Accounting & Finance, Business School, University of 
Glasgow, West Quadrangle, Glasgow University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, E-mail: Chris.Veld 
@glasgow.ac.uk; Yulia.Veld-Merkoulova@glasgow.ac.uk)  
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market returns raise an issue of causality as their expectations are also determined by 
their stock holding status. We account for the possible effects from investors’ ‘wishful 
expectations’ (Ito, 1990), as well as the deviations in individuals’ expectations caused 
by different levels of familiarity with, and knowledge of, the stock market, in addition 
to accounting for potential measurement errors and omitted variable bias. Additional 
variables which act as instruments are introduced in our IV estimates. Thus, this 
approach accounts for the endogeneity issue more rigorously than do previous studies.  
We investigate three research questions in this chapter. The first two questions are 
applied to both investors (i.e. those who hold risky financial assets) and non-investors. 
Firstly, we examine whether more risk averse individuals hold lower stock market 
return expectations. Secondly, we investigate whether the stock market return 
expectations of more risk averse individuals have a negative effect on their stock 
market participation decisions. Thirdly, we test whether the interactions between levels 
of risk aversion and stock market return expectations have negative effects on investors’ 
portfolio allocation decisions, i.e. the proportion allocated to risky financial assets 
within their total financial portfolios.  
Our data is extracted from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) of 
the CentERdata panel, the same survey panel which is used for the empirical study of 
Chapter Three of the thesis, and both individuals’ stock market expectations and risk 
aversion are measured on the basis of questions covering the period 2004-2006. The 
DHS incorporates a question which allows us to evaluate individuals’ expectations as to 
percentage point changes in a year for stock market returns worldwide. A measure of 
individuals’ risk aversion is obtained by applying a factor analysis to their responses for 
the six questions from the DHS which evaluate risk preferences with regard to 
investment strategy. After merging with other datasets from the DHS which provides 
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information on individuals’ financial, demographical, and behavioural characteristics 
for the 3 year period, our sample includes 1587 individuals from 2956 observations.  
Based on our findings, we observe pessimistic views on the part of a large 
proportion of Dutch individuals as to future stock market movements in that their 
expectations are much lower than the historical averages, supporting Hurd et al. (2011). 
With regard to the particular questions we ask in this study, we find that individuals’ 
risk aversion levels determine their stock market expectations significantly and 
negatively; higher levels of risk aversion give rise to lower stock market return 
expectations.  
Based on our IV estimates which apply the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach, we observe that the joint effects of higher levels of risk aversion and 
stock market expectations on individuals’ stock market participation decisions are 
significantly negative. For those investors who already hold risky financial assets in 
their portfolios,  their varying levels of risk aversion no longer influence their portfolio 
allocation decisions but we continue to observe significant and positive effects on their 
allocations to risky financial assets as the result of their stock market expectations. We 
support the findings from previous studies suggesting that the heterogeneous stock 
market expectations of individuals provide an answer to the stockholding puzzle (Hurd 
et al., 2011; Kézdi and Willis, 2009; Dominitz and Manski, 2007).  
What truly determines the heterogeneity of individuals’ expectations is a difficult 
issue. In addition to previous literature on individuals’ biased expectations which 
recognises the substantial influences of factors such as individuals’ own past 
investment returns and recent fluctuations in the stock market (Vissing-Jørgensen, 
2003; De Bondt, 1993, 1998; Graham and Harvey, 2001), we argue that there are also 
persistent effects arising from individuals’ risk aversion levels which leads them to hold 
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pessimistic views of the stock market returns, thus contributing to the enduring 
stockholding puzzle.   
 
1.3 Summary, Conclusion and Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis investigates individual investors’ financial decision-making under 
uncertainty. Individual investors in the real world are not as rational as described in 
standard finance theories, often failing to maximise their utilities and update their 
beliefs correctly, thus violating the fundamental axioms of rationality (Thaler, 1999a). 
Moreover, given their distinct beliefs and preferences, individuals make financial 
decisions virtually independent of one another. Taking a Behavioural Finance approach, 
the thesis investigates ‘how normal investors actually make investment decisions’. In 
particular, individuals’ different investment choices are examined through evaluating 
their stock market participation and portfolio allocation decisions.  
The thesis highlights the important role of psychology of perceptions, arguing 
that individuals make different investment decisions depending both on the manner by 
which they perceive the returns on their own investment portfolios and on stock market 
returns. The practical implications of the thesis are that there is an identifiable need to 
develop both interventions applicable to financial advisors in order to moderate the 
distortion in investors’ decision-making resulting from their biased risk perceptions, 
and policy choices such as new default investment options.  
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two presents a 
literature review. The studies on the effect of investors’ Myopic Loss Aversion and on 
individuals’ stock market return expectations are presented in Chapters Three and Four, 
respectively. Chapter Five includes a summary, general discussion, limitations of the 
study, suggestions for future research and concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Background to the Thesis 
 
2.1.1 The Behavioural Finance Approach 
Standard economic and finance theories are built on the assumptions that 
investors are rational, and that markets are efficient (Markowitz, 1952a; 1959). Rational 
investors are self-interested with their foremost desire being to maximise their expected 
utility following von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorem (1944) which explains that 
the preferences of investors when evaluating risky gambles are determined by the 
axioms of completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence.  
All available information is reflected instantaneously and completely in the 
market price and investors hold rational expectations as a result of updating their 
probability beliefs correctly in accordance with Bayes’ law. The efficient markets 
hypothesis assumes that competition between investors for abnormal returns drives 
prices to their correct values (Fama, 1965). Thus, even if some investors are not fully 
rational, occasionally over or underreacting to new information, markets remain 
rational and efficient as a result of procedures undertaken by arbitragers (Fama, 1970).  
Individual investors are assumed both to manage their portfolios based on the 
mean-variance portfolio theory with its core theme of ‘diversification’ as a means of 
reducing total portfolio risk (Markowitz 1952a; 1959), and to act in accordance with the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), under which 
portfolio performance is determined solely by the trade-off of risk and return.  
In more recent years, however, there is a growing consensus that these standard 
theories fail to explain how real investors behave and what the results of their actions 
are in the markets. Persisting anomalies in the markets and the observed practices of 
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investors lead to arguments that the fundamental axioms of rationality are often 
violated, as investors fail to maximise their utilities and update their beliefs correctly, 
pursuing decisions which are normatively questionable (Thaler, 1999a). Standard 
theories may be successful in describing the financial and economic activities of an 
‘Economic Man’ (Mill, 1836) in an abstract market, but not how real individual 
investors approach their financial decision-making.  
In particular, De Bondt (1998), applying his empirical materials, sketches a 
portrait of individual investors as a ‘sorry’ picture after identifying various classes of 
anomalies reflected in investors’ perceptions of asset prices and trading practices. He 
finds that investors tend to rely heavily on naïve patterns extrapolated from past price 
changes, apply ‘popular models’ of value (Shiller, 1990), and hold undiversified 
portfolios. He also finds that many individual investors are short-term oriented, exhibit 
excessive optimism or pessimism over time, and trade in suboptimal ways. These 
systematic violations by individual investors demonstrate that the classic equilibrium 
model lacks the ability to explain deviations from it in practice, as it is too restrictive 
and unrealistic to reconcile with individual investors’ behaviour. 
In response to the limitations faced by standard finance theories, the 
Behavioural Finance approach was developed as a new descriptive theory, taking 
account of psychological influences on individuals’ decision-making processes. In this 
approach, the principle of rationality is relaxed, based on the concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’ (Simon, 1982) which argues plausibly that investors are not fully rational. 
The literature in this area has been developed based on two main building blocks; the 
limits to arbitrage, which suggests that it can be difficult for rational traders to undo the 
dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology,  supported by the extensive 
experimental data collected by cognitive psychologists (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
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The failure of arbitrage in eliminating the deviations from the fundamental values 
caused by less rational investors explains the limits to arbitrage, whereas the 
psychological biases incorporated in investors’ beliefs and preferences cast light on the 
reasons for the deviations. The thesis particularly investigates the influence of 
psychological biases on the investment decisions of individual investors.  
Although standard finance theories often fail to capture how real individual 
investors behave given the empirical evidence, they do provide a good point of 
departure for behavioural finance studies. The motivation of the thesis stems from the 
discrepancy between theoretical predictive economic models for individuals’ portfolio 
management and empirical observation of investor practice. Raiffa (1968) describes 
three approaches to decision problems: the ‘normative’ analysis approach describes the 
rational solution to arrive at ideal decisions; the ‘descriptive’ analysis approach defines 
how real people actually make decisions; and the ‘prescriptive’ analysis approach aims 
to provide practical advice to induce individuals to make more rational decisions.  
Through evaluating psychological, cognitive and emotional aspects of 
individuals, the thesis takes a descriptive analysis approach in order to understand why, 
and to what extent, investors depart from rational or optimal investment practices. 
Further, taking a prescriptive approach, the thesis aims to recognise what types of 
judgment biases are likely when individuals make their financial decisions. Individuals 
often make their important financial decisions based on their intuitions or random tips 
from acquaintances instead of on the basis of critical or analytical thinking, 
comprehensive research, or advice from professionals. Accordingly, the thesis 
emphasises the important role of financial advisors and suggests what interventions 
might improve individual investors’ decision-making in order to help them to achieve 
their best interests. 
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2.1.2 Judgment Biases of Individual Investors  
According to the behavioural finance approach, individual investors’ decision-
making captures two vital elements, beliefs and preferences (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
Since the outcomes of investors’ investment choices are unknown at the times of their 
decision-making, they are compelled to rely on their judgments which are determined 
by both their beliefs and preferences. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) argue that when 
individuals face highly complex financial decisions involving high uncertainty, they 
tend to rely on their intuitions which often reflect errors in their beliefs and preferences. 
Individuals tend to assign mistaken values to future outcomes or adopt incorrect 
combinations of probabilities and values, rather than follow rigid Bayesian rules of 
rational expectations (Thaler, 1999a). Kahneman and Riepe (1998) argue that due to the 
illusionary effects produced by their intuitions, individuals become more prone to 
‘judgment biases’, resulting in unsatisfactory outcomes including unanticipated risks. 
Psychologists define ‘biases’ as systematic errors, or ‘cognitive illusions’, in 
individuals’ judgments (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998).  
Referring to the psychology of bounded rationality of Simon (1982), Kahneman 
(2003) argues that individuals suffer from judgment biases due to their mistaken 
intuitions, characterising ‘intuitions’ as thoughts and preferences that come to mind 
quickly and without much reflection (Kahneman, 2003; pp. 697). Kahneman (2003) 
further argues that individuals’ intuitions can be modified or predetermined through a 
more deliberate mode of cognitive operation, ‘reasoning’. The differences in 
‘accessibility’ of thoughts, which refers to the speed with which thoughts come to mind, 
distinguish intuitions from reasoning. A two-system view of the generic modes of 
cognitive function has been proposed to distinguish intuitions from reasoning 
(Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).  
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Figure 1 A Two-System View of the Generic Modes of Cognitive Function  
 
The following two-system view of the generic modes of cognitive function has been identified by 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) and Kahneman (2003) in order to distinguish intuition from reasoning. 
This figure features the three cognitive systems of perception, intuition and reasoning as proposed by 





Figure 1 features the two cognitive systems as proposed by Stanovich and West 
(2000). Intuition in System 1 is difficult to control or modify, governed by habit, 
typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit, and emotionally driven; 
sharing the same operating process as does ‘perception’. Reasoning in System 2 is 
usually consciously monitored and deliberately controlled, but also relatively flexible; 
its process is slower, serial, and effortful. Figure 1 also shows that intuition is not 
limited to processing current stimulations, but also that its content covers past, present, 
and future, as well as developing conceptual representations, as does ‘reasoning’. The 
intuitive operations of System 1 contribute to judgments which reflect impressions and 
these impressions are neither intentional nor verbally explicit. Deliberate reasoning in 
System 2 is at all times intentional, rule governed, and explicit; it is involved in all 
judgments even when these are not overtly expressed (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).  
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Kahneman (2003) argues that due to limited capacity for mental effort, 
reasoning processes are liable to interrupt each other, while intuitive processes neither 
cause nor suffer from interruptions when applied to more than one task simultaneously. 
Stanovich and West (2002) also identify one of the functions of the reasoning process 
of System 2 to be the monitoring of both the quality of mental operations and the 
intuitive process of System 1. Due to the vulnerability of System 2 to disruption of 
operations, however, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) argue that its monitoring 
function tends to be lax, allowing many intuitive, sometimes erroneous, judgments to 
be expressed. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) argue that due to intuitive judgments 
dominating the deliberate operations of reasoning, many individuals make mistakes 
when answering even easy questions. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) also find that 
even statistically sophisticated researchers make systematic errors in their statistical 
judgments, failing to follow statistical principles with which they are familiar. In 
particular, such researchers demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to sample size effects and 
base their judgments merely on their erroneous intuitive statistical inferences. 
Kahneman (2003) argues that although intuitions are often associated with poor 
performance, due to their indulgent and high accessible nature, whereby they employ 
thoughts which come to mind easily and effortlessly without demanding mental effort, 
individuals prefer to practice their intuitive judgments rather than apply reasoning. 
The highly accessible intuitions produced by System 1 control the judgments 
and preferences of individual investors, unless modified or overridden by the deliberate 
operations of System 2 (Kahneman, 2003). Although investors undertake a conscious  
investment evaluation through the reasoning processes of System 2, investors suffer 
from erroneous intuitive judgments due to the fact that System 2 fails to monitor the 
activities of System 1 adequately (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich and West, 
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2002). High accessibility, the essential characteristic of intuitions, also supports many 
related behavioural finance arguments. Kahneman (2003) argues that framing effects 
are also attributable to the accessible manner by which information is presented, 
although individuals make different choices depending on the emphasis in framing on 
different aspects of information. In Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), utility is defined in terms of gains and losses, defining 
these in terms of ‘changes in value’, rather than of ‘absolute value’. Changes in value 
are relatively more accessible, as they are more easily appreciated by individuals than 
absolute value as discussed in standard utility theory (Kahneman, 2003).  
Individuals’ judgment heuristics can also be explained by their highly accessible 
nature. Further, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) argue that individuals find ‘similarity’ 
more accessible than ‘probability’, and prefer ‘averages’ to ‘sums’. In contrast to the 
rational expectations hypothesis, individuals tend to overweight highly accessible 
values when forming their expectations and this accessibility increases if these values 
have been observed more recently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; 1974). The 
fundamental role of ‘accessibility’ in individuals’ cognitive psychology provides a 
compelling starting point to understanding individual investors’ complex beliefs and 
preferences. Individual investors are prone to judgment biases when they base their 
decisions on their intuitions, trusting their perceptions which come quickly to mind. 
When they face investment choices, e.g. whether to invest in stocks or in bonds, 
avoiding the rigorous mental cognitive process necessary in order to understand the 
trade-off between risks and returns is likely to result in biased judgments. Consequently, 
when considering the two market conundrums which the thesis investigates, it is crucial 
to understand how individuals’ cognitive functions are profoundly determined by their 
risk decisions.  
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2.2 Literature Review on Myopic Loss Aversion 
 
2.2.1 Conception of Myopic Loss Aversion 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) study the historical average equity premium between 
1889 and 1978 in the US, and find a difference between returns on the S&P 500 and 
those on US Treasury bills of about 6%. They argue that this difference is much too 
high to be justified by standard economic models, unless there is implausibly high risk 
aversion among investors. This ‘equity premium puzzle’ (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) is 
regarded similarly in other studies. Extending the studies of Siegel (1992a; 1992b), 
Siegel (2007) argues that the equity premium puzzle continues to be a phenomenon in 
recent history; the geometric average annual returns in stock was 6.8% after correcting 
for inflation for the period 1871-2006 in the US, while the average rate of return on 
short-term government bonds was 2.8% a year. Thus, over the last hundred years, 
stocks have performed extremely well, achieving a premium of 4%. Siegel (2007) also 
argues that over the thirty year period from 1831 to 1861, stocks outperformed both 
short-term and long-term bonds. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) also conclude 
from their study, based on analysis within sixteen countries, that real returns on stocks 
exceed those of bills and bonds, observing this phenomenon in many different countries 
including the US, the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands.   
This persistent equity premium puzzle indicates that the standard finance 
theories based on investor rationality and market efficiency assumptions fail to live up 
to their predictions. Over the long-term, stocks are likely to be attractive investments 
given their high average returns and low covariance with consumption growth; the 
likely rewards are, however, accompanied by high risks which discourage investors 
from holding stocks, leaving a high premium (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Consequently, 
understanding individuals’ perceptions towards risk as well as the judgment biases 
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underpinning their decisions is critical. In order to explain the equity premium puzzle, 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose the notion of Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) based 
on two psychological concepts; loss aversion and mental accounting.  
Loss aversion is the propensity of individuals to be more sensitive to their losses 
than to their gains, and is a core concept of the Prospect Theory developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as an alternative model to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s (1944) expected utility hypothesis as a description of the decision-
making processes of individuals under conditions of uncertainty. In prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), utility is defined in terms of gains and losses rather 
than in terms of the final wealth position, as in Markowitz (1952a), and these gains and 
losses are valued in relation to self-defined reference points, such as the status quo. 
 
Figure 2  Value Function in Prospect Theory  
 





Prospect theory defines the value function for individuals by an S-shaped graph 
as presented in Figure 2, with a kink at the origin, with the kink indicating that 
individuals are very conscious of even marginal changes as evaluated from the 
perspective of their reference points. The slope of the model is identified as concave for 
gains and convex for losses, and displays diminishing sensitivity in both directions; the 
slope is steeper, however, for losses than for gains. This difference in slope is a 
reflection of individuals’ loss aversion. The slope for losses is about twice as steep as 
that for gains, suggesting that the pain experienced by individuals as a result of losing a 
given amount is more than twice the pleasure produced by gaining the same amount. As 
shown by the concavity of the value function, individuals are risk averse in the domain 
of gains, from the perspective of their individual reference points, and as represented by 
its convexity, risk-seeking in the domain of losses.  
Mental accounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) is defined as the way 
individuals think about a problem and is a process undertaken by individuals in order to 
organise, frame, code, categorise, or evaluate the outcomes from each transaction, 
gamble, or asset class separately over time by activating implicit methods such as 
cognitive actions based on their subjective criteria (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; 
Thaler, 1985). Based on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) argue that 
when individuals activate their ‘mental accounting’, gains and losses are evaluated in 
relative rather than in absolute terms, as suggested by standard utility theory.  
More specifically, narrow framing is an important feature of mental accounting 
which describes the tendency of individuals to define each transaction separately rather 
than in terms of their total wealth. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) borrow a story of 
Samuelson (1963), in which mental accounting plays a crucial role, to illustrate the 
notion of myopic loss aversion. 
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Samuelson offered his colleague a bet on a toss of a coin, in which there were 
equal chances of gaining $200 and losing $100. The colleague, however, refused to take 
the bet as he would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain; yet, was willing to 
accept a series of 100 such bets as long as he did not have to watch the bet being 
played out.  
Samuelson (1963) argues that this story illustrates two specific discrepancies of 
human behaviour; firstly, the colleague refused to maximise his expected utility, and 
secondly, if he declined the particular gamble once for any particular wealth level, he 
should have also refused to play a sequence of such gambles (Tversky and Bar-Hillel 
(1983) also discuss this concept of the ‘fallacy of large numbers’).  
Corresponding to the value function of prospect theory where the average 
individual’ loss aversion coefficient is about 2.5 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the 
utility function,U(·), of changes in wealth given Samuelson’s bet to his colleague can 
be described as follows:            
(2.1)                               𝑈(𝑥) =
   𝑥                   𝑥 ≥ 0   
2.5𝑥             𝑥 < 0
                                     
Thus, given the prospect of a single bet of P1 ($200, 0.50; -$100, 0.50), the 
utility of a single bet is unattractive as shown below. 
(2.2)                 𝑈(𝑃1) = 0.50(200) + 0.50 (2.5(−100)) =  −25            
Although Samuelson’s single bet is unattractive to his colleague, the portfolio of 
bets becomes more attractive as the number of bets increases, e.g. when two bets are 
combined, the hypothetical expected utility which assumes that individuals weight their 
losses more than twice as much as their gains become positive, given the prospective 
distribution of P2 ($400, 0.25; $100, 0.50; -$200, 0.25). The utility of two bets being 
played is as below.  
(2.3)        𝑈(𝑃2) = 0.25(400) + 0.50(100) + 0.25 (2.5(−200)) =  25 
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As Samuelson’s colleague avoids watching the bet being played out, he would 
expect to see less chance of facing losses. He also expresses his expectations regarding 
overall gains which may possibly be sufficient to eliminate intermediate losses.  
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that the concept of loss aversion is reflected in 
the sentiment of Samuelson’s colleague, in that he valued his losses greater than his 
gains, while his mental accounting activated when he showed his willingness to accept 
100 bets, without re-evaluating his financial position after each individual bet. This 
example demonstrates that loss averse investors find risky assets less attractive if they 
are evaluated over the short-term, where the concept of myopia is determined by 
‘evaluation frequency’.  
Thus, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that this story highlights the intuition 
behind the notion of myopic loss aversion, i.e. the attractiveness of the risky asset will 
depend on the time horizon of the investors and the frequency of evaluating the 
performance of risky assets. If investors intend to hold risky assets for longer periods 
and evaluate the outcomes less frequently, they will be prepared to hold a greater 
proportion of risky assets in their portfolios.  
Like Samuelson’s colleague, individual investors face a virtually infinite 
number of risky offers in the market in respect of which they are required to make 
decisions simultaneously. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that the attributes or 
intuitions behind individual investors’ decisions are not as simple to measure, or as 
rational, as indicated by expected utility theory. Investors’ subjective reference points, 
one of the key elements in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), and their framing patterns derived from their mental accounting in 
terms of whether they evaluate their portfolios as a whole, or on the basis of each stock 
individually, are also likely to influence their psychology of choice.  
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Given these effects of MLA, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) attempt to identify the 
frequency of evaluating investment portfolios which would make investors indifferent 
between investing all their assets either in stocks or in bonds. Based on their 
simulations, employing samples of historical monthly returns on stocks, bonds, and 
treasury bills obtained from the CRSP
3
, for the period 1926-1990, Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) compute the prospective utility of holding stocks, bonds and T-bills 
stochastically for evaluation periods starting at one month and then increasing by one 
month at a time. Although the CRSP stock index is compared both with T-bill returns 
and with five-year bond returns, in both real and nominal terms, Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) consider that greater weight should be assigned to the comparison between 
stocks and bonds in nominal terms. They find that an evaluation frequency of one year 
makes the size of the equity premium consistent with parameters estimated by prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) determine that an 
investor with an evaluation period of one year actually behaves as if he had a one year 
planning horizon. Assuming that investors adopt an investment horizon of one year, 
they also argue that investors maximize their prospective utility when they hold a 
portfolio mix of 50 per cent stocks and 50 per cent bonds.  
In addition, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) emphasise the importance of 
considering whether institutional investors demonstrate the traits of MLA as well as do 
individual investors. They question why pension funds do not invest a higher 
proportion in stocks, given the virtually infinite time horizon relevant to them. In 
response, they state that MLA in such settings reflects an underlying agency problem. 
While pension funds themselves are generally long-term institutions, the pension fund 
managers are often subject to short-time contract and performance evaluation. There 
                                            
3
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are, therefore, potential conflicts of interest between the manager and the stockholders. 
Similarly, the investments of university foundations and endowments, while made in 
perpetuity, are nevertheless split between stocks and bonds, due to the spending rules 
requiring assured levels of return each year. Thus, stock is less favoured at times of 
volatility in the market.  
 
2.2.2 Previous Experimental Findings on Myopic Loss Aversion 
Consistent with the theoretical arguments of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), several 
studies provide experimental evidence on the effects of MLA. These studies are mainly 
based on three different experiment designs developed respectively by Thaler et al. 
(1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), and Langer and Weber (2008). 
Thaler et al. (1997) examine the conjecture that myopic investors will be more 
willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments infrequently, and also if the 
payoffs are great enough to eliminate losses. Eighty undergraduate students at the 
University of California at Berkeley were recruited to participate in a simulation of a 
series of investment allocations. They were asked to invest 100 shares for multiple 
periods between two funds which differ in terms of return and risk, i.e. one is a stock 
fund and one is a bond fund. Each subject is confronted by the same allocation problem, 
although the test systematically condenses their myopia by randomly allocating them to 
four different evaluation and reallocation scenarios. These are ‘monthly’ (200 trials, 
each trial corresponds to a single period), ‘yearly’ (25 trials, each trial is for eight 
periods), ‘five-yearly’ (5 trials, each trial binds for 40 periods), and ‘inflated monthly’ 
under conditions of high inflation (i.e. the same condition as ‘monthly’ but created by 
adding a constant 10 per cent to the returns of each stock and bond fund, thus subjects 
are assured of positive nominal returns from both funds).  
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The last condition, ‘inflated monthly,’ is designed to test implicitly whether the 
subjects exhibit money illusion by substantially increasing their preference for stocks as 
their experience of losses is eliminated (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997). The 
subjects are committed to make the same allocation and receive feedback over 
committed intervals. At the termination of the experiments, an additional examination 
is included, asking each subject to make a final allocation which will provide no 
intervening feedback, and investigated over a period twice that of previous 
experimental trials (400 trials), thus accounting for two-thirds of the subject's total 
returns from the experiment.  
Thaler et al. (1997) test, firstly, that this statistical aggregation of myopia will 
eliminate the experience of losses, thus inducing a higher willingness to take risks and 
increasing preference for stocks. They test, secondly, that a decision-maker is risk 
neutral in respect of gambles which fall strictly into the domain of either gains or losses, 
but is risk averse in respect of mixed gambles which incorporate some elements of both 
positive and negative outcomes.  
The results of their experiment support both these predictions. Investors 
restricted to less frequent evaluation periods invest a higher proportion in stocks than 
others who are asked to evaluate outcomes more often. The subjects asked to perform 
monthly evaluations demonstrate greater flexibility in decision making, yet perform 
worst in terms of achieved returns, supporting the first prediction. Investors subject to 
conditions of high inflation demonstrate a greater preference for stocks, supporting the 
second prediction. For the final allocation, subjects demonstrate on average the same 
choices for one period at a time. The subjects fail to distinguish the difference between 
deciding on an allocation for 50 years and for a single month, consistent with the 
hypothesis that the subjects are radically myopic.  
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Thaler et al. (1997) also acknowledge that the influence of the mental 
accounting of individual investors can be assessed by investigating how often they 
evaluate their investment portfolios, and how they group their cross-sectional 
transactions, i.e. whether they evaluate one security at a time or their entire portfolio at 
once. Thus, if investors frame decisions narrowly, they will pursue short-term 
approaches rather than adopt long-term strategies, and if investors frame past outcomes 
narrowly, they are likely to evaluate their outcomes more frequently. This is 
inconsistent with the predictions of rational utility maximizing theory which predicts 
that investors should be unaffected by the framing of outcomes.  
Gneezy and Potters (1997) develop an independent experimental test with a 
lottery which has a probability of 2/3 of the participants losing the amount gambled and 
a probability of 1/3 winning two and a half times the amount gambled. For the first part 
of the test, they employ nine sequences of independent rounds of the lottery and 
participants are required to make their choices with an endowed amount of 200 cents. 
For rounds 10 to 12, the second part of the test, subjects no longer receive the benefit of 
endowments, but instead make their investments from money earned from the first part 
of the experiment. Their earnings from the previous nine rounds are summed and 
divided by three for each round in the second part. The crucial feature of this 
experiment is that subjects are divided into two groups; firstly, the subjects in a high 
frequency group (H) receive feedback information, and are able to change their choices 
after each round, while the subjects in the other low frequency group (L) receive 
feedback information, and are only able to adjust their decisions after three rounds with 
the results of these three rounds being aggregated. There are fourteen experimental tests, 
seven for each treatment, and six participants are involved in each betting game, 
making 84 undergraduate students as subjects in total.  
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Gneezy and Potters (1997) believe, similarly to Thaler et al. (1997) that if 
subjects apply longer evaluation intervals, the trade-off between losses and gains in 
such lottery scenarios will be more favourable. From the manipulation of subjects’ 
evaluation periods, they discover that subjects in low frequency groups make more 
risky choices. Similarly, when investors are restricted in terms of adjustment, so called 
‘tying their hands’, they are less inclined to evaluate outcomes anxiously, thus they are 
prevented from withdrawing their investments as a result of occasional setbacks. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) argue that fund managers should take advantage of this 
tendency in their marketing strategies, for example, by manipulating the evaluation 
period of prospective clients. Benartzi and Thaler (1999) similarly argue that the 
framing of investment opportunities, exemplified here by altering the evaluation period, 
will affect the decisions of investors. The decisions of  employees in a pension plan 
who receive yearly returns compared to others who receive a return over 30 years, will 
diverge considerably, confirming the effect of aggregation on risk taking, and the 
influence of ‘narrow framing’ (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). 
Consistent with this thinking, Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) introduced 
policy changes at Israel’s largest mutual fund manager Hapoalim by changing the 
frequency of investment evaluation feedback sent to clients from every month, as in the 
past, to every three months. Thus, Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) claim that by 
providing investors with less frequent information feedback on the performance of 
risky funds, fund managers can present their funds as more attractive.  
Initially, the evaluation frequency of individuals’ portfolios was considered as 
the only driving force of myopia (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Gneezy, Kapteyn, and 
Potters (2003), however, argue that portfolio rebalancing frequency also affects asset 
prices in the same way as evaluation frequency, although these authors fail to 
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distinguish the two effects in their experiments. Subsequently, the experimental studies 
of Langer and Weber (2008), Bellemare et al. (2005) and Fellner and Sutter (2009) 
have attempted to disentangle the distinct effects of evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies separately.  
The empirical research of Langer and Weber (2008) employs a different 
experiment design in order to disentangle the effects of evaluation frequency and 
rebalancing frequency, analysing the contribution of each separately as well as the 
effect of their interactions. Employing 107 finance students as subjects, their 
computerised experiments are undertaken by means of 30 identical gambles. Given an 
initial endowment of €25, subjects face a choice in terms of whether to invest the total 
or a partial amount of their endowed resources in a lottery, which has a 40% probability 
of increasing the investment by 7%, and a 60% probability of decreasing it by 3%. 
Subjects are divided into four different conditions which are classified as (1) high 
evaluation frequency with high rebalancing frequency, (2) high evaluation frequency 
with low rebalancing frequency, (3) low evaluation frequency with high rebalancing 
frequency, and (4) low evaluation frequency with low rebalancing frequency. Langer 
and Weber (2008) determine high frequency in terms of one period and low frequency 
in terms of three periods of gambles in similar fashion to Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
They also hypothesise that rebalancing frequency has an immediate effect from the start 
of the experiment, while evaluation frequency influences investment decisions only 
over time.  
From the results, Langer and Weber (2008) find that, using isolated variables, 
rebalancing frequency has a significant effect while no effect arises from evaluation 
frequency. They demonstrate that there are significant interactions between rebalancing 
frequency and evaluation frequency as the manipulations in combination increase the 
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percentage invested into the risky asset; however, the joint effect is reversed as the 
effect of a low rebalancing period is stronger when the evaluation frequency is high 
than it is when the evaluation frequency is low. Langer and Weber (2008) argue that 
more frequent evaluation is helpful when decisions are fixed for a long period, as the 
manner by which occasional losses are wiped out by larger gains over time, is 
important to investors. Thus Langer and Weber (2008) advise that stock funds should 
require investors to agree to a minimum year-long commitment and should provide 
them with more frequent feedback during this yearly period.  
In addition, Langer and Weber (2008) examine the average allocation patterns 
over time, as previously Camerer and Weber (1992) argue that allocations to risky 
assets generally increase, resulting in risk taking, regardless of the specific treatment of 
myopia, as subjects become familiar with risky situations, and as ambiguity reduces 
over time. By comparing the first and second halves of the experiments for each 
treatment, they find that there is a ‘trend’ for investments made in the second half of the 
experiments to be higher than those made in the first half under three of the four 
conditions, thus supporting the argument of Camerer and Weber (1992).  
Following the previous experimental settings of Gneezy and Potters (1997), 
which consist of a ‘high evaluation frequency with high rebalancing frequency’ 
condition (H), and a ‘low evaluation frequency with rebalancing frequency’ condition 
(L), Bellemare et al. (2005) further include a ‘high evaluation frequency with low 
rebalancing’ condition (M) to disentangle the effects of evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies. They support the findings of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and further argue 
that high evaluation frequency systematically affects investment behaviour despite the 
consequences of manipulating the rebalancing frequency. They believe that the effect 
of myopia can be explained by evaluation frequency alone.  
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This result contrasts with the evidence of Langer and Weber (2008), as they find 
that the average investment under the condition of high evaluation frequency and low 
rebalancing frequency is most effective for risk taking. Bellemare et al. (2005) suggest 
that the different results of prior research may reflect the different experimental 
approaches adopted. Bellemare et al. (2005) follow the prior literature (Gneezy and 
Potters, 1997; Haigh and List, 2005) in applying an additive-based test that allows 
subjects to invest a certain amount for each period and in which the gains and losses of 
one period do not affect the endowments of subjects in subsequent periods. Langer and 
Weber (2008), however, use a multiplicative approach in which investors can transfer 
their initial endowment from period to period, and are allowed to reinvest their returns; 
their work, therefore, provides more realistic settings. Bellemare et al. (2005) suggest 
that while their experiment offers the advantage of comparability with previous works, 
the additive and multiplicative approaches require a more careful comparison by future 
research.  
Following the same experimental procedure as Gneezy and Porter (1997), 
Fellner and Sutter (2009) demonstrate that both evaluation frequency and rebalancing 
frequency have equal impact on risk-taking. Fellner and Sutter (2009) divide their 
subjects into the same four treatments, as applied by Langer and Weber (2008), 
employing a 2-by-2 design for both factors on two distinct levels. Their finding that low 
evaluation frequency and low rebalancing frequency lead to a higher level of 
investment is consistent with previous arguments. Fellner and Sutter (2009) also 
examine the time pattern of investment behaviour, evaluating the aggregate effects of 
MLA by creating a panel regression model. The invested amount is the dependent 
variable, and the levels of evaluation and rebalancing frequencies are the main 
explanatory variables. The model tests how subjects react to past investment returns 
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through identifying the development of investment patterns over time. In line with the 
supposition of loss recovery identified by Staw (1976), Fellner and Sutter (2009) 
observe that subjects seem to react more strongly to most recent outcomes than to their 
accumulated wealth. Subjects invest less after repeated gains, and invest more after 
repeated losses. Their analysis confirms that both evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies influence investment levels significantly and positively. The effects are, 
however, not cumulative as there are significant negative interactions between them. 
Counter-intuitively, investment levels are most affected positively by conditions of high 
evaluation frequency combined with low rebalancing frequency or by low evaluation 
frequency combined with high rebalancing frequency. This result appears to confirm 
that when at least one of either variable is of low frequency, the result is positive for the 
level of risky investments.  
Additionally, Fellner and Sutter (2009) develop their approach of restricting or 
attenuating myopia through looking at the behavioural interventions of investors. The 
majority of their subjects, in general, are found to prefer more rebalancing flexibility 
and more frequent evaluation. Fellner and Sutter (2009) thus include an additional 
condition informing subjects of the higher average payoff from low evaluation or low 
rebalancing frequency in order to encourage their subjects to switch to more rewarding 
regimes at small cost. Results reveal, however, that when subjects switch, this is from 
low levels of frequency to high levels. This amendment to the experiment fails to cause 
a strong shift of subjects’ preferences. Fellner and Sutter (2009), however, find that 
even with the imposition of small charges, about 75% of subjects retain a long time 
horizon, in respect of their initial choices, and about 66% of subjects retain a low 
evaluation frequency. This result suggests that the imposition of small charges is a 
feasible behavioural intervention.  
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Despite all previous experimental studies on MLA having determined the 
experimental conditions for their subjects exogenously, i.e. without having regard to 
their subjects’ own preferences, Fellner and Sutter (2009) introduce an endogenous 
condition where subjects have the autonomy of choosing their rebalancing and 
evaluation frequencies. Fellner and Sutter (2009) allocate subjects to either the 
endogenous and exogenous condition. Under the endogenous condition, subjects 
choose their rebalancing and evaluation frequencies, while under the exogenous 
condition; subjects are allocated particular rebalancing and evaluation frequencies 
according to a schema of varying levels of both frequencies.  
Fellner and Sutter (2009) argue that myopic symptoms tend to prevail under 
both endogenous and exogenous conditions; subjects, nevertheless, exhibit different 
reactions under each of these two conditions. Under the endogenous condition, 
investors generally invest more, and both evaluation and rebalancing frequencies have 
considerably smaller effects than in the exogenous condition. Thus, identifying an 
endogenous choice indicates less negative impact resulting from myopia. Additionally, 
endogenous subjects invest less after a number of very recent wins; however, they 
invest more after experiencing wins throughout all previous rounds, which is known as 
the ‘house money effect’ (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). In contrast, subjects under the 
exogenous condition invest more passively and seem unaffected by their past 
investment experience. Overall, Fellner and Sutter (2009) conclude that the results of 
most previous MLA studies may represent the upper limit effect of MLA as real world 
investors choose their rebalancing and evaluation frequencies autonomously.    
 Previous empirical research on MLA mainly focuses on experiments with 
students as a means of investigating individual investors’ investment behaviour. Most 
individual investors, however, rely on financial advisors or professionals when making 
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their investment decisions due to their lack of experience and knowledge of the market. 
Given the increasing market participation of individual investors via pension and 
mutual funds, the role of financial advisors and professionals is becoming ever more 
important, providing a link between these individual investors and markets. It is 
consistent with these developments that the more recent studies of Haigh and List (2005) 
and of Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) further expand the domain of experiments, including 
market professionals and financial advisors as subjects in order to estimate their risk 
preferences as well as those of students. Haigh and List (2005) undertake a field 
experiment with professional traders, applying a test which is identical to that of 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). They recruit professional traders from the Chicago Board of 
Trade including brokers, floor managers, market reporters, futures and options traders 
as well as undergraduate students, and investigate whether or not professionals’ 
behavioural responses exhibit discrepancies similar to those of students. Haigh and List 
(2005) discover that anomalistic behaviour occurs to a higher degree among 
professional traders than it does   among students.  
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) similarly study the hypothetical investment 
behaviour of 50 professional financial advisors from the Norwegian bank SR-Bank. 
Based on the experiment designed by Gneezy and Potters (1997), they find that, 
consistent with the results of Haigh and List (2005), financial advisors exhibit MLA to 
a greater extent than do students. The findings of these studies are important since 
financial advisors and market professionals often have considerable influence on 
individual investors’ financial decision-making. The negative effects of MLA on 
professionals’ investment behaviour also reinforce the potential role of fund managers 
in revealing information infrequently.   
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Additionally, Sutter (2007), applying the experiment of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997), investigates whether team decision-making,  in contrast to investment decision-
making by individual investors,  attenuates or eliminates the effects of MLA . They find 
that although teams make significantly more risky choices than do individuals, teams 
are also prone to MLA. They support the argument that there is possible attenuation of 
the effects of MLA as a result of team decision-making, as opposed to that of 
individuals, though MLA seems to be a general feature which also affects team 
decision-making.  
Motivated by previous studies, Chapter Three of the thesis explains the 
influences of MLA on individual investors’ actual portfolio allocation decision-making. 
Unlike previous studies which are largely based on experiments in laboratory settings, 
Chapter Three adopts a novel approach by employing a panel survey dataset which 
provides detailed information on investors’ asset allocations. In terms of the literature, 
the chapter enhances the previous research by providing robust evidence for the 
empirical validity of the effects of MLA.  
 
2.3 Literature Review on Individuals’ Expectations 
 
2.3.1 Literature Review on Stockholding Puzzle 
 
In a similar vein to the Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985), 
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) address the Stockholding Puzzle asking why so few 
households hold stocks despite the high historical equity premium. In their study, they 
argue that only about 25% of American households, representing all income groups, 
make direct investments in stocks. This phenomenon is observed similarly by King and 
Leape (1987) and Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). As previously discussed, standard 
economic theories, based on expected utility maximisation, suppose that almost all 
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individuals invest in stocks given the high rate of returns. The existing empirical studies, 
however, reveal that is not the case.  
These aforementioned studies are, however, based on datasets on US 
households, which cover the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of the 1990s, a considerable 
increase in stock market participation is observed, especially in countries such as the 
USA and Sweden, in which about 50 per cent of households participate either directly 
or indirectly in the stock market. This transition resulted from the buoyant performance 
of stock markets in the 1990s, and from a proliferation of newly introduced financial 
instruments, incorporating reduced transactions, entry and information costs and which 
invited individuals to participate in mutual funds or retirements accounts easily (Guiso, 
Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2002, 2003). However, given the volatile performance of stock 
prices in the 21
st
 century, this shift in stock market participation rates could be viewed 
as transitory, and high proportions of households in other countries still do not 
participate in the stock market. According to Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002, 
2003), stock market participation rates in the Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany 
are between 15 per cent and 25 per cent
4
. These low participation rates continue to 
highlight the stockholding puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).  
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) consider several possible reasons for this puzzle in 
their study, and argue that even moderate inertia, arising mainly from cultural factors 
such as race, gender, education or marital status, as well as costly information, can deter 
stockholding. Individuals lack knowledge of the stockholding process and are 
unfamiliar with the stock market, most especially with foreign markets. Haliassos and 
Bertaut (1995) also find that departures from expected-utility maximisation explain the 
                                            
4
 There are a growing number of studies which compare stockholdings across countries and which try to 
explain discrepancies in their respective stock market participation rates. For example, studies such as 
Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2011; 2012) take account of both country and household 
characteristics. However, their datasets do not take account of up-to-date information on stockholding 
rates across countries.   
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puzzle, as many households are not willing to trade any degree of risk for higher 
expected returns. While the existence of a wedge between borrowing and lending rates, 
and the size of minimum-investment requirements both provide plausible explanations, 
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) argue that risk aversion on its own, heterogeneity of 
beliefs, habit persistence, and borrowing constraints all fail to explain the puzzle.  
In response to the argument of Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), many studies 
propose alternative explanations for the stock holding puzzle. Studying the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) of US households, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) assesses the 
reasons for stock market nonparticipation. She finds that fixed transactions costs inhibit 
stock market participation and this supposition is supported by the higher trading 
frequencies of wealthy households. Based on her estimations, half of the stock market 
nonparticipation can be explained sufficiently by a modest transaction cost of 50 
dollars. Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) similarly argue that even small amounts of 
fixed costs incurred on entering the stock market, including information gathering 
costs, sign-up fees, and investor inertia, deter households’ stockholding. 
Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2010) draw attention to the conflicting 
results of previous research using discount brokerage accounts and retirement accounts, 
respectively. For instance, Barber and Odean (2000) witness investors’ excessive 
trading based on discount brokerage accounts, while inactive trading in a large 401(k) 
plan is observed by Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003). Subsequently, Bilias, 
Georgarakos and Haliassos (2010) investigate the effect of household portfolio inertia 
based on population-wide datasets extracted from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) as well as from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). They find a significant 
link between portfolio inertia and household characteristics such as low level of 
education and limited resources. They argue that the downturn seems to have 
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encouraged households to stay out, rather than to get out of the market. Furthermore, 
Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2010) argue that overtrading patterns in brokerage 
accounts are observed because owners invest only small fractions of their wealth in 
brokerage accounts. They support the idea of including provision for built-in trading as 
a default option in retirement funds in order to offset individuals’ widespread inertia.  
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Hong, Kubik, and 
Stein (2004) argue that social interaction affects stock market participation, arguing that 
‘social’ investors, defined as those who interact with their neighbours or attend church, 
find stocks to be a more attractive investment option than do ‘non-social’ investors 
when the participation level of their peers is high. Based on the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010) 
measure three indicators of cognitive ability including mathematical ability, verbal 
fluency, and recall skills, for individuals aged fifty plus in eleven European countries. 
They argue that there is a significant association between individuals’ cognitive 
abilities and their stockholding in terms of both direct stockholding and indirect market 
participation through mutual funds and retirement accounts.  
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) argue that there is a negative effect on 
individuals’ stock market participation rates which arises from a general lack of trust. 
Less trusting individuals avoid investments fearing that they may be ‘cheated’. They 
also find a significant relationship between country specific characteristics in respect of 
‘trust’ and limited stock market participation nationally. 
Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) investigate the effect of individuals’ 
financial literacy on their financial decision-making. They submit questions to the 
Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) which evaluate individuals’ basic 
financial knowledge including numeracy, inflation and interest rates, as well as more 
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advanced financial knowledge relating to market instruments such as stocks, bonds, and 
mutual funds. They find a significant positive relationship between high financial 
literacy and stock market participation rates.  
There are several studies which elicit individuals’ expectations of stock market 
returns based on survey responses in order to explain their stockholdings (Vissing-
Jørgensen, 2003; Dominitz and Manski, 2007). Following the arguments of Hurd (2009) 
and Manski (2004), the studies of Hurd, Van Rooij, and Winter (2011) and Kézdi and 
Willis (2009) support the proposition that individuals’ or households’ beliefs about 
future stock market returns have a fundamental influence on the forward-looking 
economic models which they apply in their investment decision-making.  
Despite the homogeneous expectation assumption of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), whereby investors apply the same economic 
model in forming their expectations as to trade-offs between return and risk, these 
studies develop the notion that investors’ expectations are heterogeneous. The rationale 
is based on the argument of Hong and Stein (2007) who claim that disagreements 
among investors arise due to them applying different economic models. These models 
lead their interpretations to diverge from each other, despite simultaneously available 
public information. Hurd (2009) similarly posits that heterogeneity in beliefs is due to 
investors accessing and processing publicly available information differently from each 
other, rather than as a result of them holding private information.  
Similarly, Dominitz and Manski (2011) investigate the beliefs of US individuals 
as to equity returns, for one year ahead, in probabilistic terms. They define the 
population by their expectations types as described in finance literature; random-walk 
(RW) type, individuals who employ historical market returns to predict future returns 
since such individuals believe that stock returns are independent and identically 
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distributed over time; persistence (P) type, who predict that recent stock price 
movements will persist in the near future; and mean-reversion (MR) type, who expect a 
reversion of the current stock market direction in the near future. Dominitz and Manski 
(2011) determine which category individuals fall into by looking at the relationship 
between individuals’ expectations and market returns. Individuals of the RW type 
should be invariant to recent stock market performance and should exhibit persistent 
expectations over time; after higher market returns, the P type should reveal higher 
forecasts of future returns, while the MR type should generate lower forecasts for future 
returns. Dominitz and Manski (2011) find that the central tendency of their expectations 
takes the form of persistence; however, they argue that individuals may apply different 
models through time, and that examining only the central tendency is inadequate as a 
means of understanding the ‘full story’ of how individuals form expectations.  
Based on their overall findings, Dominitz and Manski (2011) argue that 
individuals undertake ‘interpersonally variable’ but ‘intrapersonally stable’ processes 
when forming their expectations. They argue that the heterogeneity of individuals’ 
expectations varies systematically with gender, age, and schooling, and is stable over 
time. Furthermore, these specific demographic effects do not affect the way that 
different individuals (RW, P, and MR) revise expectations as the scale of these 
demographical clusters is similar across the three expectation types.  
In response to the stockholding puzzle of Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Vissing-
Jørgensen (2003) analyses investors’ beliefs and their actions based on the household 
level data collected by the USB/Gallup monthly telephone surveys which were 
undertaken with over 1,000 investors for each month from June 1998 to December 
2002. Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) finds that investors’ beliefs are correlated with their 
investment choices. Investors who expect higher stock returns hold higher proportions 
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of equity in their portfolios, thus suggesting that understanding beliefs is in fact useful 
for the understanding of prices.  
Dominitz and Manski (2007) measure the beliefs of US households about equity 
returns for one year ahead in probabilistic terms, and compare these with their portfolio 
choices. Highlighting the popularity of ‘life-cycle’ funds in the US, they challenge the 
life-cycle investment strategy whereby individuals’ risk preferences vary systematically 
with age. They suppose that individuals adopt a more conservative approach to stock 
holding as they become more risk-averse with age, and that this systematic pattern 
should apply similarly to their expectations. Their argument contrasts with those of 
Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969), who both discern a consistency in individuals’ 
level of risk-aversion as well as in their optimal portfolio allocation.  
Dominitz and Manski (2007) find substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ 
reported beliefs; individuals hold more conservative investment portfolios as they age 
due to their pessimistic views on future equity returns; men are more aggressive in 
forming their expectations as they are more optimistic about the stock market than are 
women. Marital status matters for decisions to participate in the stock market as, in the 
case of married individuals, decisions are made by two individuals with higher wealth 
than single investors, other things being equal. Dominitz and Manski (2007) argue that 
systematic disparities between individuals as to expected returns are reflected similarly 
in the respective stock holdings of these individuals.  
Furthermore, Dominitz and Manski (2007) consider the substantial proportion 
of households who hold no risky assets. They believe that those who do not hold risky 
assets distrust the existence of an equity premium. Under the standard two-asset model, 
risk-averse individuals will invest in risky assets only if their subjective means of stock 
market return expectations exceeds the risk-free rate. Dominitz and Manski (2007) 
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conclude that the probability of holding stocks increases with households’ perceived 
increases as to future stock returns.  
Hurd et al., (2011) also conclude in their study that individuals’ pessimistic views 
on the stock market, together with their perceptions as to the risks of holding stocks, 
explain the stock holding puzzle sufficiently without any need to invoke very high 
levels of risk aversion. However, based on the argument of Haliassos and Bertaut 
(1995), heterogeneity in belief does not appear to explain the stockholding puzzle, as 
they state in their paper that:   
Heterogeneity of opinions is not promising, since what is required is the 
perception that a premium exists, not that it is of a particular magnitude (pp.1114).  
The motivation of Chapter Four derives from the difference in understanding 
between the current literature which argues that heterogeneous stock market 
expectations alone explain the stockholding puzzle adequately, and the concern raised 
by Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), to the effect that it is crucial to identify whether 
investors hold the perception that a premium exists. Individuals may face the same risk-
free rate in the market, while perceiving the uncertainty over equity returns differently 
from each other since they implicitly employ both different risk measures and different 
benchmarks (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008). In particular, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, 
and Shapiro (1997) and Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) both recognise that the 
heterogeneous effects of risk aversion significantly determine individuals’ portfolio 
allocation decisions. 
Chapter Four presents a study which identifies the variations in individuals’ 
perceptions over future stock returns by investigating the effect of individuals’ risk 
aversion in explaining their stockholding decisions. 
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2.3.2 Biases in Individuals’ Expectations Formation 
The process by which individuals form their expectations is a fundamental 
component in any economic choice model. In the stock market, particularly, where 
many different individuals interact while seeking to achieve their own personal 
objectives, knowledge of how others form their expectations is crucial.  
In contrast to the rational expectations arguments fundamental to standard 
economic theories, the behavioural finance approach builds on cognitive psychology 
theories grounded in the extensive experimental evidence demonstrating that investors’ 
expectations are far from rational (Thaler, 1999a). Investors often put too much weight 
on the latest information, and put too little weight on the base rate, e.g. the historical 
average; in consequence, they tend to overact to instant market changes (De Bondt, 
1993; 1998). Such behaviour is encapsulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1971; 1974) 
in their definition of ‘representativeness heuristic’. The effect of a heuristic is described 
as follows: 
People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 p. 1124).  
Hirshleifer (2001) argues that many investors often implement rules-of-thumb, 
and exhibit heuristic biases due to limited time and cognitive resources. Similarly, De 
Bondt (1993) and Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that stock prices are not driven 
solely by economic fundamentals, but rather by ‘trend chasers’, and investors’ 
systematic misperception of market values. De Bondt (1993; 1998) finds that investors’ 
general predictions as to the direction of share price movements in the near future are 
influenced by the most recent price changes. Investors become bullish in respect of 
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their expectations as to future market returns following a rise in the market index, and 
become bearish after the index falls. The impact of index movements is larger when 
these are more recent.  De Bondt (1993; 1998) concludes that unsophisticated investors 
expect perceptible trends in prices to continue, naively extrapolating from past price 
trends. This spectacle has been configured as the extrapolation bias, which is an 
application of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) in 
cognitive psychology which encapsulate the tendency of individuals to put too much 
weight on the most recent history, while failing to place sufficient weight on 
information derived from the broader picture of history, and what it represents. Such 
individuals are vulnerable to the latest news and forgetful of base-rate information.  
Arrow (1982) states that the effect of extrapolation bias precisely typifies the 
excessive reaction to current information in the stock market as identified within excess 
security prices volatility patterns. Economists, however, argue that judgment errors are 
applied independently by individuals, thus cancelling out in equilibrium. If such 
heuristics are shared by most people, the popular models which individuals apply in 
forming their expectations are not the same as the oversimplified expectation models 
proposed by economists (Shiller, 1990). The variability of people’s expectations of 
future events is, in fact, less than the true variability, contrasting with the Bayesian 
normative approach (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). 
Thus, the fundamental axioms of rationality are often violated by individual investors, 
and their violations are systematic, thus supporting the ‘bounded rationality’ models 
proposed by Simon (1982).  
De Bondt (1993), however, observes contrasting results in the forecasts obtained 
from ‘experts’ in financial markets and from novices, respectively. Experts tend to 
predict negative returns after bull markets and unusually large positive returns after 
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bear markets. The majority of experts expect large price reversal, which is consistent 
with the views of intuitive contrarians, who believe in stock price mean-reversion. This 
result contrasts with Welch’s (2000; 2001) findings based on surveys with 226 finance 
professors, in that he demonstrates that even experts are vulnerable to extrapolation 
bias. Welch (2000) asks these professors to predict the equity risk premium during the 
bull market between 1997 and 1998, and they predict that over the next 30 years, the 
equity risk premium will be 7.2% on average. After experiencing the market crash in 
2000, Welch (2001) asks those professors the same question again, this time identifying 
an average predicted equity premium of 5.5%. Nevertheless, these professors indicate 
within the survey that they believe that market returns follow a mean-reverting process. 
The effects of extrapolation bias in individuals’ expectations as to future 
financial variables are found in other literature. Shiller (1990) argues that investors, and 
also home owners in the market, appear to extrapolate from recent past price trends by 
means of their short-term memory alone, failing to learn from their long term past 
experiences. Based on his studies on the US and Japanese stock market crashes in 
October 1987, as well as on real estate ‘booms’ in the US, he finds that individuals in 
‘boom’ cities believe that large price increases experienced during the preceding year 
will continue indefinitely. Thus, he argues that extrapolation bias is a key feature 
underpinning the popular models shared by most investors. Furthermore, strikingly 
different results are found across cities demonstrating that extrapolation bias is a 
phenomenon which is independent of local markets, but dependent on the different 
experiences of individuals. He concludes that the experience of a local real estate 
‘boom’ inclines people to the use of a popular model that leads to such illusions.  
In his survey on foreign exchange rate forecasts, Ito (1990) argues that market 
agents form ‘bandwagon’ expectations regarding the short-term future, although 
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stabilising their expectations in respect of the long-term future. This result has been 
reemphasised by De Bondt (1993; 1998) in suggesting that investors distinguish 
intuitively between temporary and permanent price movements. He supposes that 
investors’ views in respect of the short-term exhibit static expectations, while for the 
long-term they tend to exhibit regressive expectations. De Bondt (1993; 1998) finds 
that his subjects’ expectations as to company returns for the following year are 
positively related to realised market returns; expectations as to future returns for a ten 
year period, however, are more stable than expectations as to future returns for a one 
year period. Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003), and Lee, O’Brien and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2008) also find that investors’ expectations as to company growth 
rates and operating performance exhibit a positive relationship with market movements. 
Similarly, Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct a survey study with chief financial 
officers (CFOs) and find the same results.  
Ito (1990) also detects wide disagreements among respondents confirming 
significant ‘individual effects’ in that the responses of individuals are significantly 
different from those of other individuals. The distribution is long tailed and 
heterogeneous traits are extensively associated with individuals characterised by 
associations with specific industry groupings. For example, exporters are the most 
biased toward Yen depreciation, while individuals from trading companies and 
importers are the most biased toward Yen appreciation. Consequently, Ito (1990) 
defines these variations as due to individuals’ ‘wishful expectations’.  
Das and van Soest (1997; 1999) reject the rational expectations hypothesis 
based on their investigation of Dutch households’ subjective expectations as to future 
income changes.  Das and van Soest (1997; 1999) find that households’ expectations 
are heavily influenced by realised income changes in the past, i.e. individuals who have 
47 
 
experienced a reduction in income are more pessimistic than others, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, households’ expectations are compared with realised income changes in 
the following year, and those who have experienced a decrease in income 
underestimate their future income substantially. Das and van Soest (1997) argue that, in 
general, there is a positive correlation between actual income level and expected 
income change. The age and labour market status of the head and spouse of households 
significantly affects household expectations. Furthermore, Das and van Soest (1999), 
based on their analysis of the panel dataset, find that expected income changes are 
significantly correlated with labour status, family composition and the perpetual income 
of households.  
In addition to investigating stock market nonparticipation, Vissing-Jørgensen 
(2003) also investigates whether her evidence supports previously suggested 
behavioural asset pricing model assumptions and attempts to build a unified 
behavioural model explaining both short-term under-reaction and long-term over-
reaction in asset-pricing on the basis of the psychology of  representative investors. In 
particular, Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) focuses on whether wealthy investors exhibit 
behavioural biases which may explain non-standard beliefs and actions that are unlikely 
to be due to information or transactions costs.  
Using a series of questions, she investigates investors’ own investment past 
returns and their outlook as to their own future returns. She also analyses investors' 
perceptions about the current valuation of the stock market and their expectations as to 
its future valuation.  Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) reaches the following conclusions: First, 
even wealthy investors expect high returns at the peak of the market, suggesting that 
their forecasts are strongly associated with preceding market returns. Second, most 
investors believe that the market was overvalued during the last two years of the dot-
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com boom, although, despite this, only about 20% of investors believed that the market 
would decline over the next three-months or one year. Third, investors’ beliefs in 
respect of future market returns are heavily dependent on their own past investment 
experience. This result suggests a version of the law of small numbers (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1971; Barberis et al, 1998; Rabin, 2002), which refers to the decision bias 
reflecting investors’ beliefs that their recent experiences represent the market pattern as 
a whole. Fourth, the dependence of beliefs on personal past portfolio performance is 
asymmetric, consistent with theories of self-attribution bias (Daniel et al., 1998). 
Investors who experience high returns tend to attribute the results to their own skills; 
however, when the opposite is experienced, this is simply attributed to misfortune. This 
argument also supports the notion that investors’ overconfidence prevents them from 
formulating a realistic assessment of their own abilities. Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) 
emphasises that those expectations biases affect not only less wealthy, less educated, 
and less experienced investors, but also are strongly featured among high-wealth 
investors, thus creating a substantial pricing impact. 
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion of Literature Review  
 
Individuals often suffer from judgment biases since they make their financial 
decisions based on mistaken ‘intuitions’ which are not adequately modified or 
predetermined by a more deliberate mode of cognitive operation, ‘reasoning’. Previous 
literature on Behavioural Finance is based on the bounded rationality assumption of 
Simon (1982). According to De Bondt’s (1998) ‘sorry’ picture of individual investors, 
their perceptions of asset prices and trading practices reflect various classes of anomaly. 
Many individual investors are short-term oriented, exhibiting excessive optimism or 
pessimism over time, and trade in suboptimal ways, holding undiversified portfolios 
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(De Bondt, 1993; 1998). Shiller (1990) similarly argues that individual investors tend to 
rely heavily on naïve patterns based on past price changes, holding ‘popular models’ of 
value. 
Previous literature on the persistent equity premium (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) 
and the stockholding puzzles (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), indicates that standard 
finance theories based on investor rationality and market efficiency assumptions fail to 
live up to their predictions. Although stocks are likely to be attractive investments over 
the long-term, given their high average returns and low covariance with consumption 
growth, individual investors are reluctant to hold stocks due to the high risks which 
accompany the premium (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).  
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose the notion of Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) 
based on two psychological concepts; loss aversion and mental accounting as a 
response to the question of why, unless individuals’ risk aversion levels are implausibly 
high, the average equity premium remains so high. The MLA arguments of Benartzi 
and Thaler (1995) are further supported by many previous experimental studies 
including Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), Bellemare et al. (2005), 
Langer and Weber (2008) and Fellner and Sutter (2009), which argue that if investors 
evaluate and rebalance their investment portfolios infrequently, they will be more 
willing to hold stocks.  
Previous literature on the effect of MLA is mainly based on experiments (such 
as Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Bellemare et al., 2005; Langer and 
Weber; 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009). The thesis makes a novel contribution by 
evaluating the effects of MLA on investors’ real investment allocations, obtaining 
information on individual investors. This approach is free from the limitations faced by 
experimental studies and identifies the true effects of MLA on real investors.  
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Individuals’ stockholding decisions are also determined extensively by their 
distinct beliefs and preferences, which are often biased and, at the same time, 
heterogeneous. Thus individuals hold virtually independent financial portfolios from 
each other. In addition to many alternative explanations for the stock holding puzzle 
(Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), including fixed entry or transaction costs (Vissing-
Jørgensen, 2002; Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003); social interactions (Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein, 2004), cognitive ability (Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2010), trust (Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008), inertia (Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos, 2010) and 
financial literacy (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011; 2012), the arguments based 
on heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003; Dominitz and Manski, 
2007) are reviewed in-depth.  
Previous literature finds that investors’ beliefs as to future stock market returns 
are correlated with their investment decisions, thus supporting the notion that 
understanding investors’ beliefs is crucial to understanding stock prices and that the 
heterogeneity of their beliefs is significantly correlated with their personal 
characteristics (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003; Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al., 
2011). Previous studies on individuals’ heterogeneous beliefs demonstrate a lack of 
emphasis on individuals’ risk preferences. Consequently, to achieve comprehensive 
understanding of the close relationship between individuals’ beliefs and preferences, the 
thesis considers the effect of risk aversion on individuals’ stock market returns 
expectations. Further, this literature review chapter discusses previous research findings, 
supported by cognitive psychology theories, on individuals’ violation of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Understanding the process by which individuals form their 
expectations is fundamental to understanding how their financial decisions differ in the 
market where many different individuals interact.   
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Chapter 3 Myopic Loss Aversion and 
Stock Investments: An Empirical Study 






Myopic loss aversion was suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as the main 
explanation for the equity premium puzzle. We investigate the impact of myopic loss 
aversion on actual investment decisions of 400 Dutch individual investors, covered by 
the Dutch National Bank Household Survey. We find that higher loss aversion is 
associated with a lower share of investments in risky assets. The investors also tend to 
self-select relatively high evaluation frequency. The combination of short investment 
horizon and high loss aversion leads to significantly lower levels of risky investments, 
confirming the main prediction of the myopic loss aversion theory. The effect of 
myopia is strongest when both evaluation and rebalancing frequencies are high. We 
also find that less myopic individuals increase their investment over time, although this 






3.1 Introduction  
 
 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) first suggested that myopic loss aversion (MLA) 
could explain the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Because the 
risk aversion levels of investors alone cannot explain the abnormally large equity 
premium, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose the MLA concept, which combines the 
behavioural concepts of loss aversion and mental accounting. MLA is the tendency of 
investors, who are loss averse and observe their intermediate losses frequently, to invest 
less in equities as a consequence. Using simulations, Benartzi and Thaler argue that if 
investors evaluate their portfolios annually, the size of the equity premium is consistent 
with parameters estimated in prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Supporting this argument, the experimental studies of Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), and Haigh and List (2005) find that when evaluation frequencies are 
reduced, subjects increase their investment levels in risky assets.  
The concept of myopia was originally developed using portfolio evaluation 
frequency; however, Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003) suggest rebalancing 
frequency as another important proxy for myopia. Consequently, several experimental 
studies have tried to disentangle the effects of evaluation and rebalancing frequencies, 
though their findings conflict to some extent. Bellemare et al. (2005) argue that 
evaluation frequency alone can determine the effect of myopia, while Langer and 
Weber (2008) find that rebalancing frequency is the only driving force. Fellner and 
Sutter (2009) conclude that both variables contribute to the effects of myopia. In 
addition, in a multi-period experimental setting, Fellner and Sutter (2009) show that 
their subjects have a clear preference for more frequent feedback and rebalancing. 
Previous studies on MLA are mostly based on experiments, using students as 
subjects for investment allocation simulations. However, there are a number of reasons 
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why analysing the decisions made by real investors may be preferable to relying only 
on experimental results. First of all, the monetary returns from experiments are very 
small compared to the returns from real-life investment decisions. The implications of 
winning or losing a gamble in an experiment are almost negligible for the participants’ 
lifetime expected utility. Secondly, awarding people a reward for their choices creates 
an endowment effect; this has been shown by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) 
to distort the subjects’ decisions. Thirdly, the subjects used in such studies (most 
frequently, undergraduate students) are often very different from the population of 
investors in terms of their experience, knowledge, wealth and demographics.  
Finally, in real life, investors often have control over the important variables 
that are treated as exogenous in the experimental studies on myopic loss aversion. 
Fellner and Sutter (2009) show that, for example, giving the subjects control over their 
investment horizon and feedback frequency can change the observed effect of myopia 
on the investment choices. Thus the previous studies have been successful in 
identifying the existence of myopic loss aversion in laboratory settings. Nevertheless, 
we do not know with certainty whether these results would affect the decision-making 
processes of real investors.  
In this chapter, we fill this gap by measuring myopic loss aversion for a 
representative cross-section of individuals, and testing its effects on their actual 
investments in risky assets
5
. Our second contribution is in explicitly accounting for the 
joint effects of myopia and loss aversion, rather than merely studying them in isolation. 
Examining these two effects together is important because the entire concept of myopic 
loss aversion is built on the interaction of loss aversion and myopia. To the best of our 
                                            
5 The only study that comes close to analysing these issues on real-life data is that of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010) who exclusively focus on loss aversion as an explanation for household portfolio 
choice. However, they do not address the effects of investors’ myopia.  
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knowledge, this is the first empirical study of myopic loss aversion which incorporates 
the effects of both investors’ myopia and loss aversion. 
Following Benartzi and Thaler (1995), we define MLA as a combination of 
individual investors’ levels of myopia and loss aversion. To measure the level of 
myopia, we survey investors on both their evaluation and rebalancing frequencies. We 
also include questions which identify investors’ reference points and framing patterns 
in line with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). The survey results are combined with the annual Dutch National Bank 
Household Survey (DHS), conducted on the same individuals, which enables us to 
determine investors’ loss aversion level based on their responses to hypothetical 
intertemporal questions. The DHS also includes information on investors’ asset 
allocation, their background characteristics (income and demographic), and their 
subjective measures of risk aversion and time preference.  
Our findings strongly support the myopic loss aversion effect in individual 
investment behaviour and suggest that the simulations results of Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) are based on plausible assumptions, with a median investor in our sample 
evaluating her investment results quarterly, although rebalancing the portfolio less than 
once a year. This result is also in line with the experiment of Fellner and Sutter (2009), 
who find that most subjects display a strong preference for high evaluation frequency 
and a somewhat less pronounced preference for short investment horizons. We find 
significant negative effects of myopic loss aversion on the proportion of individual 
portfolios invested in risky financial assets. These effects are driven by both loss 
aversion and myopia factors. Among highly loss averse individuals, the combination of 
frequent evaluation and high portfolio rebalancing frequency leads to relatively low 
levels of investments in risky financial assets, supporting the laboratory findings of 
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Langer and Weber (2008). This result is also consistent with Fellner and Sutter (2009), 
who find that both evaluation and rebalancing frequencies play an important role in 
myopic loss aversion. When we investigate the changes in the share of portfolios 
allocated to risky financial assets, the effect of myopia dominates the influence of loss 
aversion on investors’ decisions. Investors who evaluate their holdings less frequently 
tend to increase their holdings over time compared to those who check their 
performance at least monthly. The result whereby infrequent evaluations lead to an 
increase in risky investments over time stands after we control for the changes in the 
level of investments due to stock market fluctuations.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss 
previous literature in the area of MLA and introduce our main hypotheses. In Section 3 
we explain our survey data collection procedure and provide details on how our 
variables are constructed. In Section 4 we present the models and empirical results of 
the study. Finally, we summarise and conclude our study in Section 5. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
The equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) focuses on the 
abnormally high difference between the returns on the S&P 500 and default-free 
Treasury bills in the US between 1889 and 1978. The historical average equity 
premium of 6% is too high to be justified by standard economic models, unless there is 
an implausibly high level of risk aversion among investors.  
As an answer to this puzzle, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose the concept of 
myopic loss aversion (MLA), which describes the tendency of loss averse investors to 
evaluate their portfolios too frequently and consequently to invest too little in risky 
assets. This notion is based on two behavioural concepts, loss aversion and mental 
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accounting; these are fundamental to the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) on decision-making under uncertainty.  
Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) simulations show that to make the size of the 
historical equity premium consistent with the theory, an investor should evaluate his 
portfolio annually, and that an equal proportion of stocks and bonds would maximise 
his prospective utility. Experimental studies have supported their argument. Thaler et al. 
(1997) replicate a series of investment allocations between two assets, which differ in 
risk, such as stocks and bonds. Their results confirm that the subjects who are under the 
less frequent evaluation condition invest a higher proportion in stocks than those who 
evaluate their investment results more frequently. They also create a situation of high 
inflation, by adding a constant to the returns of stocks and bonds, thus ensuring positive 
returns. The results reveal that subjects, who do not observe losses, substantially 
increase their preference for stocks, thus exhibiting money illusion (Shafir, Diamond, 
and Tversky, 1997).  
Gneezy and Potters (1997) find that if subjects are restricted in investment 
adjustment, they are less inclined to evaluate outcomes anxiously, thus preventing them 
from withdrawing their investments over occasional setbacks. Undertaking the same 
experiment as Gneezy and Potters (1997), both Haigh and List (2005) and Eriksen and 
Kvaløy (2010) find that the adverse effects of MLA are observed to an even higher 
extent among professional traders and financial advisors than they are among students.  
Similarly, Sutter (2007) manipulates the study of Gneezy and Potters (1997) in 
order to compare investment decisions between teams and individuals by forming three 
individuals into one team. He finds a persistent influence of MLA on the decisions of 
teams; although teams’ decisions exhibit attenuated MLA by making much higher 
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investments than individuals, they are still prone to MLA. He concludes that MLA is a 
valid explanation for the equity premium puzzle regardless of types of decision maker.  
Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003) add market interactions to their 
experiments, allowing their subjects to buy and sell an asset freely by submitting bids 
and offers. They observe that the frequency of rebalancing a portfolio affects the asset 
prices in the same way as evaluation frequency, which was initially considered as the 
only driving force of myopia. Subsequently, a number of experimental studies have 
tried to disentangle the effects of evaluation and rebalancing frequencies.  
Bellemare et al. (2005) follow the experimental approach of Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), but divide the subjects into three groups to disentangle the effect of 
evaluation frequency from that of rebalancing frequency. They conclude that the effect 
of myopia can be explained by evaluation frequency alone.  
Langer and Weber (2008) similarly disentangle the evaluation period from the 
rebalancing period by dividing their subjects into four categories. They also employ a 
multiplicative approach in which an investor can transfer his initial endowment from 
period to period, and reinvest their returns. They argue that there is a significant effect 
only from the rebalancing frequency and that the effect of the low rebalancing 
frequency is stronger when the evaluation frequency is high.  
Fellner and Sutter (2009) determine that both variables influence investment 
behaviour. Taking the time pattern of investment behaviour into account, they find 
positive results when at least one of these variables is at a lower frequency. The 
investments in a risky lottery by their subjects are highest under conditions of low 
rebalancing frequency combined with high evaluation frequency or of high rebalancing 
frequency with low evaluation frequency. Additionally, they allow endogenous choices 
regarding the levels of frequencies for a subgroup of their subjects. Since the majority 
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prefer high frequency conditions, they include a novel intervention, informing subjects 
of a higher average payoff from the low frequency conditions to encourage them to 
switch to the more rewarding regime at a small cost. They do not achieve a strong shift 
in subjects’ preferences, but their intervention is still partially successful as a large 
proportion of their subjects at the low frequency conditions retain this frequency to 
avoid the charge. Fellner and Sutter (2009) argue that the subjects who made 
endogenous choices are less negatively affected by MLA than those who were 
exogenously divided into varying levels of frequency conditions.  
Most experimental studies on MLA endeavour to overcome the limitations 
arising from the artificial set-ups. For example, Gneezy et al. (2003) enhance their 
experiment by adding market interactions while Langer and Weber (2008) apply a 
multiplicative approach in which subjects can transfer their initial endowment over 
periods and reinvest their returns. Fellner and Sutter (2009) introduce endogenous 
choices as to levels of frequencies by their subjects to embody more realistic 
circumstances. Although most studies have tried to provide the most realistic conditions 
for their subjects, it is difficult to incorporate real market conditions in experiments. 
Most studies conduct their experiments with students, except a few which include 
professional investors, such as Haigh and List (2005) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010). 
Additionally, subjects are usually exogenously assigned their experimental conditions. 
To overcome these limitations, in this study we use survey results of individual 
investors to study the effects of MLA on their actual portfolio allocation decisions.  
Based on the arguments of Benartzi and Thaler (1995; 1999), and Thaler et al. 
(1997), we suggest the following hypothesis. 




Thaler et al. (1997) acknowledge that their experiment provides the subjects 
with a learning opportunity, as they monitor the performance of different assets in 
terms of their risk and return through the experiment. Individuals who participate in the 
market also experience the history of the market and the utility derived from their 
decisions. In practice, those investors who frequently evaluate their portfolio returns 
have a higher chance of facing losses. The more loss averse such investors are, the 
greater the level of disappointment they experience from investing in risky financial 
assets, and therefore, they are more likely to reduce their holdings over time. Thus the 
second hypothesis is:   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Individuals who are less affected by MLA increase their holdings in 
risky financial assets over time relative to those highly affected.     
 
3.3 Data Description and Construction of Financial Variables 
 
3.3.1 Sample Selection  
 
We use the survey data from the CentERdata panel, a specialised online 
research institute at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. It consists of over 2,000 
households including individuals over 16 years, representative of the Dutch population 
with regard to a number of important demographic characteristics. This panel has been 
extensively involved in academic research; for instance, Van Rooij, Lusardi, and 
Alessie (2011; 2012) use it to study the effects of financial literacy on individual stock 
market participation and wealth, Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) study the 
preferences of individual investors on dividend payments, and Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2008) investigate the relationship between trust and stock market 
participation based on the data from this panel.  
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Table 1 Sampling Process and Demographic Background 
 
Panel A - Sampling Process 
 
The following table presents the sampling process of this study.  
 
 Remained Lost  
Total number of individuals contacted on behalf of our survey   2,226 - 
Individuals who were able to answer investment related questions in our 
survey   
687 1,539 
After merging the dataset with the hypothetical intertemporal questions  407 280 
After merging the dataset with risk aversion and time preference questions  403 4 
After merging the dataset  with questions on assets and liabilities  400 3 
 
 
Panel B - Demographic Background of Individual Investors 
 
The following table presents the demographic backgrounds of 400 individuals in our sample. 
 
Gender Men 68.3%  Education  Secondary Education  43.3% 
 Women 31.8%   College or University 56.8% 
       
Marital 
status 
Single 20.5%  Occupation  Regular employment  54.8% 
 Married 79.5%   Self-employed 12.8% 
     Retired 24.5% 
Age 30s and Less 20.3%   Others 8% 
 40s 26%     
 50s 21.3%     
 60s 17.5%     
 70s and more 15%     
 
 
Panel C - Financial Information  
 
The following table presents the ownership rate, defined as the percentage of individuals who 
hold risky financial assets, and descriptive statistics of the share invested in risky financial 
assets from individuals’ total financial assets (SRFA), and its breakdown between shares and 
mutual funds. The AEX index total return is the average annual return over the sample period, 
including reinvested dividends.  
 
 Stats. Ownership % SRFA % Mutual 
funds % 
Share % AEX 
Return 
 Mean 59.39% 23.38% 59.78% 39.18% 8.45% 
 Median  6.95% 85.39% 12.19%  
N = 3347  Std. 
Dev 




Panel D – Descriptive Statistics on Financial Assets  
 
The following table presents the descriptive statistics including mean, median and standard 
deviations of stock, mutual funds, risky financial assets, total financial assets, total assets, 




 Risky Total    
 €  Mutual Financial Financial Total Financial Total 
Year Stat. Stock Funds Assets Assets Assets Debts Debts 
1997 Mean 15,753.89 7,448.69 23,202.58 45,245.82 150,885.70 2,238.96 32,827.48 
 N=145  Median  0.00 0.00 2,042.01 16,174.85 118,005.50 0.00 5,899.14 
 
S.D. 64,042.51 16,487.30 71,841.24 88,157.12 156,906.50 6,817.08 50,690.94 
1998 Mean 22,176.92 11,604.15 33,781.07 52,786.30 190,431.60 2,253.65 36,669.24 
 N=145  Median  0.00 0.00 3,305.79 15,700.79 139,401.20 0.00 23,596.56 
  S.D. 87,852.07 24,614.87 99,725.78 114,511.80 346,686.00 7,701.56 60,006.26 
1999 Mean 19,594.54 12,683.44 32,478.49 49,815.55 114,495.90 2,920.45 25,496.94 
 N=160  Median  0.00 0.00 4,084.02 16,046.80 52,236.67 0.00 0.00 
  S.D. 86,612.18 33,703.39 114,339.20 130,258.50 162,941.20 18,057.38 56,774.17 
2000 Mean 10,943.89 10,838.90 21,831.06 43,062.34 164,179.80 1,774.76 28,628.95 
 N=220 Median  0.00 0.00 2,061.07 19,422.92 91,378.23 0.00 84.86 
  S.D. 48,120.83 32,096.91 71,677.85 81,356.26 201,463.40 5,946.07 50,427.47 
2001 Mean 14,808.07 14,819.66 29,790.06 70,032.32 210,256.00 2,489.08 38,158.36 
 N=279 Median  0.00 907.56 3,630.24 29,041.92 147,106.70 0.00 2,059.31 
  S.D. 71,081.16 43,447.65 99,311.60 184,823.90 291,892.80 11,886.20 57,974.15 
2002 Mean 10,989.77 13,092.21 24,541.12 71,953.65 255,469.00 3,522.29 54,263.33 
 N=297 Median  0.00 1,134.45 4,855.45 32,822.36 192,605.30 0.00 13,160.07 
  S.D. 47,631.92 36,317.94 66,331.18 114,366.70 257,031.60 23,874.68 93,664.43 
2003 Mean 8,012.15 9,177.44 17,411.40 72,018.64 260,270.60 5,783.86 58,779.35 
 N=315  Median  0.00 0.00 492.00 32,082.82 226,236.50 0.00 21,360.00 
  S.D. 27,919.99 34,872.34 48,984.78 159,083.20 289,044.00 36,266.11 97,013.10 
2004 Mean 9,674.27 9,932.91 19,826.75 86,468.17 273,985.30 2,716.01 55,868.38 
 N=297  Median  0.00 0.00 1,000.00 38,169.19 226,643.00 0.00 15,000.00 
  S.D. 33,773.54 37,124.08 53,586.90 251,144.20 358,096.70 17,030.51 80,860.02 
2005 Mean 9,595.49 12,755.74 22,406.57 85,369.43 287,397.10 2,326.61 58,587.29 
 N=270  Median  0.00 0.00 1,895.00 39,100.00 250,830.00 0.00 30,500.00 
  S.D. 31,644.72 41,683.44 56,631.94 190,774.30 318,104.40 13,603.85 77,742.50 
2006 Mean 12,185.72 17,149.47 29,370.47 87,750.40 299,566.00 996.42 56,191.85 
 N=274  Median  0.00 0.00 1,808.00 39,631.50 253,714.80 0.00 21,405.20 
  S.D. 45,747.04 45,687.93 75,373.91 131,457.30 273,400.00 7,105.93 76,459.73 
2007 Mean 11,982.70 18,114.85 30,111.53 99,037.26 343,356.20 1,688.74 67,024.59 
 N=270  Median  0.00 0.00 968.50 42,308.00 280,322.00 0.00 28,200.00 
  S.D. 46,552.48 46,433.69 78,959.94 205,975.90 357,695.10 8,766.30 94,767.50 
2008 Mean 13,401.06 24,457.35 37,872.99 112,928.30 371,219.40 1,001.66 72,406.66 
 N=246  Median  0.00 0.00 1,325.00 41,874.61 299,347.00 0.00 24,750.00 
  S.D. 76,479.33 99,156.79 164,600.70 335,561.80 459,853.80 5,132.49 113,363.50 
2009 Mean 8,290.50 18,202.10 26,531.97 83,535.37 330,331.60 2,874.27 69,403.94 
 N=226  Median  0.00 0.00 1,700.00 37,134.30 284,446.70 0.00 14,500.00 
  S.D. 42,689.81 67,603.51 84,930.40 167,539.30 330,640.70 18,158.42 112,705.60 
2010 Mean 7,597.64 16,171.69 23,769.32 85,294.66 341,252.00 1,785.73 74,145.07 
 N=203  Median  0.00 0.00 825.00 38,003.48 300,600.00 0.00 26,000.00 
  S.D. 51,579.86 61,718.81 81,534.51 177,365.80 319,707.30 11,160.74 110,633.10 
Total Mean 18,496.30 19,654.51 38,351.09 103,404.10 351,509.40 3,706.51 70,816.32 
 N=3347  Median  0.00 0.00 2,500.00 42,204.20 265,126.00 0.00 14,580.00 
  S.D. 97,007.28 64,279.28 136,317.00 241,328.80 438,646.00 24,919.09 118,139.70 
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In 2003, we submit a special survey on MLA to the CentERdata panel and 
2,226 panel members participated. Since the survey questions focused on investors’ 
portfolio evaluation and rebalancing frequencies, as well as on their relevant reference 
points and framing patterns for the evaluations, only those who invest in risky financial 
assets (stocks and mutual funds) had the ability to answer.
6
  
From those 2,226 individuals, we obtain responses from 687 investors, which 
indicate that about 30% of the contacted panel members are investors. This percentage 
is comparable to the equity ownership rates in the Netherlands reported by Alessie, 
Hochguertel, and van Soest (2004) and by Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010). We 
combine the special survey on MLA with the annual Dutch National Bank Household 
survey (DHS) which includes extensive financial, demographic and psychological 
information. The DHS survey has been undertaken by the panel since 1993. From the 
Economics and Psychological Concepts section of the DHS, we select questions which 
enable us to estimate the loss aversion, discount rate, and risk-aversion, of individuals 
as well as their time preferences. We discuss these questions in more detail in the 
following sections.  
We first merge the survey with the inter-temporal choice questions from the 
DHS which enable us to estimate individuals’ loss aversion levels and discount rates. 
These questions are available for the period 1997-2002. Due to the removal of these 
questions from 2003, a large number of missing values is generated, resulting in a 
reduction of the sample size to 407. We further incorporate the risk-aversion and time 
preference questions from the DHS for the year 2003. For the resulting additional 5% 
of missing values, we impute values reported in the years 2002 and/or 2004 for the 
same individuals, but we do not have these data for 4 individuals. Finally, we merge 
                                            
6
 In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the effect of myopic loss aversion and individual 
investors’ portfolio allocation decisions according to the theory suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). 
Thus, the question of what determines stock market participation falls outwith the scope of the study. 
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our dataset with the assets and liabilities section of the DHS for the period 1997 (the 
first year for which the inter-temporal questions are available) to 2010, making 14 years 
of asset allocation data in total. We lose a further 3 individuals who failed to report 
their assets and liabilities over the period. In Panel A of Table 1, we present our sample 
selection process and in Panel B we show the demographic characteristics of our 
sample in 2003. 
Our unbalanced panel includes 400 individuals who appear on average for 8 
years, making a total of 3,347 observations for the period from 1997 to 2010. With 
respect to the 400 individual investors’ demographical characteristics, 70% of these are 
men and about 30% are women. Their ages range from 20 to 88, with an average age of 
52. About 80% of them are married. 57% have either a college or university education. 
Our sample, including investors only, is more representative of actual stock market 
investors, and is thus biased towards older, married, better educated male respondents. 
We believe that it is, therefore, more suitable for investigating the effects of MLA than 
the randomly selected samples of previous experimental studies. 
3.3.2 Financial Variables and the Market Performance  
 
We incorporate the aggregated assets and liabilities values from the annual DHS 
from 1997 to 2010. All financial values are as at 31
st
 of December of the preceding year. 
Following Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2000), we define Total financial assets 
as the sum of  positive balances on Checking accounts, Employer sponsored savings 
plans, Savings accounts, Deposit books, Savings certificate, Single-premium annuity 
insurance policies, Savings and endowment insurance policies, Mutual funds, Bonds, 
Stocks, Options, Money lent to friends and family, and Other savings or investments.
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7 Different types of assets and liabilities available from the DHS are discussed in detail by Alessie, 




Employer sponsored savings plans are a unique asset class in the Netherlands, 
designed to encourage employees to participate in wealth accumulation, and introduced 
by a political compromise between unions, employers and the government in the early 
nineties (Alessie et al., 2000). Individuals report the total amount held in their 
Employer sponsored savings account only if they participate in a ‘save-as-you-earn 
deduction arrangement’ which automatically deposits a certain amount from their gross 
salary in a separate savings account. In the Netherlands, the total saved amount is 
subject to neither income tax nor premiums for social insurance policies. Each year, 
employees can save up to €613 (reduced in 2011 from €788 which applied during 1995-
2010). In order to be entitled to future tax benefits on withdrawals, however, no money 
may be withdrawn during the first four years (DNB Household Survey 2011 
codebook).
8
 Although this scheme is less liquid than ordinary savings accounts, it is 
much more tax favoured.  
As a common form of defined contribution (DC) pension plans, Single-premium 
annuity insurance policies involve a one-time premium payment which is tax 
deductible. If individuals had taken out the insurance and if it is still in effect, they 
report the amount of the guaranteed minimum final payment. Individuals only report if 
they hold these policies separately from employer-sponsored savings plans or 
professional pension plans. Most Dutch employees are covered by mandatory defined 
benefit (DB) pension plans, thus the participation rate in such voluntary insurance 
policies is much lower than for any other European country (Alessie et al., 2000). 
Individuals also report the total amount saved on their Savings and endowment 
insurance policies. As a form of life-insurance, endowment insurance policies are 
known as ‘insured saving’, providing a lump sum at maturity rather than an annuity. 
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Although the premium payments are not tax deductible, the lump sum is. Some of these 
life insurance policies are also linked to a mortgage.  
Pension wealth accounts for a considerable part of total household wealth in the 
Netherlands as most Dutch employees are entitled to mandatory occupational pension 
schemes. However, we are unable to obtain reliable information from the DHS, which 
fails to capture the details of mandatory occupational pension investments held by 
households. Consequently, we are unable to identify the true level of risky financial 
assets held by individual investors. In addition, although non-mandatory pension 
savings are defined within the financial asset categories in the forms of life and annuity 
insurance, they are rather broadly defined (Alessie et al., 2000). To obtain better 
understanding of the pension system in the Netherlands, and the consequential 
investment decisions of Dutch individual investors, we discuss the pension system in 
the Netherlands in further detail in the following section.   
Risky financial assets are calculated as the sum of Individual company shares 
and Mutual funds
9
. Our main variable of interest is the Share of Risky Financial Assets 
(hereafter SRFA), which is defined as the percentage of individuals’ total financial 
assets which is invested in risky financial assets. The SRFA value is comparable to the 
endowed capital allocated to risky gambles in experimental studies. 
 In Panel C of Table 1, we present average risky asset ownership rates, measured 
as the percentage of individuals holding risky financial assets over our sample years. 
These rates are below 100% since we observe that individuals in our sample tend to exit 
and re-enter the equity market from time to time. Descriptive statistics for the SRFA, 
                                            
9  We do not include Options or Bonds in the risky financial asset category, due to their different 
characteristics, and the possibility of hedging. If individuals hold any put or call options, they report the 
total amounts that they had paid for when they had bought them or the total market value when they had 
written them. Bonds are often reckoned as riskless assets in the Netherlands, and in our data from the 
DHS, the length or type, e.g. whether they are issued by the government or private companies, are not 
distinguished. Alessie et al. (2000) identify that Bonds are an unpopular type of asset in the Netherlands, 
in contrast to other European countries.  
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the proportion of Shares and Mutual funds in the SRFA, and the average total annual 
return on the main Dutch stock market index AEX, are also reported.  
In Panel D of Table 1, the descriptive statistics including mean, median and 
standard deviations of stock, mutual funds, risky financial assets, total financial assets, 
total assets, financial debts, and total debts are reported in Euros for each year over the 
sample period. We winsorise all financial variables, by means of replacing all 
observations in the top percentile at the value of the 99
th
 percentile. Thus, we can 
prevent any outliers affecting our results.  
To control for the credit constraint of individuals, which can influence investors’ 
investment capability (Cocco, 2004; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005), we create a 
debt ratio taking account of individuals’ total debts to total assets. Total assets comprise 
financial assets and fixed assets including Real estate, Owners’ houses and the Cash 
value of insurance on real estate and owners’ houses. In the debt category, there are 
Negative current accounts balance, Private loans, Extended lines of credit, Debts with 
mail-order firms, Loans from family and friends, Student loans, Credit card debts, and 
Other debts, as well as Mortgages for real estate and owners’ houses.   
Household wealth is largely invested in the house as a non-financial asset. 
Simultaneously, the majority of home-owners hold one or more mortgages. The 
decreasing trend in mortgage interest rates, which is also fully tax-deductible, has 
increased demand for housing ownership (Alessie et al., 2000). Mortgages on real 
estate investment and a second house are, however, not tax deductible, which makes 
them less popular. As with other countries, house prices in the Netherlands are highly 
sensitive to economic and political changes. The Dutch housing market was also 
affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, experiencing a fall in national median 
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price of 13% (14% in real terms) from 2008 to 2009,
10
 after the relatively long house 
price boom over 1992-2007. Consequently, not only investors’ investments in real 
estate, but also their own houses are liable to be risky assets regarding uncertain price 
movements. The DHS, therefore, asks households to report the market value of their 
real estate investments including their own houses.     
Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2000) argue that the portfolio structures of 
Dutch households reflect institutional features including both mandatory pensions and 
tax systems. Individual investors tend to adopt investment strategies which optimally 
exploit the existing tax rules. Two important asset classes affecting individuals’ savings 
and net worth, and closely connected to institutional plans, thus require further 
investigations are individuals’ pension assets and their real estate investments. In the 
following section, we discuss the nature, size and tax incentives related to pension 
savings and real estate investments including owner-occupied housing in the 
Netherlands. These two asset categories are important in relation to individual 
investors’ decisions on whether to invest in other or risky assets.  
 
3.3.3 Pension Savings and the Housing Market in the Netherlands 
 
Both pension savings and housing are important asset classes to individual 
investors in ensuring their financial stability after retirement. The pension saving 
schemes and housing plans held by individual investors directly influence their current 
savings, consumption, and net worth. It is important to discuss, therefore, the nature, 
size and tax incentives related to pension savings and housings in the Netherlands as 
the context for the current study.  
                                            
10
 The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reports that the median national house price was €225,000 





In the Netherlands, a mixture of public and private pension provisions is 
available under three main pillars: the first pillar is the state old-age pension as a 
statutory insurance scheme; the second pillar is a supplementary occupational pension 
scheme supported by employers; and the third pillar is individual saving schemes which 
are privately arranged by enrolling onto annuities or endowment insurance (Alessie, 
Kapteyn, and Klijn, 1997). The first pillar includes two forms, namely a General Old 
Age Pensions Act (AOW) and a Surviving Dependants Act (ANW). Regulated by law 
since 1957, the AOW is a public fund based on the pay-as-you-go system supported by 
tax revenues to provide a full pension right to those who are 65 and over. Individuals 
aged between 15 and 65 are insured by the AOW at an accumulating rate of 2% each 
year to ensure a 100% entitlement to the flat-rate benefit when reaching the age of 65. 
The AOW guarantees 70% of the minimum wage for singles, and 50% to each 
individual in a couple, if both are entitled (in 2011, the pension benefits were EUR 
1,034 and EUR 711, respectively). At the end of 2010, the AOW pension benefits were 
provided to about 3 million people, at a cost amounting to EUR 30 billion in total. 
Housewives are also entitled to the AOW benefit when they become 65 even if they 
have never paid contributions. Similarly, the ANW is a flat-rate benefit available for the 
surviving partner or children after the death of the other partner or parents.
11
 
The AOW provision accounts for only a small part of the joint capital of all 
pension providers which is over EUR 725 billion providing pension benefit or vested 
pension rights to about 8.5 million individuals (Dutch Central Bank Annual Report, 
2007). The major part of pension provisions in the Netherlands is financed by the 
collective occupational pension at the second pillar.  The occupational pension scheme 
                                            
11
 This section summarises a document titled ‘The old age pension system in the Netherlands’ published 
by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (June, 2008). More information on pensions in 
the Netherlands can be found at the website of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment: 
www.english.szw.nl (benefits/old-age pension). 
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is regarded as the best developed scheme in Europe and is characterised by quasi-
mandatory participation covering more than 95% of employees, collective risk sharing, 
and the transfer pension value system. Each year, employees accrue about 2% of their 
salary for the pension right regardless of their age, gender or income, and the benefit is 
available from retirement, usually at 65, till death. In general, employers contribute 
more than 50% of the total. In the Netherlands, defined benefit (DB) plans dominate, 
covering about 85% of the occupational pension provisions, thus allowing employees to 
be exempted from financial or longevity risks. In 2010, most DB plans are based on 
average wage (91%), and DB plans based on final pay only accounts for 1% of the total 
compared to 59% in 2000. About 5% of employers currently offer a defined 
contribution (DC) plan (Whitehouse, 2003). Following the international trend to 
transfer investment risk to employees, more companies are anticipated to convert to DC 
plans. The new International Accounting Standards 19 (IAS), which requires the 
liabilities retaining to DB schemes to be reported on company balance sheets, also 
increased companies’ preference for DC plans (Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast, 2007).   
 The third pillar is private pension schemes based on annuities and endowment 
insurance encouraged by partial tax reliefs. Self-employed individuals can arrange 
individual pension provision supplementary to their AOW benefits. Additionally, the 
annual special tax allowance is available to companies run by self-employed 
individuals deferring the tax payment over that amount. The general pension schemes 
are potentially subject to taxation at each of three stages: 1) when money is contributed 
to funds by either employers or employees; 2) when the funds accrue investment 





. There are international variations in the generosity of tax incentives for 
pension funds (Whitehouse, 2003). The tax treatment in the Netherlands is identified as 
an EET system, as at the first two stages contributions to the pension funds and also 
incomes are tax exempt (E), then benefits are taxed (T) at the last stage.  Individuals are 
encouraged by the tax incentives to purchase annuity insurance in addition to their 
pension obligations.  The generous tax legislation benefits investors by allowing lower 
marginal tax rates during retirement than employment (Whitehouse, 2003).   
The government plays a significant role in the housing market in the 
Netherlands to the extent of land development and reclamation given that about 60% of 
the population are living below sea-level, as well as providing and controlling mortgage 
subsidies and the social housing sector. In the 1950s, owner-occupied housing 
constituted only 29% of the total residential figure, which largely consists of rented 
housing
13
. From the 1980s, home-ownership was promoted by the government with 
generous mortgage subsidies. For home-owners, mortgage interest is fully tax 
deductible and capital gains from house sales are not subject to tax. Residential 
mortgage debts reached almost 100% of GDP in 2008, and more than 3.5 million Dutch 
households, six out of every seven, had taken out a mortgage by 2009
14
. The total 
owner-occupied residential figure had increased from 42% in 1980 to 55% in 2011.15 
The total tax deduction amounted to about 33 billion Euros in 2011, a doubling since 
2000
16
. Although it varies depending on the total income of households, a home-
owning household saves 290 Euros on average (about a 13% reduction) per month from 
                                            
12
 European Commission (2013), Taxation and Custom Union presents articles about pension taxation, 
find at : http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/pensions/index_en.htm 
13
 Detailed information is available at: http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/a-review-of-the-
netherlands-real-estate-investment-market-55334.aspx 
14
 Statistics Netherlands Press release (March, 2010), Netherlands Housing Research 2009, 
http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/0D12FD2B-2272-4892-91A2-EA3F98DD860C/0/pb10e020.pdf 
15
 Statistics Netherlands: http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=71446ned 
16





their income tax and social insurance contributions. The government also provides 
grants to low-income households to help them towards home-ownership (Elsinga, 
2003).  
Since 2002, the Dutch government limits interest deductibility to 30 years to 
prevent excessive mortgage growth. If a home-owning household moves to a more 
expensive house, their down-payment is expected to be paid by their capital gains on 
their former house. Tax deductibility is also inapplicable to mortgages on real estate 
investments and second home-ownership since 2001. This change of the scheme is due 
to the exploitation of mortgage tax benefits which was prevalent during the nineties   
(Alessie et al., 2000).  
Both pension savings and home-ownership are extremely tax-favoured in the 
Netherlands. Compared to other countries, Dutch individual investors receive more 
institutional supports in terms of their asset management and wealth accumulation. It is, 
however, unfortunate that our dataset does not fully capture the insight of investments 
to be discussed together with their further investment decisions.  
 
3.4 Results from the Survey Questions 
 
3.4.1 Measuring the Level of Myopia 
 
To define the level of myopia, we follow the design of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997), and also adopt the approach of Langer and Weber (2008), to disentangle the 
effects of the evaluation frequency from the rebalancing frequency, adopting a 2-by-2 
design where both frequencies are divided into two levels, High and Low. Fellner and 
Sutter (2009) also support this design as the combination of both factors enables 
complete identification of myopia. In our survey, we ask investors about their 
evaluation and rebalancing frequencies following the ‘choice bracketing’ approach of 
72 
 
Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999), by providing ‘daily’, ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, 
‘quarterly’, ‘annually’, and ‘less often than annually’ options for both questions.  
The question on the evaluation frequency is posed as “How often do you 
evaluate the performance of your stock portfolio on average? An evaluation can take 
different forms. It can, for example, vary from including recent prices in a spread sheet 
to simply checking in newspapers or on Teletext
17
 how the shares perform.” The 
question of rebalancing frequency is posed as “How often do you change your stock 
portfolio by buying or selling shares without the need for cash?”18 
Our survey results are presented in Table 2. We observe that individuals’ 
evaluation frequencies are evenly spread from ‘daily’ to ‘less often than annually’. 44% 
of individuals choose to evaluate their portfolio performance every month or more 
often. These frequencies of evaluation expose individuals to observing portfolio losses 
on a regular basis, which may be detrimental to their propensity to invest in risky assets 
and, therefore, to their aggregate wealth. Such choices are similar to the very strong 
preferences for frequent feedback found in the experimental study of Fellner and Sutter 
(2009).  
In assessing rebalancing frequency, however, 70% indicate that they rebalance 
their portfolio less often than annually. Individuals in our sample opt for a low 
rebalancing frequency in contrast to the argument (Fellner and Sutter, 2009) that 
investors generally prefer high rebalancing frequency, and tend to over-trade due to 
their overconfidence based on the study of the discount brokerage accounts (Odean, 
1999; Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001). Our results are more similar to Agnew, Balduzzi, 
                                            
17
 Teletext is a data broadcasting service in which pre-programmed sequences of frames of data are 
broadcast cyclically. 
18
 This question fails to deal with the fairly common ‘regular’ monthly investment in equities (or mutual 
funds).We acknowledge it as a limitation as there is room for ambiguity in the responses made by 
individuals to this question. However, the natural reaction would be probably not to regard these monthly 
contributions as ‘rebalancing’ of the individuals’ actively managed portfolios.  
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and Sundén (2003), who find that individual investors in 401(k) plans also trade 
infrequently, as over 87% maintain their allocation for at least a year and, on average, 
they rebalance every 3.85 years. We divide both variables into high and low at their 
median values. For evaluation frequency, we allocate individuals from ‘daily’ to 
‘monthly’ conditions to High level (44%) and from ‘quarterly’ to ‘less than annually’ to 
Low level (56%). For rebalancing frequency, we define frequencies from ‘daily’ to 
‘annually’ as High level (30%) and define frequency of ‘less than annually’ as Low 
level (70%).  
Table 2 Measuring the Level of Myopia 
 
Evaluation Frequency  
How often do you evaluate the performance of your stock portfolio on average? An evaluation 
can take different forms. It can, for example, vary from including recent prices in a spreadsheet 
to simply checking in newspapers or on teletext how the shares perform.  
 

















 High Level (44%) Low Level (56%)  
 
Rebalancing Frequency  
How often do you change your stock portfolio by buying or selling shares without the need for 
cash? 
 

















 High Level (30%) Low Level (70%)  
 
Groupings by the level of Myopia  
 
 Frequency Per cent 
HEHR (High Evaluation with High Rebalancing frequency) 70 17.5% 
HELR (High Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency) 107 26.8% 
LEHR (Low Evaluation with High Rebalancing frequency) 50 12.5% 
LELR  (Low Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency) 173 43.3% 
Total  400 100% 
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 Consequently, we categorise 400 individuals into four groups, which allows us 
to disentangle the two variables, and assess the effect of varying levels of myopia. We 
allocate 70 individuals (17.5%) into ‘High Evaluation with High Rebalancing 
frequency’ group (HEHR); 107 individuals (26.75%) into ‘High Evaluation with Low 
Rebalancing frequency’ group (HELR); 50 individuals (12.5%) into ‘Low Evaluation 
with High Rebalancing frequency’ group (LEHR); and 173 individuals (43.25%) into 
‘Low Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency’ group (LELR) as listed in Table 2.  
3.4.2 Measuring Individuals’ Loss Aversion Coefficients and Discount Rates 
 
During 1997-2002, the DNB Household survey included 16 hypothetical inter-
temporal choice questions which were developed by Tu (2004) based on experimental 
work by Thaler (1981) and Loewenstein (1988). The discounted utility (DU) model 
assumes that decision makers have a single discount rate across gains and losses, and 
for delaying and speeding-up a payment when comparing inter-temporal choices. 
However, Thaler (1981) and Loewenstein (1988) contest the assumption that 
individuals’ self-determined discount rates vary according to different situations, since 
they demand a higher premium for delaying a sure payment than the cost to pay for 
speeding-up the same amount.  
In particular, individuals have different discount rates for gains and losses, and 
qualitatively different attitudes towards borrowing and lending (Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1992). This inter-temporal choice model incorporates the loss aversion effects of 
individuals in terms of framing their gains and losses relative to their subjective 
discount rates. Loewenstein (1988) specifies three terms to define individuals’ 
preferences: the immediate consumption price, the delayed consumption price, and the 
speeding-up consumption price. The delayed premium cost is a compensation for 
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delayed consumption compared to the immediate consumption, and the speeding-up 
cost is a sacrifice to advance the delayed consumption to immediate consumption.  
16 questions developed by Tu (2004) differ by four components: delaying (D) 
vs. speeding-up (S) a payment; gains (G) vs. losses (L); a time dimension (T) of 3 
months vs. 1 year; and the size of the payment (X) which are ƒ 1000 vs. ƒ 100,000 in 
Dutch guilders. The gains arise from winning a prize in the National lottery, and the 
losses arise from a tax assessment. For example, the Delay of Gain question asks an 
individual to state the required additional amount to compensate for postponing the 
prize of ƒ1,000 for one year. Questions on (1) ‘Delay of a Gain’ and (2) ‘Speed-up of a 
loss’ with an amount of ƒ1,000 for a 1 year time dimension are presented as below. 
(1)  ‘Imagine that you win a prize of ƒ1,000 (€454) in the National Lottery. 
The prize is to be paid out today. Imagine, however, that the lottery asks 
if you are prepared to wait A YEAR before you get the prize (there is no 
risk involved in this wait). How much extra money would you ask to 
receive AT LEAST to compensate for the waiting term of a year? If you 
agree on the waiting term without the need to receive extra money for 
that, please type 0 (zero) – AT LEAST a compensation of ƒ       .’ 
(2)  ‘Imagine that you receive a tax assessment of ƒ1,000 (€454). The 
assessment has to be settled within A YEAR. It is, however, possible to settle 
the assessment now, and in that case you will get a REDUCTION. How 
much REDUCTION would you like to get AT LEAST for settling the 
assessment now instead of after a year? If you are not interested in getting 
a reduction for paying early or if you think there is no need to get a 
reduction for paying early, please type 0 (zero) – AT LEAST a reduction of 
ƒ       .’ 
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The Delay of Gain (DG) question (1) asks an individual to state the required 
additional amount to compensate for postponing the prize of ƒ1,000 for one year. If the 
individual states ƒ200, this amount is to compensate for the waiting time of one year, 
and the final payment of ƒ1,200 will be made. Similarly, the Speed-up of a Loss (SL) 
question (2) is framed to distinguish how much an individual expects to reduce their 
final payments through expediting the payment due in the future. If the individual states 
ƒ200 as his demanded reduction, the tax assessment will be reduced to ƒ800, as an 
immediate payment.  
From the answers to the 16 questions, we winsorise extreme values and 
undertake a validity check for two types of judgment errors following Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010). First, we discard respondents who answer zero to all questions 
each year as we consider that they did not pay full attention to the questions
19
. Second, 
we winsorise individuals’ responses at X (ƒ1,000 or ƒ100,000) for the DG questions 
and at 50% of X for the other questions to control for extreme values. We also compare 
the answers on the set of four questions for each situation to discard any responses 
displaying a judgment error.  
For instance, on the DG situation, the four questions vary with X amount of 
either ƒ1000 or ƒ100,000  and a horizon T of either three months or one year. Thus if a 
respondent demands greater amounts for the premium to delay the gain for 3 months 
rather than delaying for one year for the same amount, or, if a respondent demands 
greater amounts as the premium for delaying ƒ1,000 rather than ƒ100,000 for the same 
horizon, we consider them as judgment errors and discard them. 
                                            
19
 About 3-5% observations were deleted due to these individuals answering zero to all questions each 
year. Although it is possible that those individuals are not loss averse and hold a zero discount rate, it was 
impossible to determine whether their responses did indeed reflect this or whether, alternatively, were 
simply due to a lack of interest in participating in the survey. Following the approach of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010), therefore, we discarded them.  
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It has been emphasised by Thaler (1981), and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), 
that dynamic inconsistency of time-preferences affects inter-temporal choices 
independently from loss aversion effects; thus we exclude questions with a three 
months horizon to avoid such discrepancies.  
 
Table 3 Measuring Loss Aversion Coefficients and Discount Rates 
 
Panel A - Intertemporal Choice Questions  
 
Descriptive statistics for eight hypothetical inter-temporal decision questions of 400 individuals 
are presented below. These questions specify delaying vs. speeding-up a payment; gains vs. 
losses; payment size of ƒ 1000 vs. ƒ 100,000 in Dutch guilders with a time dimension of one 
year. The gains are from winning a prize in the National lottery situation and the losses are 
from a tax assessment. The delayed premium cost is a compensation for the delayed 
consumption compared to the immediate consumption, and the speeding-up cost is a sacrifice to 









Dev Min Max 
% of Premium for Delay of Gain, ƒ1,000  17.82% 11.11% 17.012% 0% 100% 
% of Premium for Delay of Gain, ƒ100,000 12.99% 7.94% 14.20% 0% 97% 
% of Cost for Delay of Loss, ƒ1,000 3.06% 1.80% 4.418% 0% 27% 
% of Cost for Delay of Loss, ƒ100,000  2.59% 1.74% 3.452% 0% 22% 
% of Sacrifice to Speed up of Gain, ƒ1,000  4.02% 1.58% 7.803% 0% 50% 
% of Sacrifice to Speed up of Gain, ƒ100,000  3.91% 1.76% 7.012% 0% 47% 
% of Reduction by Speed up of Loss, ƒ1,000 9.59% 7.96% 7.394% 0% 47% 
% of Reduction by Speed up of Loss, 
ƒ100,000 
7.33% 5.40% 6.779% 0% 44% 
      
 
Panel B - Estimation results of Loss-Aversion Coefficient and Discount Rate  
 
Parameters Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loss Aversion Coefficient 3.73 1.93 6.45 0.10 40 
S.E. of Loss-Aversion  2.14 0.42 8.89 0.00 139.66 
Discount Rate 7.7% 5.28% 7% 0.00% 100% 




Descriptive statistics of the responses for the eight questions with a time 
dimension of one year are presented in Panel A of Table 3. Individuals in our sample 
demand the highest premium for delay of gains as compared to all other situations. The 
mean value of 17.82% for the premium ratio indicates that individuals demand 178.2 
guilders on average as their premium for delaying a gain of ƒ1000 for a year. For the 
delay of losses, on the other hand, individuals only expect to pay ƒ30.6 (3.06%) to 
delay a payment of ƒ1000 for one year. They expect to spend less for their delay of 
losses and speed-up of gains, although they demand a high reduction from the speed-up 
of losses. These deviations violate the notions of conventional discounted utility (DU), 
which proposes the same discount rate for borrowing and lending circumstances.  
We adopt the derived equations of the inter-temporal choice questions from 
Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) based on the reference point model of Loewenstein 
(1988). The value of a payoff at time 0,    and at time T,    is expressed as below in 
Equation (3.1).  
(3.1)        V(  ,    ; R) = v(   – R) + δ(T) v(  – R) 
R assigns the reference point which is subject to 0 < R ≤ X. δ (T) refers to the 
individual’s discount rate factor over the length of T, and v (・) is the value function 
evaluating the payoff, in which v (0) = 0. In the situation of ‘Delay of a Gain’ (DG), for 
example, an individual expects to receive an amount X at time 0. Conditional on the 
expected amount of compensation (𝑃  ), however, the individual is willing to delay the 
gain of X to time T. In this case, individuals are indifferent as to receiving either (X, 0) 
or (0, X + 𝑃  ). 
(3.2)       V(X, 0; R) = V (0, X + 𝑃  ; R)               
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(3.3)       v(X – R) + δ(T)v(– R) = v(0 – R) + δ(T)v(X +𝑃  – R)  
Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) specify the value function v (·) based on 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), where the curvature parameter equals 
to one (Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001), and λ >1 
suggest the loss aversion as follow.  
(3.4)                  ( ) = {
         ≥ 0
        < 0
 
 
Then, the Equation (3.3) can be rewritten.  
(3.5)      X – R – δ(T)λR = –λR + δ(T)(X +𝑃  – R)  
(3.6)      𝑃  = [ (1– δ(T))(X – R) +(1–δ(T))λR ] / δ(T)  
Loewenstein (1988) indicates that the reference point ranges from 0 < R ≤ X. 
To simplify the equation, however, we apply Loewenstein’s (1988) full reference point 
adjustment which makes R equals X, i.e. r = R / X = 1. This full reference point 
approach provides the most effective results according to the findings of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010). The proportion of 𝑃   in relation to X is defined as     . The 
delayed premium cost ratio     can be expressed as a function of the loss aversion 
parameter and the discount rate.  
(3.7)          = (1– δ(T))[ (1 – r) + λr ] / δ(T) = λ (1– δ(T)) / δ(T) 
The premium ratio should be positive and bounded, given λ > 1 and 0 < δ(T) ≤ 
1. Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) take the same steps to derive equations for the 
other three situations involving speeding-up of a gain (SG), delay of a loss (DL), and 
speeding-up of a loss (DL).  
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(3.8)            = (1– δ(T)) 
(3.9)            = (1/λ) (1– δ(T)) / δ(T) 
(3.10)           = (1– δ(T)) 
As in derived equations, we estimate the loss aversion coefficient (  ), and 
discount rate (  ) of an individual based on the calculated ratios of each question 
(       (X, T),        (X, T),        (X, T) and        (X, T)). The ratio p has been defined 
as P/X. Two parameters are required to meet the conditions of   > 0, and 0<    ≤1. We 
denote that individual i expects the payment P for the delay or speed up of the amount 
X (1000 or 100,000 guilders) for time T (one year only), over the survey period t 
(1997–2002). As not all individuals have participated in the survey for six years, our 
panel is unbalanced; thus we include all available years with valid answers, and denote 
as   .  For the delay of gain question, for instance,       denotes the number of years 
for which individual i participated. Adopting the GMM estimations with Loewenstein 
(1988)’s full reference point (r=R/X=1), Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) develop 
the following equations. 
(3.11)      ∑         (X, Y) /       – [  (1-  
 )   
  ] 
    ∑         (X, Y) /       – [(1-  
 )] 
                    ∑         (X, Y) /       – [(1/  )(1-  
 )   
  ]  
   ∑         (X, Y) /       – [(1-  
 )] 
The GMM estimations minimise the sum of the squared errors as in Equation 
(3.12) when deriving two parameters from the eight moments situation (Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg, 2010, pp.451). 
 
(3.12)           ∑ ∑         (   )      





From the calculated ratios from each question, we derive equations based on the 
full reference point adjustment model of Loewenstein (1988), which provides the most 
effective results according to the findings in Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010). 
Through adopting the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimations to 
minimise the sum of the squared errors, we derive two parameters i.e. the loss aversion 
coefficient and discount rate, from the eight moments situation. Descriptive statistics of 
the two parameters are presented in Panel B of Table 3. The loss aversion coefficient 
and discount rate are estimated for each individual based on their average responses 
over 1997-2002. When the two parameters are calculated, the GMM estimations report 
standard errors for each parameter and for each individual. Thus, we also report 
descriptive statistics of standard errors from the estimations for the two parameters.   
85% of our investors have loss aversion coefficients higher than 1, which means 
that they are loss averse (1 indicates that they are indifferent to a loss and gain of the 
same value). The mean (3.73) and median (1.93) values of the loss aversion coefficient 
indicate considerable skewness to the right. The mean estimated annual discount rate is 
7.7%, and the median value is 5.28%. By comparison, the estimations of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010), based on the full reference point adjustment model of 
Loewenstein (1988), give mean and median values of the loss aversion coefficients 
which are higher (mean 5.61; median 2.47), and estimated discount rates which are 
lower (mean 5%; median 4%), than our estimations. Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) 
include all individuals in the panel rather than restricting their sample to investors only, 
which indicate that investors have lower loss aversion coefficients and higher discount 
rates than the population as a whole. Our estimations are in line with Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010) who use the same dataset, as well as with Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) who find that individuals hold the loss aversion coefficient of 2.25.  
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Table 4 Questions on Other Psychological Variables 
 
Risk-aversion  
Do you agree with the statement?  
“I would never consider investments in shares because I find this too risky”. 
 Strongly 
disagree  























Time Preference  
Do you agree with the statement?  
“I often work on things that will only pay off in a couple of years”. 
 Strongly 
disagree 























Reference Point  
When you evaluate the performance of your stock investments (including stocks in investment 
funds), what is your relevant benchmark?  
 














Framing Patterns  
When you evaluate the performance of your investments do you look at the performance of 






















3.4.3  Risk Aversion and Time Preference 
 
Previous studies, including Barsky et al. (1997) and Donkers and van Soest 
(1999), point out that stock market participation is significantly and negatively 
correlated with investors’ level of risk-aversion; if investors are highly risk averse, they 
are unwilling to invest in risky assets. We select questions from the DHS, which enable 
us to determine individuals’ subjective risk aversion level and time preferences as 
shown in Table 4. Veld-Merkoulova (2011) also uses these variables as proxies for 
individual investors’ preferences in asset allocation.  
Individuals are asked whether they agree with a statement ‘I would never 
consider investments in shares, because I find this too risky’. Respondents select an 
answer on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Based on the 
median value of 3, we allocate those individuals who score the question from 1 to 3 to 
High (59%) and from 4 to 7 to Low (41%) levels of risk aversion respectively.  
Investors’ time preferences indicate whether they are short-term or long-term 
oriented in planning for the future. Balduzzi and Lynch (1999) and Lynch and Balduzzi 
(2000) emphasise that investors who have long-term objectives are inclined to invest a 
greater proportion of their wealth in stocks than investors with short-term objectives. 
To measure investors’ degree of time preferences, we select a question, which asks 
individuals whether they agree with a statement of “I often work on things that will 
only pay off in a couple of years”. Individuals choose an answer on the Likert scale 
from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Based on the median value, we divide 
individuals who select answers from 1 to 3 into the short-term preference group (43%) 




3.4.4 Reference Points and Framing Patterns 
 
In Table 4, we also present the results from the questions on individual investors’ 
reference points and framing patterns, which are obtained from our survey conducted in 
2003. These questions are discussed in the study of risk perceptions of individual 
investors by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008). The reference point, to which an 
individual compares his investment returns, is the most important point at the valuation 
stage of the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). Based on their experimental results, Thaler et al. (1997) argue that the reference 
point strongly influences investors’ perceptions. When the subjects only perceive 
positive returns from the market under conditions of high inflation, they increase their 
investments in risky assets without realising that they are suffering from money illusion 
(Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997).  
We offer the respondents a choice of reference points: the initial price paid for a 
stock, the returns on the savings account, the market index, and others. In our results, 
57% indicate that they check mainly whether their investments increase in value 
compared to the price that they paid for them; around 30% compare with the return on 
the savings account; 8.5% consider whether their investments outperform the market 
indices, such as the AEX in the Netherlands, and 5% refer to other benchmarks. The 
number of individuals who choose the market index is unexpectedly low, while the 
majority select the initial price paid as their reference point, supporting the arguments 
of Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and of Shefrin and Statman (1985).  
The fact that framing patterns determine how the investments are perceived and 
subsequently evaluated by investors influences their imminent decisions (Thaler, 
1999b). Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that whether investors apply wide or 
narrow framing patterns affects their risk taking decisions considerably. If investors 
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evaluate the performance of individual company stocks in isolation, as in narrow 
framing, they face greater volatility than they do if evaluating the entire portfolio 
performance. In addition, Thaler et al. (1997) suggest that if investors frame their 
decisions narrowly, they will evaluate the performance more often, resulting in more 
frequent trading and vice versa. Barberis and Huang (2001) argue that the prevalence of 
narrow framing can help explain empirically observed high individual stock return and 
volatility patterns. We investigate investors’ framing patterns by asking them whether 
they evaluate their portfolio as a whole or look at the performance of individual 
company shares. We find that 22% apply narrow framing by looking at the 
performance of individual company shares, 36% evaluate both individual company 
shares and the whole portfolio, and 42% focus on the whole portfolio.  
 
3.5 Empirical Results   
 
3.5.1 The Effects of MLA on the Investment Level 
 
We investigate the joint effects of myopia, loss aversion and control variables 
on the share of investors’ total financial assets invested in risky financial assets (SRFA) 
over our sample period. We apply the following model equation (3.13), including only 
investors in our sample, with observations of non-zero risky investment holdings. We 
estimate Prais-Winston (1954) regression models with panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE), after a Woodridge (2002) test detects autocorrelations in the disturbances
20
. 
We control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following the recommendations 
of Beck and Katz (1995).  
 
                                            
20
 Based on simulation results, Drukker (2003) further suggests that the autocorrelation test of 





       =  +     +       +     +             (3.13) 
 (0   ) 
 
The dependent variable         denotes the observed share of risky financial 
assets in the total financial assets (decimals) of individual i at time t (1997–2010).     is 
the vector of investors’ time-invariant characteristics, which include the levels of 
myopia, loss aversion, discount rates, risk aversion level, time-preference level, 
reference points, framing patterns, gender, marital status, education level, and 
employment status.       is the vector of time-varying characteristics which include age, 
financial assets, and debt ratio.     is a vector of year dummies, which applies to all 
individuals. By including year dummies, we account for year specific effects such as 
macro-economic conditions.       is a normally distributed error term which is corrected 
for the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
We present four specifications of the empirical model (3.13) in Table 5. 
Regression (1) includes all explanatory and control variables. Regression (2) excludes 
self-reported risk aversion and level of time preference. Regression (3) excludes 
reference points and framing pattern variables. Finally, regression (4) is estimated 
without any survey-based controls (risk aversion, time preference, reference points and 
framing patterns). In our models, we investigate the effect of myopia and loss aversion 
independently, as well as their interactions. To evaluate the effect of myopia, we omit 





Table 5 The Effect of MLA on the Investment Level   
 
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard 
error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the 
disturbances. The dependent variable is the share of total financial assets invested in risky 
financial assets (SRFA) by individuals (in decimals). In our unbalanced panel, the total number 
of observations of non-zero risky financial assets is 1986 from 340 investors. Corrected z–
statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels are denoted by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, 
and * 10% (p-values are two-tailed). 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SRFA –/+ Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Level of Myopia          
HELR + -0.040 (-1.41) -0.044 (-1.59) -0.050* (-1.78) -0.053** (-1.93) 
LEHR +  0.015 (0.40)  0.012 (0.32)  0.008 (0.22)  0.005 (0.13) 
LELR + -0.063** (-2.26) -0.072*** (-2.68) -0.069*** (-2.55) -0.080*** (-3.07) 
Loss Aversion (LA) – -0.004* (-1.73) -0.004* (-1.76) -0.004* (-1.92) -0.004** (-1.93) 
Level of MLA          
HELR*LA +  0.005 (1.60)  0.005 (1.58)  0.006* (1.88)  0.005* (1.80) 
LEHR* LA + -0.002 (-0.25) -0.001 (-0.09)  0.000 (-0.01)  0.001 (0.12) 
LELR* LA +  0.005* (1.79)  0.005** (1.93)  0.005** (1.98)  0.006** (2.10) 
Discount Rate – -0.067 (-0.57) -0.059 (-0.50) -0.083 (-0.72) -0.076 (-0.65) 
Risk Aversion  – -0.043** (-2.22)   -0.042** (-2.19)   
Time Preference – -0.019 (-1.06)   -0.017 (-0.99)   
Reference Points          
Initial Price – -0.062** (-1.98) -0.069** (-2.23)     
Savings account – -0.058* (-1.74) -0.070** (-2.13)     
Others – -0.054 (-1.03) -0.061 (-1.18)     
Framing Patterns          
Individual Shares – -0.054** (-2.39) -0.049** (-2.20)     
Shares and Portfolio –  0.038** (1.94)  0.038** (1.97)     
Gender (Men) + -0.003 (-0.12)  0.006 (0.26)  0.000 (0.02)  0.008 (0.36) 
Age +  0.002** (2.03)  0.002* (1.75)  0.002** (2.01)  0.002* (1.75) 
Marriage –/+ -0.029 (-1.39) -0.032 (-1.53) -0.032 (-1.57) -0.034 (-1.66) 
Education   + -0.027 (-1.49) -0.026 (-1.45) -0.033* (-1.85) -0.032* (-1.80) 
Occupation           
Self-employed +  0.137*** (4.24)  0.142*** (4.45)  0.130*** (3.99)  0.134*** (4.14) 
Retired +  0.101*** (3.37)  0.100*** (3.38)  0.091*** (3.09)  0.091*** (3.07) 
Others –/+  0.025 (0.75)  0.019 (0.58)  0.034 (1.05)  0.029 (0.88) 
Financial Assets +  0.001 (0.17)  0.003 (0.40)  0.003 (0.42)  0.004 (0.61) 
Debt ratio  –  0.013** (2.07)  0.013** (2.04)  0.013** (2.03)  0.013** (2.00) 
Year Effect  Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant   0.457*** (6.87)  0.456*** (6.89)  0.419*** (7.34)  0.410*** (7.22) 
Wald Test   Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. 
HEHR*LA=LEHR*LA  0.06 0.799 0.01 0.928 0.00 0.991 0.02 0.902 
HELR*LA=LELR*LA  0.01 0.933 0.05 0.815 0.00 0.945 0.02 0.897 
HEHR*LA=HELR*LA  2.56 0.109 2.49 0.115 3.55* 0.060 3.25* 0.071 
LEHR*LA=LELR*LA  0.74 0.391 0.54 0.463 0.46 0.498 0.33 0.565 
HEHR*LA=LELR*LA  3.21* 0.073 3.73* 0.053 3.92** 0.048 4.42** 0.036 
Effect of the Crisis   18.41*** 0.000 18.90*** 0.000 19.63*** 0.000 19.89*** 0.000 
Mean y1998-y2007  -0.059  -0.061  -0.059  -0.061  
Mean y2008-y2010   -0.131  -0.134  -0.134  -0.136  
AR(1) Rho  0.648 0.642 0.637 0.638 




When we consider the effect of myopia alone, investors with a low level of 
rebalancing frequency (HELR and in particular LELR groups) invest significantly less 
than investors with a short horizon (HEHR category). We observe no effect from the 
varying level of evaluation frequency as there is no significant difference between the 
varying levels of evaluation frequency given the same level of rebalancing frequency 
(LEHR compared to HEHR and LELR versus HELR). What is particularly important 
for our tests is whether the coefficients for loss aversion differ across groups with 
higher and lower frequencies of evaluation and/or rebalancing.  
For the HEHR group, higher loss aversion leads to significantly lower level of 
risky investments (coefficient of –0.004). Taking into account interaction terms, we 
find that the loss aversion coefficient is not statistically significant for all other 
investors’ groups. This means that higher loss aversion decreases risky assets share, but 
only for the investors who both frequently evaluate and rebalance their portfolios. This 
finding confirms the existence of myopic loss aversion among individual investors.  
On the other hand, neither frequent evaluation of investment results nor frequent 
rebalancing, taken separately appear to systematically increase the effect of loss 
aversion on investors’ portfolio holdings. For example, the differences between loss 
aversion effects for HEHR versus LEHR and for HELR versus LELR groups are small 
and not statistically significant (as shown by Wald test statistics in Table 5). We 
conclude that, for actual investment decisions, it is the combination of rebalancing and 
evaluation frequency that causes the myopic loss aversion effect. Our results are 
consistent with the strong interaction effect between rebalancing and evaluation 
frequencies, found by Langer and Weber (2008) in a controlled experimental setting.  
The risk aversion variable shows expected significantly negative signs, 
indicating that investors, who describe themselves as more risk-averse, invest less in 
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equities. This result is consistent with our assumptions. Considerable disparities are 
observed between investors’ different reference points. As compared with those who 
choose market return as a reference point, investors who choose other reference points 
have significantly less SRFA. Investors who compare their performance to the returns 
on savings accounts have the lowest SRFA. Although individuals’ reference points may 
change over time, depending on stock market performance, especially during a bear 
market period, the question on investors’ reference points is only asked in 2003. Thus, 
we fail to capture the time-specific effects over our sample period.  With regard to 
framing patterns, investors who evaluate the performance of individual company shares 
separately, compared to the omitted category of evaluating the whole portfolio, hold 
significantly less risky assets. Investors who evaluate the performance of both 
individual shares and the whole portfolio, however, invest significantly more.  
With regard to the control variables, as in the case of those of Haliassos and 
Bertaut (1995), our sample does not indicate a significant gender effect. We observe a 
positive relationship between age and the SRFA; older investors hold higher 
proportions of risky financial assets in their portfolios.
 21
 It has also been pointed out by 
Van Rooij et al. (2011) and Hurd (1990) that this could be due to the different mortality 
rates of richer and poorer households, i.e. rich people tend to live longer. Our results, 
however, contrast with the life-cycle theory of Cocco et al. (2005); specifically, their 
argument that the level of optimal investment in risky assets decreases with investors’ 
age. In particular, considering that most Dutch investors are entitled to generous state 
pension (AOW) benefits as well as mandatory supplementary occupational pension 
arrangements, they are perhaps less afraid of holding extra risks in their portfolios, thus 
they hold a higher proportion of risky financial assets.    
                                            
21 The following article reports that self-employed households and couples over 65 years old were the 




Barber and Odean (2000; 2001) find that single investors are less risk averse 
and invest more, while Agnew et al. (2003) argue that stock allocations should be 
higher for married investors, as having dual earners in a household also enables more 
diversification possibilities. In our sample, however, we do not observe any significant 
effect from the marital status of investors. We do not observe a significant education 
effect from our first two model specifications. In model specifications 3 and 4, however, 
we observe that those investors with a college or university degree invest a significantly 
smaller proportion of their financial portfolios in risky financial assets in contrast to our 
expectation, although only at the 10% significance level. These results indicate that 
individuals’ education levels are different from their level of financial literacy (Van 
Rooij et al., 2011; 2012).  
Self-employed and retired individuals invest at significantly higher levels than 
individuals in regular employment. Our finding is consistent with Barsky et al. (1997), 
who argue that self-employed people are more risk tolerant and thus invest more in 
risky assets
22
. Self-employed individuals in the Netherlands can arrange individual 
pension provisions supplementary to their state pension (AOW) benefits. Although they 
are eligible to annual special tax allowance deferring the tax payment over that amount, 
they will not be able to enjoy employer’s contributions (Alessie et al. 2000). Also, their 
risky income stream makes it harder for them to save on a regular basis to their pension 
plans. Therefore, an alternative argument for higher stock-ownership by self-employed 
individuals is for their pension purpose on retirement to generate a ‘pot of gold’.  
 The size of total financial assets is not significantly related to investments in 
risky assets. The effect of debt ratio is, however, positive and significant, showing 
                                            
22
 Using US data, Heaton and Lucas (2000) argue that self-employed investors hold greater amounts of 
their own business equities, but comparably little common stock. We exclude any equity holdings in self-
employed individuals’ own businesses; thus, our finding cannot be explained by the argument of Heaton 
and Lucas (2000). 
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opposite signs from those we expected. This suggests that those investors who hold 
higher levels of total debt in relation to their total assets hold more risky financial assets 
in their financial portfolios, possibly reflecting greater risk tolerance. This finding is 
consistent with that of Heaton and Lucas (2000) who suggest that some stocks are 
indirectly financed by mortgage debts. Consequently, a higher mortgage is associated 
with higher stock holding. Correspondingly, Alessie et al. (2002) report that the 
abolition of the tax deductibility for mortgages on real estate and second-home 
investments in 2001 is due to the exploitation of low mortgage interest and tax 
deductibility benefits by Dutch individuals. In 1999, only 40% of new mortgages were 
issued to purchase first homes, the rest were issued to individuals to speculate on the 
increase in house prices, or to finance stock market operations.   
We observe significant year effects, which reflect high fluctuations in investors’ 
holdings of risky financial assets over time. Taking 1997 as a reference year, we also 
investigate the effect of the 2008 financial crisis as presented in Table 5. Through 
comparing the average values of pre- and post-crisis time dummy variable coefficients, 
we observe that investors’ investment levels fell significantly after the crisis.  
 
3.5.2 The Effect of MLA on the Investment Level Changes Over Time 
To test our second hypothesis, we investigate the joint effects of myopia and 
loss aversion on the yearly changes of the SRFA of individuals. We consider the 
dynamic aspects of investment level changes especially important, as we can identify 
how MLA affects investment decisions over time within our panel dataset. To address 
such dynamic effects, we control for the lagged changes in individuals’ SRFA. To this 
end, we develop a structural state dependence model including the lagged dependent 
variable in addition to those observed exogenous variables and unobserved disturbances.  
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The changes in investment level are also persistently influenced by unobserved 
explanatory variables in our model, consequently causing serial correlations if we fail 
to account for the initial conditions in this dynamic context. Thus we include the initial 
conditions in our model which are derived from individuals’ SRFA levels at the 
beginning of the observation period as suggested by Wooldridge (2005). Including 
investors and non-investors in our sample, the dependent variable has a minimum value 
of -1 and a maximum value of 1, while most observations are concentrated around zero 
due to having a large number of individuals who are consistently holding zero risky 
financial assets over time in our sample.  
             =           +           +   
 
 
 +    
   
  +      +            (3.14) 
 (0   )    
As in Equation (3.13), we control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations in 
the disturbances by employing a Prais-Winston regression (1954) with panel-corrected 
standard error (PCSE) estimates. In equation (3.14),              , the dependent 
variable, (in decimals) denotes the changes in share allocated to risky financial assets 
from total financial assets by individual i over time t (1997–2010). The lagged 
dependent variable,          , and initial investment level          , are included as 
covariates as discussed above. As in our Equation (3.13), in Equation (3.14),     is the 
vector of investors’ time-invariant variables: the levels of myopia, loss aversion and 
discount rates, risk aversion level, time-preference level, reference points, framing 
patterns, gender, marital status, education level, and employment status.        is the 
vector of the annual changes in time-varying characteristics of individuals; these are 
age, financial assets, and debts ratio.     is a vector for the constant, and year dummies. 
      is a normally distributed error term which is robust to the presence of arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.   
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Table 6 The Effect of MLA on the Changes in Investment Level  
 
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard 
error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the 
disturbances. Testing hypothesis H2, the dependent variable (in decimals) is the change in the 
share of total financial assets invested in risky financial assets (SRFA) by individuals. In our 
unbalanced panel, including the lagged dependent variable, the total number of observations 
including zero and non-zero risky financial assets is 2147 from 347 individuals. Corrected z–
statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels are denoted by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, 
and * 10% (p-values are two-tailed). 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆SRFA –/+ Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Lag ∆SRFA – -0.438*** (-20.61) -0.435*** (-20.13) -0.437*** (-20.36) -0.435*** (-20.01) 
SRFA +  0.494*** (23.20)  0.471*** (22.42)  0.481*** (22.69)  0.462*** (21.95) 
Level of Myopia          
HELR +  0.008 (0.49)  0.025 (1.45)  0.014 (0.79)  0.030* (1.77) 
LEHR +  0.018 (0.90)  0.027 (1.33)  0.023 (1.11)  0.032 (1.53) 
LELR +  0.033* (1.92)  0.058*** (3.60)  0.041** (2.44)  0.068*** (4.30) 
Loss Aversion (LA)  – -0.001 (-0.35)  0.000 (-0.31)  0.000 (-0.21)  0.000 (-0.20) 
Level of MLA          
HELR* LA + -0.001 (-0.27)  0.000 (-0.14) -0.001 (-0.50) -0.001 (-0.32) 
LEHR* LA +  0.003 (1.37)  0.003 (1.39)  0.002 (1.10)  0.003 (1.18) 
LELR* LA +  0.000 (-0.21) -0.001 (-0.41) -0.001 (-0.33) -0.001 (-0.51) 
Discount Rate –/+  0.144*** (2.54)  0.128** (2.25)  0.155*** (2.74)  0.140** (2.44) 
Risk Aversion –  0.065*** (5.88)    0.065*** (5.86)   
Time Preferences  –/+ -0.007 (-0.77)   -0.010 (-1.09)   
Reference Points          
Initial Price –  0.013 (0.75)  0.021 (1.23)     
Savings  –  0.020 (1.11)  0.029 (1.61)     
Others –  0.006 (0.26)  0.005 (0.21)     
Framing Patterns          
Individual Shares –  0.009 (0.83)  0.004 (0.32)     
Shares and Portfolio – -0.043*** (-3.79) -0.045*** (-3.91)     
Gender (Men) + -0.009 (-0.75) -0.025** (-2.19) -0.011 (-0.94) -0.025** (-2.27) 
Age – -0.002*** (-4.39) -0.002*** (-3.65) -0.002*** (-4.19) -0.002*** (-3.54) 
Marriage +  0.032*** (2.85)  0.031*** (2.89)  0.031*** (2.86)  0.031*** (2.86) 
Education  + -0.008 (-0.75) -0.006 (-0.64) -0.002 (-0.19) -0.002 (-0.18) 
Occupation          
Self-employed + -0.045** (-2.18) -0.048** (-2.35) -0.041** (-1.99) -0.043** (-2.08) 
Retired + -0.017 (-1.04) -0.015 (-0.91) -0.011 (-0.70) -0.010 (-0.59) 
Others –/+  0.006 (0.41)  0.008 (0.54)  0.006 (0.41)  0.008 (0.54) 
∆ Financial Assets +  0.017*** (2.64)  0.018*** (2.71)  0.018*** (2.80) 0.019*** (2.86) 
∆ Debt ratio – -0.002 (-0.59) -0.002 (-0.60) -0.002 (-0.69) -0.002 (-0.72) 
Year Effect  Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant  -0.061 (-1.62) -0.064* (-1.72) -0.068** (-2.05) -0.066** (-2.00) 
Wald Test   Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. 
HELR=LELR  3.17* 0.075 6.01** 0.014 3.98** 0.046 7.89*** 0.005 
LEHR=LELR  0.62 0.430 2.80* 0.094 0.98 0.322 3.85** 0.050 
AR(1) Rho  0.326 0.319 0.3242 0.3226 





We present four model specifications in Table 6. For all of the specifications, 
the lagged dependent variables are significantly and negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable while initial investment levels are significantly and positively 
related to it. The negative autocorrelation of the changes in SRFA reflects individual 
investors’ responses to the volatile market changes during the sample period. Although 
investors are aware that the market returns exhibit the tendency of mean reversion, they 
may suffer from the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). According to 
this notion, gamblers often bet on a fair chance, perceiving a random sequence as 
reflecting true probabilities. If the sequence consistently favours one direction, they 
expect the next will exhibit the opposite tendency, i.e. a random process will self-
correct. Thus, investors make changes to their SRFA in the direction opposite to their 
previous changes. Positive coefficients from risk aversion also support the risk-seeking 
behaviour of investors in the domain of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
With respect to the effect of myopia, investors with low evaluation frequencies 
increase their SRFA over time, as indicated by the difference in coefficients between 
HEHR and LELR, as well as between HELR and LELR (according to the significant 
Wald test statistics as shown in Table 6). These positive effects from the infrequent 
evaluation become stronger and more significant in our specifications 2 and 4, when we 
exclude the effects of risk aversion and time preference. We observe no significant 
effect from either loss aversion or the interaction between myopia and loss aversion. 
Thus, our results indicate that, regardless of their loss aversion level, investors who 
evaluate their portfolios less frequently increase their SRFA over time. However, it 
appears that most of the myopic loss aversion effect has already made its impact on the 
investment levels in our sample, and the further changes in the portfolio allocations are 
not influenced by MLA.  
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Discount rate coefficients show a positive relationship with the changes in 
SRFA in our specifications. From the risk-aversion variable, we observe positive and 
statistically significant effects, in contrast to our expectations, which specify that highly 
risk averse investors increase their SRFA over time. Although we observe that investors 
with a high level of risk aversion hold significantly less risky financial assets from our 
previous model, this model indicates that they increase their investment over time. This 
phenomenon supports Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who describe the risk-seeking 
behaviour of investors in the domain of losses. According to them, investors tend to 
take more risks to avoid losses than to realise gains. Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post 
(2004) also argue that when investors are confronted with losses, they seek to maximize 
the probability that terminal wealth exceeds their aspiration level, which is to achieve 
their break-even points. This is evidence of the break-even effect, in which loss averse 
investors prefer a gamble over a sure gain when they are below break-even. As such, 
we could expect investors to increase their investments in risky assets after 
experiencing losses.  
Time preference variables and reference points of individuals appear to have no 
influence on the changes in SRFA over time. From the different framing patterns, 
compared to the reference category of the broad framing, evaluating the whole portfolio, 
investors who examine at both the performance of individual shares as well as the 
whole portfolio reduce their SRFA over time, while there is no significant difference 
from individuals who examine at the performance of individual company shares only. 
These results partly support the argument that broad framing which reduces the 
portfolio return volatility induces investors to undertake risk-taking decisions 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993).  
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With regard to the demographical characteristics, we observe that male 
investors reduce their SRFA over time more than female investors. We suspect that 
male investors are more impatient than female investors, thus becoming easily 
pessimistic towards the market. Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) also argue that men 
tend to overtrade due to their over-confidence, yet results for men are worse than those 
for women.  
Investor age shows a negative relationship with the changes in SRFA. 
Although older investors in our sample hold a higher SRFA, this result suggests that 
they reduce their holdings over time, which supports the life-cycle theory of Cocco et al. 
(2005). Marital status also plays a significantly positive role in the changes in the SRFA, 
supporting the argument of Agnew et al. (2003). We observe no significant effect of the 
varying education levels. Comparing different occupations of individuals, a negative 
trend is demonstrated by self-employed individuals as compared to regular employees. 
On the basis of our model specifications, changes in SRFA are significantly affected by 
changes in investors’ financial assets, but not by the changes in their debt ratios.   
 
3.5.3 Redefining Investment Level Changes     
 
As Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2010) note, widespread portfolio inertia 
means that more than half of the households do not trade the stocks in their portfolios 
for extended periods of time. In many cases, investors do not actively rebalance their 
portfolios, but rather follow a passive buy-and-hold strategy. However, as the values of 
their equity holdings change due to market fluctuations, these will mechanically affect 
their shares of risky assets in total assets. In order to avoid treating such changes as 
deliberate investment decisions, possibly driven by MLA or other factors, in this 
section we control for the impact of market returns on the changes in SRFA.  
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We test whether the effects of MLA would be significant when we isolate the 
absolute changes in SRFA made solely by investors, by excluding the changes made 
passively due to market returns over the years. Firstly, we obtain yearly market returns 
   from the AEX Total Return Index, and then calculate investors’ ‘expected’ SRFA 
(SRFA*) at time t through adjusting their SRFA level at time t-1 by the market return 
of     . From the reported values of individuals’ SRFA at time t, we subtract the 
estimated SRFA* value at time t, to obtain the changes made by investors,  .        . 
If investors did not actively change their investment levels in risky financial assets at 
that time,   .          should be equal to zero, on average. We estimate the following 
regression equation (3.15) which is similar to regression equation (3.14) except for the 
redefined dependent variable. We report four specifications of the regression model in 
Table 7 where we observe similar results to those in Table 6.  
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Coefficients for LEHR and LELR are all positive, and 6 out of 8 of them are 
statistically significant. This suggests that changes in the proportion of individual 
investors’ financial portfolios invested in risky assets are positively related to the low 
level of evaluation frequency, supporting our findings. Thus, our robustness check 
confirms that regardless of the loss aversion level, infrequent evaluation positively 
affects investment level changes, supporting Bellemare et al. (2005). With regard to 
other control variables, most relationships are similar to those in Table 6. Thus, we can 
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confirm that redefining the dependent variable by controlling for the impact of market 
return on the changes of investors’ SRFA over time does not influence our results on 
the relationship between myopia, loss aversion and changes in holdings of risky assets.  
 
 
Table 7 The Effect of MLA on the Discretionary Changes in Investments  
 
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard 
error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the 
disturbances. Testing hypothesis H2, the dependent variable is the change in the share of total 
financial assets invested in risky financial assets (SRFA) by individuals, corrected for the 
market return over the period. In our unbalanced panel, including the lagged dependent variable, 
the total number of observations including zero and non-zero risky financial assets is 2147 from 
347 individuals. Corrected z–statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels are denoted 
by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% (p-values are two-tailed). 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
D.SRFA  –/+ Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Lag D.SRFA – -0.431*** (-19.74) -0.429*** (-19.41) -0.431*** (-19.56) -0.430*** (-19.29) 
MRFA +  0.450*** (21.84)  0.433*** (21.29)  0.440*** (21.40)  0.424*** (20.82) 
Level of Myopia          
HELR +  0.007 (0.44)  0.021 (1.30)  0.012 (0.70)  0.026 (1.57) 
LEHR +  0.023 (1.18)  0.030 (1.56)  0.026 (1.36)  0.034* (1.74) 
LELR +  0.030* (1.88)  0.052*** (3.41)  0.038** (2.38)  0.061*** (4.07) 
Loss Aversion (LA) –  0.000 (-0.30)  0.000 (-0.26)  0.000 (-0.19)  0.000 (-0.18) 
Level of MLA          
HELR* LA + -0.001 (-0.34)  0.000 (-0.23) -0.001 (-0.53) -0.001 (-0.36) 
LEHR* LA +  0.001 (0.60)  0.001 (0.63)  0.001 (0.38)  0.001 (0.46) 
LELR* LA +  0.000 (-0.24) -0.001 (-0.42) -0.001 (-0.34) -0.001 (-0.51) 
Discount Rate –/+  0.123** (2.24)  0.109** (1.97)  0.133** (2.42)  0.120** (2.16) 
Risk Aversion –  0.056*** (5.28)    0.056*** (5.30)   
Time Preference  –/+ -0.006 (-0.64)   -0.008 (-0.92)   
Reference Points          
Initial Price –  0.015 (0.91)  0.023 (1.34)     
Savings account –  0.024 (1.35)  0.032* (1.79)     
Others –  0.009 (0.38)  0.008 (0.34)     
Framing Patterns          
Individual Shares –  0.008 (0.72)  0.003 (0.27)     
Shares and Portfolio – -0.040*** (-3.68) -0.041*** (-3.78)     
Gender (Men) + -0.010 (-0.86) -0.023** (-2.19) -0.011 (-1.02) -0.024 (-2.26) 
Age – -0.002*** (-4.14) -0.002*** (-3.46) -0.002*** (-3.97) -0.002*** (-3.37) 
Marriage +  0.029*** (2.72)  0.029*** (2.75)  0.029*** (2.74)  0.028*** (2.74) 
Education  + -0.008 (-0.89) -0.008 (-0.80) -0.003 (-0.34) -0.003 (-0.34) 
Occupation          
Self-employed + -0.040** (-2.07) -0.044** (-2.24) -0.037* (-1.87) -0.039** (-1.96) 
Retired + -0.016 (-1.08) -0.015 (-0.97) -0.011 (-0.74) -0.010 (-0.65) 
Others –/+  0.007 (0.49)  0.009 (0.60)  0.007 (0.49)  0.009 (0.61) 
∆ Financial Assets +  0.019*** (2.91)  0.020*** (2.97)  0.020*** (3.06)  0.021*** (3.11) 
∆ Debt ratio –  0.000 (-0.02)  0.000 (-0.01)  0.000 (-0.14)  0.000 (-0.14) 
Year Effect  Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant  -0.096*** (-2.66) -0.099*** (-2.75) -0.099*** (-3.11) -0.098*** (-3.06) 
AR(1) Rho  0.283 0.280 0.284 0.284 
R-Squared  0.433 0.423 0.428 0.419 
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions  
 
 
We investigate the effects of Myopic Loss Aversion of Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) on individual investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. While myopic loss 
aversion has been studied previously in a laboratory setting, our study is the first to 
establish the effects of myopic loss aversion on actual investment behaviour. We use 
estimates of investors’ myopia and loss aversion, combined with detailed panel data 
from the Dutch Household Survey. Following Langer and Weber (2008), we 
disentangle evaluation frequency from rebalancing frequency. The effect of myopia is 
combined with individuals’ varying levels of loss aversion, which we estimate from 
their responses to the hypothetical intertemporal choice questions developed by Thaler 
(1981) and Loewenstein (1988).  
We observe that the combination of short investment horizons with loss 
aversion has significant negative effects on individuals’ investments in risky financial 
assets. This result confirms that the myopic loss aversion theory of Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) holds for actual investment decisions. Our results also show that both evaluation 
frequency and rebalancing frequency play significant roles. Among highly loss averse 
individuals, only those who both evaluate and rebalance their portfolios frequently 
allocate a lower share to risky financial assets. This result supports the experimental 
findings of Langer and Weber (2008) on the interaction between portfolio evaluation 
and rebalancing. When we further investigate changes in investors’ investments in risky 
financial assets over time, infrequent evaluation influences them positively to increase 
their holdings, but loss aversion has no effect. This result is robust to controlling for the 
impact of market returns on individuals’ levels of risky assets. 
Overall, we find that the widespread existence of myopic loss aversion affects 
the financial decision-making of individuals. High loss aversion, combined with the 
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propensity to frequently evaluate investment performance and to change the 
composition of investment portfolios, leads to lower investments in risky assets and to 
utility losses over investors’ lifetimes. However, once individuals establish their risky 
asset allocations according to their levels of both loss aversion and myopia, myopic loss 
aversion is unlikely to further decrease their levels of risky investments. These results 
support the suggestion that long-term investment vehicles (such as defined contribution 
pension funds) should offer default asset allocations with higher proportions of risky 
assets in order to provide more gains from equity market participation across broader 




Chapter 4 Stock Market Expectations 








We investigate the relationship between individuals’ stock market return expectations 
and risk aversion, and test whether the joint effects arising from the interaction of these 
two variables affect individuals’ investment decisions. Both individuals’ stock market 
expectations and risk aversion levels are elicited from the Dutch National Bank 
Household Survey (DHS) over the period 2004-2006. From our findings, we observe 
that individuals’ risk aversion levels have significant and negative effects on their stock 
market expectations. With regard to individuals’ stock market participation decisions, 
we identify significant and negative effects arising from the interaction between stock 
market expectations and risk aversion in addition to the significant and positive effect 
from stock market return expectations, and the significant and negative effect from risk 
aversion, singularly. Once individuals participate in the stock market, however, their 







There is a growing consensus (Hurd, Van Rooij, and Winter, 2011; Kezdi and 
Willis, 2009; Dominitz and Manski, 2007) that the heterogeneous stock market 
expectations of individuals may provide an answer to the puzzling question as to why 
so few individuals hold stocks (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). Based on the argument of 
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), however, heterogeneity in belief does not appear to 
explain the stockholding puzzle. They state in their paper that, heterogeneity of 
opinions is not promising, since what is required is the perception that a premium 
exists, not that it is of a particular magnitude (pp.1114).  
The motivation of Chapter Four derives from the difference in understanding 
between the current literature which argues that heterogeneous stock market 
expectations alone explain the stockholding puzzle adequately, and the concern raised 
by Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) to the effect that it is crucial to identify whether 
investors hold the perception that a premium exists. Manski (2004) also argues that in 
order to understand individuals’ expectations properly, it is necessary to thoroughly 
investigate individuals’ perceptions of the environment and processing of new 
information.  
As previously argued by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), Donkers 
and van Soest (1999) and Kapteyn and Teppa (2011), there are systematic variations in 
individuals’ risk aversion levels which determine their risk taking decisions. Individuals 
may face the same risk-free rate in the market, while perceiving the uncertainty over 
equity returns differently from each other since they implicitly employ both different 
risk measures and different benchmarks (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008). Most 
studies, including Hurd, Van Rooij, and Winter (2011) and Dominitz and Manski, 2007, 
however, do not emphasise the effect of risk aversion on either stock market 
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expectations or stock holding decisions. In particular, Hurd, Van Rooij, and Winter 
(2011) argue that individuals’ stock market expectations alone can explain the stock 
holding puzzle adequately without any need to invoke individuals’ risk aversion levels. 
According to Rabin and Thaler (2001, p.210), risk aversion is “hesitation over 
risky monetary prospects even when they involve an expected gain”, thus lending 
support to arguments that individuals’ risk aversion levels affect individuals’ stock 
market return expectations negatively and also their stock investment decisions.  As 
such, it is crucial to identify whether the effect of stock market expectations on 
individuals’ portfolio allocation decisions is the same for those with varying levels of 
risk aversion. 
In this study, we account for the negative effect of risk aversion on the stock 
market return expectations of individual investors. Further, we investigate the 
interactions between stock market expectations and risk aversion levels on individuals’ 
portfolio allocation decisions. In order to disentangle the effect of risk aversion from 
that of individuals’ stock market expectations, we first consider whether individuals’ 
stock market expectations depend on their levels of risk aversion. Second, we study 
whether individuals’ stock market expectations and their risk aversion levels jointly 
determine their stock market participation decisions. Thirdly, we test whether for stock 
market investors, their expectations and their levels of risk aversion jointly determine 
their portfolio allocation decisions, i.e. the proportion of risky financial assets held in 
their financial portfolios.  
We obtain both individuals’ stock market expectations and risk aversion levels 
from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) over the period 2004-2006. 
We measure individuals’ stock market expectations by a question which elicits 
individuals’ expectations as to stock price changes one year ahead on the basis of point 
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forecasts in a similar fashion to Vissing-Jørgensen (2003). Our risk aversion measure is 
obtained from a series of questions evaluating individuals’ risk preferences in terms of 
investment strategy
23
. We use the approach suggested by Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) to 
elicit individuals’ risk aversion levels by applying factor analysis to survey responses. 
Our analysis is based on detailed information on individuals’ financial, demographical, 
and behavioural characteristics which is available from the covariate-rich DHS.  
In accounting for the effect of individuals’ stock market expectations on their 
stock market participation decisions, the expectations variable gives rise to a clear 
endogeneity issue given that individuals’ expectations are also affected by their stock 
ownership status. Thus in order to account for the causality issue, we apply 
instrumental variables (IV) estimations with additional variables which act as 
instruments. We consider two instruments, namely individuals’ expectations as to, first, 
their own financial situations, and, second, their investment horizons. These 
instruments are orthogonal within our models and significantly influence individuals’ 
stock market expectations.  
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we observe that individuals’ risk aversion 
levels affect their stock market expectations, significantly and negatively. We also find 
in respect of our second hypothesis, that there are significant and negative interactions 
between stock market expectations and risk aversion levels on stock market 
participation decisions, in addition to their significant singularly effects. Regarding our 
third hypothesis, only stock market expectations exhibit significant and positive effects 
on portfolio allocation decisions, while the effect of risk aversion and of the 
interactions between stock market expectations and risk aversions are insignificant. 
                                            
23
 To compute the risk aversion measure in Chapter 3, only one of the questions that with the most 
explanatory power, available from the DHS is used. In this chapter, we extend our approach in measuring 
risk aversion by including all six available questions from the DHS through applying a Principal 
Component Factor Analysis (PCA) in order to identify one factor variable as suggested by Kapteyn and 
Teppa (2011).  
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These findings confirm that once individuals participate in the stock market, risk 
aversion becomes irrelevant; thus we observe no significant interactions between stock 
market expectations and risk aversion. Nevertheless, individuals’ stock market 
participation decisions are significantly influenced by both their expectations and their 
levels of risk aversion.  
Our study contributes to the literature by addressing the effect of risk aversion in 
linking individuals’ stock market expectations to their stock market participation 
decisions. Additionally, we consider the problem of endogeneity more rigorously than 
prior work does.  In the remainder of this chapter, we present a literature review and 
our research hypotheses in section 2; we discuss our data and constructions of variables 
in section 3; we develop our empirical models and present the results in section 4; 
section 5 discusses our robustness checks; and finally, we summarise and discuss our 
findings in section 6.  
 
4.2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
 
In response to the puzzling question as to why so few investors hold stocks in their 
portfolios (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), there is a growing consensus that the 
heterogeneous expectations of investors provide a possible answer to the stock market 
participation puzzle (Hurd et al. 2011; Kézdi and Willis, 2009; Dominitz and Manski, 
2007). Despite the homogeneous expectation assumption of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) whereby investors apply the same theoretical 
economic model to form the same expectation of market return and risk, these studies 
support the notion that investors’ expectations are heterogeneous. According to Hong 
and Stein (2007), disagreements arise among investors, despite simultaneously 
available public information, because they use different economic models which cause 
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their interpretations of information to diverge from each other (Harris and Raviv, 1993; 
Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Similarly, Hurd (2009) posits that heterogeneous beliefs are 
more likely to be caused by deviations in the manner by which investors access and 
process publicly available information, rather than by private signals or scarcity of 
information.  
Dominitz and Manski (2011) argue that individuals apply ‘interpersonally 
variable’ but ‘intrapersonally stable’ processes when they form their expectations, 
suggesting that the variations can be explained by the different ways in which 
individuals process public information. They categorise individuals by their 
expectations type (random walk, persistence, and mean-reversion) and conclude that 
although the central tendency of expectations takes the form of persistence, individuals’ 
expected equity returns are heterogeneous. Their findings are consistent with those of 
Ito (1990) who argues that even under the extreme violation of the rational expectation 
hypothesis, which is grounded in a Bayesian approach, individuals exhibit widely 
heterogeneous expectations, thus confirming significant ‘individual effects’.  
Since individuals’ expectations determine their consequent actions (Manski, 2004), 
understanding the effects of heterogeneous stock market expectations is recognised as 
crucial in explaining their portfolio allocation decisions. Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) finds 
that the heterogeneous beliefs of American investors are correlated with their 
investment choices, with those who expect higher stock returns holding higher 
proportions of equity in their portfolios. Dominitz and Manski (2007) also argue that 
heterogeneity in expected returns is reflected in individuals’ stock holdings, with the 
probability of holding stocks increasing as US households’ perceived likelihood of 
positive equity returns increases. Both Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) and Dominitz and 
Manski (2007) find that substantial heterogeneity in beliefs reflects demographical and 
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financial characteristics. Hurd et al. (2011) find, consistent with previous US-based 
studies such as Dominitz and Manski (2007), that substantial heterogeneity in the stock 
market expectations of Dutch households is a significant influence on their stock 
ownership. They argue that those households with expectations of higher future returns 
are more likely to own stocks, and those with expectations as  to higher volatility in 
returns are less likely to do so. Based on a larger set of covariates, Hurd et al. (2011), in 
similar manner to Hudomiet et al. (2011) and Kézdi and Willis (2009), also consider 
the influences of socio-demographic information, personal traits (including factors such 
as optimism, trust, and risk aversion) and investment behaviour (including factors such 
as whether investors have recently traded or follow the stock market closely) on 
investors’ expectations. 
 In response to Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Dominitz and Manski (2007) find 
that many investors are not as convinced as are economists about the existence of an 
equity premium as they observe nearly two-thirds of US households believe that the 
probability of positive nominal equity returns is less than fifty per cent. Assuming that 
all individuals face the same risk-free rate and perceive the same level of uncertainty as 
to equity returns, Dominitz and Manski (2007) argue that the subjective probability of 
perceived positive nominal returns on equity determines the probability of equity 
holding. According to Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008), however, individuals 
perceive the level of uncertainty over equity returns differently from each other as they 
implicitly employ both different risk measures and different benchmarks. Their findings 
are consistent with the ‘disagreements models’ of Hong and Stein (2007). In particular, 
Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers and van Soest (1999) and Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) 
argue that different types of individuals are characterised by varying levels of risk 
aversion, symptomatic of their background and wealth characteristics.  
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Subsequently, Hurd et al. (2011) address individuals’ risk aversion as an influential 
factor on stock market expectations. They find, however, that risk aversion has only a 
limited effect on both individuals’ expected stock market returns and volatility and on 
their stockholding decisions. Thus they conclude that individuals’ stock market 
expectations alone explain the stock holding puzzle adequately, without a need to 
invoke very high levels of risk aversion. The study of Kézdi and Willis (2009) is the 
only one which considers risk aversion as a link between individuals’ subjective beliefs 
and their stockholdings. The estimated constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
parameters of individuals in their study are, however, much smaller than those 
identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985) using historical stock market returns. Thus 
they conclude that the effect of risk aversion as a link between individuals’ beliefs and 
their stockholding is only moderate. These findings on heterogeneity in stock market 
expectations as well as on risk preferences are important, as both factors play a 
significant role in determining investment decisions.  
After comparing different risk aversion measures, Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) 
argue that results are sensitive to the specific measures used; in particular the measures 
suggested by Barsky et al. (1997) have little explanatory power. Both Kézdi and Willis 
(2009) and Hurd et al. (2011) estimate individuals’ risk aversion on the basis of survey 
responses to hypothetical gambles over lifetime income, developed by Barsky et al. 
(1997). Thus, the findings of Kézdi and Willis (2009) and Hurd et al. (2011), require 
careful interpretation and further validation by the application of a more powerful risk 
aversion measure.  
Adopting different measures for both stock market returns expectations and the 
risk aversion of individuals from those used by Kézdi and Willis (2009), and Hurd et al. 
(2011), we disentangle the effect of risk aversion from that of individuals’ expectations.  
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Firstly, we hypothesise that more risk averse individuals hold lower stock market 
returns expectations. 
Hypothesis 1) More risk averse individuals hold lower stock market return 
expectations.  
Secondly, we hypothesise that the interactions between stock market return 
expectations and individuals’ risk aversion levels result in negative effects on their 
stock market participation decisions.  
Hypothesis 2) The stock market return expectations of more risk averse individuals 
have a negative effect on their stock market participation decisions.  
Thirdly, we hypothesise that the interactions between investors’ levels of risk 
aversion and stock market return expectations have negative effects on their portfolio 
allocation decisions, i.e. the proportion of their financial portfolios allocated to risky 
financial assets. 
Hypothesis 3) The stock market return expectations of more risk averse investors 
have a negative effect on their portfolio allocation decisions.  
 
4.3 Data Description and Construction of the Variables 
 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Selection  
 
This study uses the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) which is an 
online survey conducted by the CentERdata panel in the Netherlands. Since 1993, this 
survey has been completed annually by approximately 3,000 panel members over 16 
years old from about 2,000 households. With regard to the demographic characteristics 
of panel members, it is believed that the average panel member has experience and 
knowledge similar to that of the average person living in the Netherlands. Of the 
finance studies using this panel, Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) study the 
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preferences of individual investors on dividend payments; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2008) investigate individuals’ risk perceptions and measurements; Veld-Merkoulova 
(2011) evaluates the relationship between investment horizon, labour income, and the 
portfolio choice of individual investors; and Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011, 
2012) discuss the effect of financial literacy on stock market participation, retirement 
planning and household wealth. Recently, using the LISS panel
24
, Kaplanski, Levy, 
Veld, and Veld-Merkoulova (2012) study the effects of sentiment-creating factors on 
individuals’ perceived risk and stock market returns.  
We obtain the data on individuals’ stock market return expectations, which were the 
subject of a supplementary question asked by the DHS the period from 2004 to 2006, 
from the Economic and Psychological Concepts section. This period includes a market 
rebound and modest recovery, with revival starting in 2003, after three years of 
declining stock market prices worldwide following the dot-com crisis of 2001. On 
average, the DHS takes 7 to 8 months to obtain data covering the entire survey.  
Questions are only asked during the weekend and most respondents answer during 
the first weekend that the questions are available. The stock market return question was 
released around late spring, and the majority of members answered on the 16th, 19th and 
16th weekend of the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. We specify the response 
dates for the majority of individuals each year by drawing vertical lines in the graph in 
Figure 3, which shows the movements of the AEX and MSCI World total return indices 
from 2001 to 2009 (covering three years before and after our survey period) as a point 
of reference. There is a high correlation (0.9783; significant at 1% level) between these 
indices. 
 
                                            
24
 Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) survey panel from the CentERdata; more 
information is available at: http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/ 
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The Figure below presents the historical performances of the AEX and MSCI World Total Return Index 
(RI) from 2001 to 2009, which spans three years before and after our survey period. The vertical lines 
indicate the timing of the repose from the individuals to the stock market expectation question each year.   
 
  
                                            
25
 According to the Statistical Bulletin (June 2006, pp.21-25) reported by the Dutch National Bank, 
Dutch private investors, on average, hold only about 35% of their portfolios in foreign securities, 
indicating that the reminder is invested in the Netherlands. Thus, we include the MSCI World market 
index in addition to the AEX Dutch market index as reference levels.  
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Table 8 Sample Selection Process and Data Overview 
 
Panel A - Sample Selection Process  
 
The table below presents a sample selection process in our dataset for each year. We merge the stock 
price expectations survey question with general information of the household, assets and liabilities, and 
economic and psychological concepts datasets from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS).   
  
Sample Selection Process (Total number of Observations) 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Number of individuals’ contacted 2015 2056 1779 5850 
















Stock Market Expectations Question 1343 1359 1073 3775 
Sample selecting process from merging with      
General Information on the Household Questions 1343 1359 1073 3775 
Assets and Liabilities Questions 1186 1136 944 3266 
Economic and Psychological Concepts Questions 1062 1029 865 2956 
Total number of Observations 1062 1029 865 2956 
 
Panel B - Background Characteristics    
 
We present background characteristics of our sample measured for each year, including gender, marital 
status, age group, education level, employment status, house ownership status. The quartile values of 
individuals’ total financial assets and net worth are presented in Euros. We also present the percentage of 
investors in the sample and the share of risky assets in financial portfolios held by investors.  
 
Variables  2004 2005 2006 Total 
Gender Female 0.363 0.374 0.331 0.360 
Marital Status Married 0.769 75.5 0.768 0.764 
Age Groups 35 and less 0.184 0.197 0.160 0.181 
 From 36 to 50 0.320 0.290 0.252 0.279 
 From 51 to 65 0.319 0.346 0.390 0.349 
 65 and over 0.177 0.196 0.199 0.190 
Education College degree  0.497 0.477 0.476 0.484 
Employment Regular  0.562 0.538 0.513 0.540 
 Self-employed 0.043 0.041 0.047 0.044 
 Retired 0.199 0.216 0.245 0.218 
 Unemployed 0.123 0.129 0.117 0.123 
 Others 0.073 0.076 0.077 0.075 
House Owner  Owner  0.754 0.740 0.751 0.748 
Financial Asset  25% € 4,643 € 4,089 € 3,989 € 4,285 
(Percentile) 50% € 16,533 € 17,280 € 16,500 € 16,662 
 75% € 41,325 € 47,185 € 52,859 € 45,954 
Net Worth  25% € 12,312 € 12,866 € 13,038 € 12,809 
(Percentile) 50% € 68,163 € 85,119 € 96,504 € 82,423 
 75% € 216,922 € 240,640 € 261,755 € 237,189 
Market Participation                                              Investors 0.339 0.344 0.347 0.343 
% of Risky Financial  25% 13.36% 10.52% 13.06% 12.23% 
Held by Investors 50% 33.84% 29.17% 36.67% 32.89% 
(Percentile) 75% 56.92% 59.06% 63.83% 60.97% 
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Our sample selection process is presented in Panel A of Table 8. The participation 
rate is around 74% which includes 13% ‘I don’t know’ responses. We exclude missing 
values as well as ‘I don’t know’ responses. Our  panel dataset is then constructed by 
merging the expectation question with the datasets of the General Information on the 
Household section to obtain respondents’ demographical backgrounds; the Aggregate 
dataset of Asset and Liabilities which provides the information about respondents’ asset 
allocations, (we exclude missing values and those with zero financial assets); and the 
Economic and Psychological Concepts section which includes questions allowing us to 
measure risk aversion and other behavioural factors. We obtain a total of 2956 
observations from 1587 individuals over 3 years.  
As presented in Panel B of Table 8, the sample composition is similar over all years. 
Over our entire sample, we have about 36% of female respondents, and 64% of male 
respondents; about 76% are married or living with a partner; about 18% are less than 35 
years old, 28% are between 36 and 50, 35% are between 51 and 65, and 19% are over 
65, and about 50% have received a vocational college or university education. About 
half are in regular employment; about 5% are self-employed; about 20% are retired; 
about 10% are unemployed and less than 10% have other employment statuses; and 
about 75% own their house.  
The DHS specifies detailed information concerning the assets, liabilities and 
mortgages of members. The aggregated data set includes a total of twenty-four main 
asset components, eight debt components and three mortgage components
26
. From the 
list of financial assets, we define risky financial assets as the sum of individual 
company shares, mutual funds
27
, options and business equities. We treat other financial 
                                            
26
 Values are determined by the market value on the last day of the previous year, e.g. in 2004, values are 
recorded as at 31 December 2003. 
27
 The DHS does not specify subcomponents of the mutual fund category. Thus, if investors hold 
balanced funds, this category will include some element of fixed income ownership. According to 
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assets as non-risky, comprising savings and checking accounts, bonds, single-premium 
annuity insurance policies, employer sponsored savings plans, money lent to friends 
and family, and other savings or investments.
28
 We report quartile values of 
individuals’ financial assets and net worth29 in Euros. Over our entire sample, there are 
about 34% of investors who hold about 33% (median) of risky financial assets within 
their financial asset portfolios.  
 
4.3.2 Measuring Subjective Stock Market Expectations   
Individuals’ stock market expectations are estimated by their point forecasts in 
similar fashion to Vissing-Jørgensen (2003). The wording of the stock market 
expectation question which we consider in this study is as follows:  
“How do you expect worldwide stock prices to move over the next two years - 
will stock prices increase, decrease or remain about the same? How many percentage 
points do you expect them to increase or decrease by per year?”  
The question combines two parts to elicit individuals’ expectations as to, firstly, 
the direction of future stock price movements, and secondly, changes in the magnitude 
of future returns. For our study, we only use expected changes in magnitude. Although 
Hurd et al. (2011) use the same panel to conduct their study, our question differs from 
those used by them. In their study, individuals are asked to imagine a hypothetical 
situation in which they unexpectedly received 10,000 Euros from a rich relative, and 
                                                                                                                               
Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2004), about 50% of the total amount in mutual funds was invested 
in the stock market; about 30% in real estate; and about 10% in bonds in the Netherlands. 
28
 Although we do not have information on individuals’ retirement account, Dimmock and Kouwenberg 
(2010) note that in the Netherlands, the system of employer-sponsored pensions covers most employees, 
as it is controlled by the state and over 95% of these pensions are defined-benefit plans. Although we are 
aware that tax deferred equity investment in retirement accounts could influence individuals’ private 
investment decisions, we do not account for the effects in this study. This is acknowledged as a limitation.  
29 Net worth is calculated by deducting total debts from total assets. Total assets comprise financial and 
fixed assets including real estate, and owners’ houses, and cash value of insurance on real estate and 
owners’ houses. Debts include private loans, extended lines of credit, debt with mail-order firms, loans 
from family and friends, student loans, credit card debt, and other debts, as well as mortgages on real 
estate and owners’ houses.  
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are considering investing this amount in a mutual fund investing principally in blue 
chip stocks. Hurd et al. (2011) elicit individuals’ beliefs as to the probability of eight 
possible outcomes, namely, gains and losses of more than 0%, 10%, 20%, and 30%, 
respectively, over a one year horizon.  
The questions give rise to some concerns as to their validity, since according to 
Fitzsimons and Shiv (2001), hypothetical questions influence respondents’ underlying 
psychological processes, consequently affecting their responses. The value of the 
hypothetical inheritance of 10,000 Euros to respondents may vary depending on their 
current wealth levels. The hypothetical inheritance may also create an endowment 
effect, distorting individuals’ views (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990).  
Compared to that of Hurd et al. (2011), the question we use is simple and 
straightforward, eliciting individuals’ intuitive expectations as to stock market returns 
worldwide. It is free from any potential bias arising from the incorporation of 
hypothetical circumstances. It may appear to compel respondents to provide point 
forecasts for their expectations without allowing them to express their uncertainty about 
the future (Manski, 2004). Nevertheless, Hurd et al. (2011) emphasise that most 
individuals in the CentERdata panel are experienced survey respondents and are likely, 
therefore, to provide meaningful answers.  
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of the survey results from the individuals’ 
subjective stock market expectations question. To control for extreme outliers, we 
undertake a 99% winsorisation of each year’s responses. In 2004, individuals indicate 
that stock prices will increase over the next two years by 3.82% per year on average 
(median: 2%); the average expected rate decreases to 2.25% in 2005 (median: 0%); and 
in 2006, individuals believe the market will increase on average by 3.94% per year 
(median: 3%).  
116 
 
Table 9 Stock Market Return Expectations Question and Results 
The following table presents the results of individuals’ expectations for the stock market returns over 2004-2006 in our sample. We report separate results for investors and 
non-investors in our sample. T values for the mean differences and Z scores from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for the median differences between investors and 
non-investors responses are reported from the estimations. The significance level is defined by the p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%* (p-values are two-tailed). 
 
Stock Market Expectations (%): “How do you expect stock prices to do over the next two years? By how many percentage points do you expect them to 
increase or decrease per year?”  
 
 All Individuals Investors Non-Investors Mean Median 
% Mean Median S.D Min Max N Mean Median S.D Min Max N Mean Median S.D Min Max N T-Stat Z-Score 
2004 3.82% 2% 7.61% -25% 40% 1062 6.00% 5% 7.88% -25% 40% 359 2.71% 0% 7.21% -25% 40% 703 6.62*** 8.33*** 
2005 2.35% 0% 6.22% -25% 30% 1029 3.64% 2% 5.91% -30% 30% 354 1.67% 0% 6.27% -25% 30% 675 4.96*** 6.05*** 
2006 3.94% 3% 6.09% -20% 30% 865 5.51% 5% 5.40% -10% 30% 300 3.10% 2% 6.28% -20% 30% 565 5.89*** 7.07*** 
Total 3.34% 2% 6.76% -25% 40% 2956 5.03% 5% 6.62% -25% 40% 1013 2.46% 0% 6.65% -25% 40% 1942 9.98*** 12.22*** 
 
Table 10 Risk Aversion Measure and Principal Component Factor Analysis    
The table below presents descriptive statistics from the responses, and factor analysis results. From our entire 2956 observations over three years, we create a factor based on 
principal component factor analysis (PCA). Individuals indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 to what extent they agree with the following statements, where 1 indicates ‘totally 
disagree’ and 7 indicates ‘totally agree’. [R] indicates that individuals’ responses are reversed to make consistent interpretations that the lowest scale is the least risk averse 
and the highest scale is the most risk averse. Communalities indicate the reliability of the factor variable presenting the percentage of variance of each question explained by 
the factor, and factor loadings are the measure of correlation coefficients between each risk preference question and the factor variable. 
 
Risk Preference Questions Mean Median S.D Communalities Factor Loadings  
R1) I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed  
returns than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns.  
5.20 6 1.59 0.411 0.641 
R2) I would never consider investments in shares because I find this too risky. 4.25 4 2.02 0.456 0.675 
R3) If I think an investment will be profitable; I am prepared to borrow  
money to make this investment. [R] 
5.70 6 1.56 0.277 0.526 
R4) I want to be certain that my investments are safe.  5.47 6 1.27 0.360 0.600 
R5) I get more and more convinced that I should take greater financial  
risks to improve my financial position. [R] 
5.07 5 1.70 0.327 0.572 
R6) I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a  
chance to gain money. [R] 
5.25 6 1.55 0.608 0.779 
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Both mean and median values of individuals’ expectation in 2005 are 
significantly lower than those of any other year at the 1% level of significance (two-
tailed). However, the differences between 2004 and 2006 are not significant. We 
observe that individuals’ expected stock market returns are much lower than the 
historical averages. The geometric average annual rate of return calculated from the 
AEX total return index over 1983-2006 is 14.1%, and that from the MSCI World total 
return is 11.4%. In particular, the geometric average annual rate of returns, calculated 
from the AEX and MSCI World total return indices, are 13.75% and 13.53% 
respectively for our survey period of 2004-2006. Thus our findings reinforce those of 
Hurd et al. (2011) as to the pessimistic views regarding the stock market held by Dutch 
individuals.   
Following Dominitz and Manski (2007), we also account for individuals’ 
perceptions as to the existence of an equity premium, in addition to the particular 
magnitude of their expectations. From the distribution of individuals’ responses, we 
observe that only about fifty per cent of individuals recognise a premium for holding 
stocks. The percentages of respondents who expect positive returns from stock markets 
over the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 are 53%, 43%, and 60%, respectively. Over the 
period as a whole, the percentage of positive expectations increases.  
To test whether or not there is a significant shift to more optimistic views in 
2006, we undertake a binomial probability test. Our test result confirms that the 
probability of positive expectations in 2006 is significantly higher than in 2004 at the 
1% level. The percentage of positive expectations in 2005 is significantly lower than in 
any other year at the 1% level. A significant drop both in the percentage of individuals 
expecting positive returns, as well as in the magnitude of returns expected in 2005 
indicates that individuals’ expectations are affected strongly by the most recent stock 
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market performance prior to the dates when the survey was executed. Figure 3 indicates 
that individuals’ responses are obtained immediately following a small decline in stock 
prices. This supports the arguments of De Bondt (1993, 1998) and Graham and Harvey 
(2001) to the effect that individuals’ expectations are influenced strongly by their recent 
experiences.  
By comparing both the mean and median values each year, Table 9 also shows 
that investors expect significantly higher stock market returns than do non-investors. 
This systematic difference in expectations between investors and non-investors 
highlights the issue of causality between stock market expectations and stock 
ownership. Investors may hold higher expectations as to stock market returns because 
of their ‘wishful expectations’ (Ito, 1990), or, alternatively, these expectations may 
reflect factors such as familiarity with recent stock market history and belief in the 
existence of an equity premium. We therefore treat the stock market expectations 
variable as endogenous in order to better understand the direction of the relationship.  
 
4.3.3 Measuring Risk Aversion 
 
We measure risk aversion of individuals based on six questions available from 
the DHS, which evaluate individuals’ risk preferences in terms of investment strategy. 
Table 10 (pp.104) presents descriptive statistics including values of mean, median and 
standard deviations from individuals’ responses on six questions (R1-R6) over three 
years.  Individuals indicate whether or not they agree or disagree with six statements 
such as, “I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns 
than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns” on a scale from 
1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Questions R1, R2, and R4 are concerned with 
the strength of individuals’ preferences for safe investments while questions R3, R5, 
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and R6 are concerned with individuals’ appetite for incurring risk in order to maximise 
possible profits. Individuals’ responses to questions R3, R5, and R6 are therefore 
reversed in order to ensure that, in the case of all questions, the lowest point on the 
scale represents the least risk averse while the highest point on the scale represents the 
most risk averse.  
We elicit the risk aversion of individuals by a relatively simple application of 
factor analysis to survey responses, taking the same approach as in Kapteyn and Teppa 
(2011). Including all six questions, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) estimate is 
undertaken, applying the extraction method to create one factor variable. We report 
communalities and factor loadings from each risk preference question in Table 10. 
Communalities indicate the reliability of the factor variable in terms of the percentage 
of variance of each question explained by the factor. Factor loadings are the measure of 
correlation coefficients between each risk preference question, i.e. each component of 
the factor variable, and the factor variable estimated from the PCA
30
.  The risk aversion 
factor variable has a mean of zero and a variance of one, which correlates more than 50% 
with the responses for each of the six questions. 
Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) argue that eliciting risk aversion by the relatively 
simple approach of factor analysis through utilising survey responses is more powerful 
than that of Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2007) which is based on complex 
economic theory. Barsky et al. (1997) develop a hypothetical question which estimates 
respondents’ willingness to take a gamble on a 50:50 chance of either doubling their 
current income or having it reduced by a third. Kimball et al. (2007) extend the 
scenarios further by incorporating varying levels of downside risk. Risk aversion 
measures which estimate individuals’ attitudes towards gambles over their lifetime 
                                            
30
 For more information, please refer to Jolliffe (2005) on Principal Component Analysis.  
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income are, however, affected by the level of risk inherent in their current portfolios. 
For example, individuals who hold risky portfolios will avoid betting on a safe income 
stream. Likewise, those who hold safe portfolios are likely to consider taking gambles 
over their income (Kapteyn and Teppa, 2011). Given the possibility of such outcomes, 
these risk aversion measures are misleading as measures of the true risk aversion of 
individuals.  
Since different measures of risk aversion give rise to variations in their validity 
and predictive power, it is important to acknowledge that results are sensitive to 
different measures. In particular, after comparing different risk aversion measures in 
their study of subjective measures of risk aversion, Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) argue 
that the measures suggested by Barsky et al. (1997) have little explanatory power. Both 
Kézdi and Willis (2009) and Hurd et al. (2011), however, estimate individuals’ risk 
aversion on the basis of survey responses to hypothetical gambles over lifetime income, 
developed respectively by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2007) and Barsky et al. (1997). 
Thus, the findings of Kézdi and Willis (2009) and Hurd et al. (2011) that risk aversion 
has only a limited effect on individuals’ stock market returns expectations and that 
individuals’ stock market expectations alone explain the stock holding puzzle 
adequately, require careful interpretation and further validation by the application of a 
more powerful risk aversion measure.  
In order to test whether the risk aversion factor captures the heterogeneity 
among individuals, we run a cross-sectional pooled linear regression by developing the 
following equation (4.1). 
(4.1)                =  +        +      + 𝜀    




The dependent variable,        , denotes an individual i’ risk aversion factor in 
terms of decimal at time t.       is the sum of vectors of demographical and financial 
characteristics measured for each year including gender, marital status, age group, 
education level, employment status, house ownership status, financial assets and net 
worth.     is a vector of year dummies.   is a constant. 𝜀    is a normally distributed 
error term with a mean of zero. The standard errors are clustered by individuals and are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  
In Table 11, we denote an expected sign, i.e. negative or positive, for the 
coefficient of each independent variable with regard to its relationship with the 
dependent variable, the risk aversion factor. Due to high collinearity between age group 
and employment status, and between financial assets and net worth quartiles, 31  in 
addition to the full model (1), we present regressions (2) – (5) which exclude each 
categorical variable which is subject to multicollinearity. Our results presented in Table 
11 support the previous research findings of Barsky et al. (1997) and Kapteyn and 
Teppa (2011) that individuals’ hold heterogeneous risk preferences. Females and older 
individuals are much more risk averse than males and younger individuals. More 
                                            
31
 From the full model (1) in Table 11, we obtain the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 1.95, and 
the highest VIF value of 3.99 from the age group category, 65<Age. Although these values are much 
lower than the rule of the thumb value of 10 for severe multicollinearity within the model (O’Brien, 
2007), there are significant relationships between age group and employment status, and also between 
financial assets and net worth quartiles according to the Pearson Chi-squared tests summarised below. 
Thus, we exclude each variable from regressions (2) – (5) to determine whether the collinearity of these 
variables affects the magnitude of coefficients and the significance levels of other variables.  
 
  
Employment Status  
 
  Net Worth 
Age Regular Self-employed Retired Unemployed Others Total 
 Financial 
asset 
1 2 3 4 Total 
35 and 
Less 
416 36 0 68 16 536  1 479 100 110 49 738 
36≤Age 
≤50 
643 50 0 93 40 826  2 230 230 193 86 739 
51≤Age 
≤65 
533 39 175 146 139 1,032  3 26 319 223 172 740 
65<Age 
3 4 470 58 27 562  4 3 92 213 431 739 
Total 1,595 129 645 365 222 2,956  Total 738 741 739 738 2,956 




educated individuals are relatively less risk averse. Self-employed individuals are less 
risk averse, while retired individuals are more risk averse than those in regular 
employment. Individuals whose holdings of financial assets fall within the upper 
quartiles are less risk averse than those whose holdings occupy the lowest quartile of 
the distribution, confirming a significant wealth effect. The opposite signs from the 
holdings of net worth observed in regression (1)–(3) disappear when financial assets 
quartiles are omitted from regression (5), which indicate that there are no variations 
between the upper quartiles of net worth and the lowest quartile of the distribution (an 
absence of significant variation of risk aversion is also observed in the univariate test).   
Although Hoffmann, Post and Pennings (2013) find that individuals’ risk 
tolerance and perception fluctuate over time in a similar fashion to their stock market 
expectations, we do not observe a significant year effect. Our findings indicate that the 
risk aversion levels of individuals remains stable during the survey period which covers 
a relatively buoyant market period. The relationship between individuals’ risk aversion 
factors and their stock market return expectations is significantly negative with a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of - 12.84% (at the 0% significance level, two-tailed).  
In order to investigate the interactions between individuals’ stock market 
expectations and risk aversion, we create a dummy variable which determines high and 
low levels of risk aversion for the factor variable at a cut-off point of zero. Within the 
sample period, about 20% of individuals move from the low to the high level of risk 
aversion, while about 20% move from high to low. Again, our sample results 
demonstrate that most, although not all, individuals remain at the same risk aversion 
level over time. Overall, our measure of risk aversion captures significant heterogeneity 




Table 11 Heterogeneity in Individuals’ Risk Aversion   
 
From 2956 observations from 1587 individuals, we present OLS regression results. The dependent variable is stock market return expectations. Our standard errors are 
clustered by each individual and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is defined by the two-tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Risk Aversion Factor (decimal) –/+ Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Female +  0.488*** (8.81)  0.484*** (9.37)  0.494*** (8.87)  0.460*** (8.55)  0.479*** (8.64) 
Married +  0.013 (0.23)  0.029 (0.52)  0.013 (0.23)  0.005 (0.08)  0.016 (0.28) 
36≤ Age ≤50 +  0.085 (1.25)  0.085 (1.25)    0.103 (1.52)  0.068 (1.00) 
51≤ Age ≤65 +  0.286*** (3.89)  0.329*** (4.57)    0.310*** (4.32)  0.261*** (3.59) 
65<Age +  0.321*** (3.08)  0.535*** (6.69)    0.349*** (3.39)  0.298*** (2.87) 
Education (High) – -0.090* (-1.79) -0.090* (-1.80) -0.123*** (-2.50) -0.086* (-1.72) -0.105** (-2.10) 
Self-employed – -0.233** (-2.28)   -0.243** (-2.42) -0.235** (-2.31) -0.284*** (-2.81) 
Retired +  0.243*** (2.72)    0.399*** (6.31)  0.242*** (2.70)  0.238*** (2.65) 
Unemployed +  0.111 (1.36)    0.170** (2.15)  0.102 (1.24)  0.106 (1.30) 
Other occupations – -0.067 (-0.69)    0.036 (0.38) -0.069 (-0.71) -0.058 (-0.59) 
House owners – -0.070 (-1.11) -0.065 (-1.02) -0.091 (-1.43) -0.013 (-0.22) -0.037 (-0.58) 
Financial assets (Q_2) – -0.034 (-0.56) -0.035 (-0.58) -0.019 (-0.32) -0.001 (-0.01)   
Financial assets (Q_3) – -0.117* (-1.72) -0.127* (-1.87) -0.086 (-1.28) -0.054 (-0.87)   
Financial assets (Q_4) – -0.280*** (-3.53) -0.293*** (-3.73) -0.249*** (-3.14) -0.204*** (-2.84)   
Net worth (Q_2) –  0.099 (1.49)  0.090 (1.35)  0.106 (1.59)    0.018 (0.29) 
Net worth (Q_3) –  0.158** (2.06)  0.152** (1.96)  0.207*** (2.71)    0.038 (0.52) 
Net worth (Q_4) –  0.158* (1.82)  0.162* (1.85)  0.239*** (2.77)   -0.028 (-0.36) 
Year 2005 +  0.038 (1.24)  0.039 (1.24)  0.043 (1.37)  0.039 (1.27)  0.038 (1.24) 
Year 2006  – -0.011 (-0.33) -0.010 (-0.28)  0.002 (0.06) -0.013 (-0.38) -0.010 (-0.31) 
Constant  -0.332*** (-3.69) -0.342*** (-3.82) -0.225*** (-2.70) -0.317*** (-3.59) -0.339*** (-3.85) 
R-squared  0.099 0.091 0.089 0.097 0.092 
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4.3.4 Other Behavioural factors  
We identify other behavioural factors which influence both individuals’ stock 
market expectations and portfolio allocation decisions. In Appendix B, we present both 
survey questions and mean values for the dummy variables. In responding to the DHS, 
individuals are requested to indicate as to how knowledgeable they consider themselves 
to be with regard to financial matters. It has been documented that investors of higher 
financial literacy are able to undertake more advanced economic evaluations (Van 
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011; 2012). Based on individuals’ self-evaluated financial 
knowledge levels, we identify whether those who believe themselves to be highly 
knowledgeable investors form their expectations and investment decisions differently 
from those who perceive themselves as the opposite.  
Additionally, we assess whether individuals’ expectations vary depending on 
the source of advice they receive, broadly categorised as (1) parents and friends, (2) the 
media, (3) professional advisers, and (4) others. Canner, Mankiw, and Weil (1997) 
point out that disclosure of individuals’ most important financial sources of advice 
reveals the most important influences on them when forming expectations. According 
to Shiller (1990), investors’ mental frames are shared socially, and easily manipulated 
by the news media, discussions with families and friends, and recommendations from 
financial advisors. Similarly, De Bondt (1998) states that investors’ seemingly 
irrational behaviour reflects the popular financial advice they receive, arguing that 
many individuals make investment decisions which lack rigorous consideration, being 
based on impulse or on random tips from acquaintances. Furthermore, De Bondt (1998) 
argues that those investors who rely on the most informal advice tend to be more 
pessimistic in their attitude to risk. In contrast, those who receive advice from 
professional finance advisors are more likely to be investors. 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1 Risk Aversion on Stock Market Expectations  
 
In order to test our first hypothesis that individuals’ stock market expectations 
are affected negatively by risk aversion, we develop the following equation (4.2). 
(4.2)          𝑥   =  +      +        +       +      + 𝜀    
       𝜀   ~ (0  𝜀
 ) 
The dependent variable,  𝑥    , denotes an individual i’ stock market expectation 
in terms of percentage (%) at time t.       is a dummy variable for risk aversion.       is 
the sum of vectors of demographical and financial characteristics measured for each 
year including gender, marital status, age group, education level, employment status, 
house ownership status, financial assets and net worth.       is the sum of vectors of 
behavioural factors including self-evaluated financial knowledge level, and source of 
most important financial advice.     is a vector of year dummies.   is a constant. 𝜀    is a 
normally distributed error term with a mean of zero. The standard errors are clustered 
by individuals and are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Table 12 presents five estimation results based on our equation. We denote an 
expected sign, i.e. negative or positive for the coefficient of each independent variable 
with regard to the relationship with individuals’ stock market return expectations. 
Regression (1) presents the full model, and due to high collinearity between age group 
and employment status, and between financial assets and net worth quartiles, we 
present regressions (2) – (5) which exclude each categorical variable, included in the 
full model, which is subject to multicollinearity.  
We observe significant and negative effects arising from individuals’ risk 
aversion levels which results in them holding negative stock market expectations 
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consistent with our first hypothesis. We observe a highly significant gender effect in 
that females expect much lower stock market returns than males, consistent with the 
finding of Hurd et al. (2011) that females are much more pessimistic than males. 
Individuals with higher levels of education hold higher stock market expectations, and 
those who are over 65 hold more negative expectations than those aged less than 36. In 
regression (2) in Table 12, where employment status is excluded, the age effects 
become more significant (at the 5% level, two-tailed). Likewise in regression (3), those 
individuals who are retired hold significantly negative stock market return expectations 
(at the 0% level, two-tailed). With regard to regressions (4) and (5), individuals with 
higher financial assets and who fall within higher net worth quartiles expect 
significantly higher stock market returns than those within the lowest quartile.  
The effect of individuals’ self-evaluated financial knowledge level is significant. 
Those with higher levels of self-evaluated financial knowledge hold higher 
expectations than those perceiving themselves as less knowledgeable. The effect of the 
most important source of financial advice is also significant. Compared to those who 
rely on the most informal source of advice, i.e. advice from families and friends, 
individuals who receive advice from the media, professional financial advisors, and 
other sources expect significantly higher returns. With regard to year dummies, we 
observe that individuals’ stock market expectations in year 2005, but not in year 2006, 
are significantly lower than in year 2004, as discussed previously.  
In support of our first hypothesis, we conclude that individuals’ stock market 
return expectations are heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity is determined 
significantly by their levels of risk aversion, as well as changes in their expectations 
over time, while also reflecting significant effects arising from other control variables 
including demographical, financial, and behavioural factors in the model.  
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Table 12 Heterogeneity in Stock Market Return Expectations  
 
From 2956 observations from 1587 individuals, we present OLS regression results. The dependent variable is stock market return expectations. Our standard errors are 
clustered by each individual and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is defined by the two-tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stock Market Expectations (%) –/+ Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Risk Aversion (1-High)  – -0.845*** (-2.90) -0.852*** (-2.96) -0.875*** (-3.02) -0.833*** (-2.85) -0.863*** (-2.97) 
Female – -1.458*** (-4.04) -1.401*** (-4.26) -1.481*** (-4.07) -1.582*** (-4.70) -1.431*** (-3.98) 
Married +  0.188 (0.52)  0.225 (0.64)  0.217 (0.60)  0.142 (0.39)  0.183 (0.50) 
36≤ Age ≤50 – -0.025 (-0.05) -0.045 (-0.09)      0.053 (0.11)  0.026 (0.05) 
51≤ Age ≤65 – -0.510 (-1.07) -0.590 (-1.26)     -0.417 (-0.90) -0.440 (-0.93) 
65<Age – -1.077* (-1.74) -1.190** (-2.34)     -0.975 (-1.61) -1.009* (-1.64) 
Education (High) +  0.522* (1.69)  0.516* (1.71)  0.588** (1.95)  0.533* (1.74)  0.548* (1.76) 
Self-employed +  0.751 (0.93)      0.745 (0.92)  0.752 (0.93)  0.861 (1.07) 
Retired – -0.067 (-0.14)     -0.739*** (-2.19) -0.077 (-0.17) -0.061 (-0.13) 
Unemployed –  0.269 (0.46)      0.074 (0.13)  0.223 (0.38)  0.286 (0.49) 
Other occupations – -0.425 (-0.65)     -0.679 (-1.06) -0.425 (-0.65) -0.441 (-0.69) 
House owners +  0.369 (0.87)  0.373 (0.88)  0.425 (1.00)  0.630 (1.58)  0.291 (0.68) 
Financial assets (Q_2) + -0.004 (-0.01)  0.038 (0.10) -0.042 (-0.10)  0.193 (0.48)   
Financial assets (Q_3) +  0.373 (0.83)  0.438 (0.99)  0.310 (0.69)  0.732* (1.83)   
Financial assets (Q_4) +  0.596 (1.24)  0.687 (1.45)  0.533 (1.12)  0.974** (2.31)   
Net worth (Q_2) +  0.633 (1.40)  0.626 (1.38)  0.627 (1.38)    0.853** (2.07) 
Net worth (Q_3) +  0.839* (1.65)  0.815 (1.60)  0.756 (1.50)    1.130** (2.42) 
Net worth (Q_4) +  0.748 (1.30)  0.726 (1.26)  0.578 (1.02)    1.181** (2.40) 
Knowledge Level (More or Less) +  1.250*** (3.03)  1.240*** (2.99)  1.268*** (3.06)  1.270*** (3.08)  1.270*** (3.05) 
Knowledge Level (High)  +  1.731*** (3.57)  1.745*** (3.61)  1.773*** (3.65)  1.739*** (3.59)  1.777*** (3.67) 
Advice (Media) +  0.755** (2.07)  0.738** (2.02)  0.655* (1.82)  0.777** (2.13)  0.756** (2.07) 
Advice (Professional Advisor)  +  0.975*** (2.55)  0.989*** (2.59)  0.923** (2.43)  1.001*** (2.63)  0.987*** (2.58) 
Advice (Others) +  1.180* (1.85)  1.165* (1.83)  1.076* (1.72)  1.155* (1.81)  1.166* (1.82) 
Year 2005    – -1.355*** (-5.20) -1.355*** (-5.20) -1.371*** (-5.28) -1.351*** (-5.19) -1.355*** (-5.20) 
Year 2006  +  0.159 (0.56)  0.164 (0.58)  0.133 (0.47)  0.154 (0.54)  0.157 (0.56) 
Constant   1.715*** (2.21)  1.715** (2.26)  1.609** (2.20)  1.815** (2.38)  1.686** (2.26) 
R-squared  0.066 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
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4.4.2 Stock Market Expectations and Stock Market Participation Decisions 
 
In order to test our second hypothesis, we investigate the combined effect of 
stock market expectations and risk aversion on individuals’ stock market participation 
decisions. We create a Linear Probability Model (LPM) based on the OLS regression 
where the estimates of the independent variables are interpreted as the probability of 
stock market participation as shown below in equation (4.3).  
(4.3)             =  +  𝑥   +      +  𝑥         +        +       +     +  𝜀    
       𝜀   ~  (0  𝜀
 ) 
The dependent variable is a qualitative dichotomous variable, describing 
individuals’ stock market participation decisions.      , stands for 1, if individual i holds 
any risky financial assets at time t, otherwise 0. We include individuals’ stock market 
expectations in terms of percentage,   𝑥   , and risk aversion dummy,      , as 
explanatory variables, as well as their interactions. The remaining variables and 
controls for the standard errors are the same as for equation (4.2). 
In Panel A of Table 13, we present OLS (1) model from the linear probability 
estimations and two instrumental variable (IV) estimates, GMM (1) and GMM (2). As 
proposed by Hansen (1984), we apply the Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) to 
control for unknown forms of heteroskedasticity within our linear regression models 
with IV estimators to produce efficient and consistent estimations
32
. In Table 13, we 
only report the full models from three estimations, as the estimates of the explanatory 
variables are unaffected by the multicollinearity within the model, and next to each 
independent variable, we denote an expected sign for the coefficient. 
                                            
32
 To correct for intra group correlations in the IV estimates, we cluster standard errors by individuals as 
specified by Wooldridge (2002, pp.193). For further discussion, see Hayashi (2000, pp. 227-228, 407, 
and 417), and for the application of the model, see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), and Baum 
(2006, Chapter 8. Instrumental-variables estimators). 
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The LPM model with the binary dependent variable faces several potential 
problems as it violates the OLS assumptions
33
. Nevertheless, we base our estimates on 
this model so as to enable comparison with the instrumental variable (IV) with GMM 
estimates. When we compare the reported OLS (1) model with the marginal effects 
after the Probit model (not reported), however, the sign, size and significant levels of 
most coefficients are very similar. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) note that the LPM tends 
to provide the correct signs for the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables; nevertheless its distributional properties and statistical inferences 
cannot be justified theoretically.  
From OLS (1) model in Panel A Table 13, we observe positive and significant 
effects from stock market return expectations and also negative and significant effects 
from risk aversion. However the interactions of these two variables are not significant. 
The magnitude of the coefficient of stock market expectations is very small; a 1% 
increase in expectations increases stock market participation only by 0.8%. Since we 
recognise the problem of endogeneity when determining the influence of stock market 
expectations on stock market participation, the OLS (1) estimates of the effect of stock 
market expectations are likely to be biased and unreliable.  
Individuals’ stock market expectations are influenced by the closeness with 
which they follow the market and their awareness of, and familiarity with, market 
history. Thus individuals’ expectations are also affected by their stock market 
participation. Stock market returns expectations of those individuals who have no 
experience of holding stocks may be based on mere speculation reflecting poor quality 
                                            
33
Aldrich and Nelson (1984) identify several problems with the LPM. Firstly, the assumption in the LPM 
that all disturbances have the same variance (the residuals are subject to heteroskedasticity) casts doubt 
on the validity of standard errors. Secondly, the residuals in the LPM are not normally distributed. 
Thirdly, in the LPM there is no linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Fourthly, in the LPM the probabilities can range outside the range 0 to 1 since the predicted value in OLS 
can assume infinite values in both negative and positive directions.   
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information and confidence. Also, stock market expectations are likely to be correlated 
with other unobserved variables influencing stock market participation, including 
factors such as personal experiences of economic fluctuations (Malmendier and Nagel, 
2011), individuals’ information sets which reflects their preceding stock market 
expectations (Arrondel et al., 2012), and varying levels of cognitive capacity (Christelis 
et al., 2010) which we are unable to identify due to the non-availability of the data.  
To account for the issues of causality affecting our results, we include additional 
variables as instruments in order to apply instrumental variables (IV) estimations. The 
first instrument we consider is individuals’ expectations as to their own financial 
situation a year ahead and, in particular, whether it will ‘improve’, ‘stay the same’, or 
‘deteriorate’. According to Vissing-Jørgensen (2003), individuals’ expectations reflect 
their own particular situations. Thus we believe that individuals form stock market 
expectations based on their expectations as to their own financial situations.  
The second instrument which we consider is individuals’ investment horizons; 
more specifically, whether an individual’s most important time-horizon with regard to 
planning expenditures and savings is ‘a couple of months’, ‘the next year’, ‘the next 
couple of years’, or ‘more than five years’. Differing investment horizons lead to 
individuals holding distinctive attitudes towards different assets, which in turn 
influence stock market expectations. In Appendix B, we present the survey questions 
and mean values for both categorical dummy instruments. In terms of our model, 
consideration of stock market expectations as an endogenous variable implies that the 
related interaction term with risk aversion is also endogenous. Thus, we control for two 
endogenous variables in our model. To account for the endogenous interaction term, we 
include additional instruments created by multiplying the risk aversion dummy with our 
two categorical dummy instruments.  
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Table 13 Stock Market Expectations and Stock Market Participation  
 
Panel A - Comparison between the OLS and GMM models 
We present a linear probability model OLS (1) and second stages of IV estimates with GMM estimators GMM 
(1) and GMM (2). In GMM (1), we include as the only instrument, individuals’ expectation as to their own 
financial situations, while in GMM (2) we also include investment horizon as an instrument in the first-stage 
regressions. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if individuals own any risky financial assets; otherwise, it 
takes a value of zero. In the report of P-value exogeneity tests, Ex stands for stock market expectations, and 
Ex’RA stands for the interactions between stock market expectations and risk aversion. Our standard errors are 
clustered by individuals and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is defined by the two-tailed p-
values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
  OLS (1) GMM (1) GMM (2) 
Stock Market Participation –/+ Coef. T Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Stock Market Expectation  +  0.008*** (4.49)  0.055*** (4.46)  0.043*** (3.76) 
Risk Aversion (1-High) – -0.184*** (-9.47) -0.073 (-1.30) -0.107** (-2.19) 
Risk Aversion X Expectation – -0.003 (-1.11) -0.027* (-1.77) -0.022* (-1.67) 
Female –  0.018 (0.75)  0.061** (2.12)  0.049* (1.77) 
Married – -0.016 (-0.64) -0.017 (-0.58) -0.005 (-0.20) 
36≤ Age ≤50 +  0.075*** (2.75)  0.083*** (2.49)  0.097*** (3.02) 
51≤ Age ≤65 +  0.014 (0.49)  0.039 (1.13)  0.032 (0.96) 
65<Age +  0.064 (1.43)  0.102** (2.03)  0.092* (1.88) 
High level education  +  0.074*** (3.33)  0.056** (2.21)  0.066*** (2.67) 
Self-employed +  0.216*** (4.32)  0.196*** (3.12)  0.199*** (3.32) 
Retired – -0.010 (-0.28) -0.007 (-0.19) -0.006 (-0.16) 
Unemployed –  0.031 (0.99)  0.033 (0.93)  0.027 (0.77) 
Other occupations –  0.084** (2.29)  0.126*** (2.72)  0.101** (2.40) 
House owners – -0.034 (-1.25) -0.049 (-1.53) -0.055* (-1.78) 
Financial assets (Q_2) +  0.154*** (6.92)  0.153*** (5.45)  0.142*** (5.45) 
Financial assets (Q_3) +  0.317*** (10.84)  0.301*** (8.80)  0.316*** (9.56) 
Financial assets (Q_4) +  0.549*** (16.89)  0.523*** (13.51)  0.548*** (15.13) 
Net worth (Q_2) +  0.005 (0.18) -0.027 (-0.81) -0.014 (-0.42) 
Net worth (Q_3) +  0.015 (0.48) -0.023 (-0.60) -0.001 (-0.02) 
Net worth (Q_4) +  0.009 (0.24) -0.028 (-0.63) -0.027 (-0.63) 
Knowledge Level (More or Less) +  0.033 (1.28) -0.002 (-0.05)  0.013 (0.45) 
Knowledge Level (High)  +  0.095*** (3.04)  0.039 (0.99)  0.068* (1.83) 
Advice (Media) +  0.064*** (2.82)  0.033 (1.22)  0.037 (1.43) 
Advice (Professional Advisor)  +  0.077*** (3.22)  0.035 (1.19)  0.040 (1.40) 
Advice (Others) +  0.051 (1.41) -0.005 (-0.10)  0.005 (0.13) 
Year 2005   0.028 (2.41)  0.073*** (3.64)  0.066*** (3.45) 
Year 2006   0.013 (0.90)  0.005 (0.28)  0.020 (1.16) 
Constant  -0.025 (-0.58) -0.134** (-2.17) -0.120** (-2.17) 
R-squared   0.3319  0.3850  0.4920 
N of Observations   2956  2939  2640 
N of Individuals    1587  1579  1426 
    
Underidentification test: P-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics, Chi-sq (3)                   0.000  0.000 
Overidentification test: P-value of Hansen J-statistic, Chi-sq (2) 0.9095  0.4461 
Endogeneity test: P-value on Ex, Chi-sq (1)                   0.00  0.00 
Endogeneity test: P-value on Ex’RA, Chi-sq (1)                   0.022  0.09 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Risk Aversion, Chi-sq (1)                   0.69  0.19 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Future Expectations Instruments, Chi-sq (2)                   0.91  0.37 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Horizon Instruments Chi-sq (3)                     0.21 




Panel B - First-Stage Regressions of GMM estimates 
 
We present first-stage regression results from the GMM (1) and GMM (2) models. F-statistics are cluster robust, 
and our standard errors are clustered by individuals and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is 
defined by the two-tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
First-Stages GMM(1) – First-Stages  GMM (2) – First-Stages 
 Expectation (Ex) Interaction (Ex’RA) Expectation (Ex) Interaction (Ex’RA) 
 Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Risk Aversion (1-High) -0.562 (-0.90)  5.183*** (10.73)  0.124 (0.14)  6.220*** (8.64) 
Female -1.277*** (-3.66) -0.725*** (-2.93) -1.330*** (-3.56) -0.800*** (-3.00) 
Married  0.359 (1.02)  0.492** (2.08)  0.446 (1.22)  0.473* (1.90) 
36≤ Age ≤50  0.213 (0.46)  0.191 (0.65) -0.125 (-0.25) -0.099 (-0.31) 
51≤ Age ≤65  0.259 (0.55)  0.343 (1.11) -0.084 (-0.16) -0.040 (-0.12) 
65<Age -0.205 (-0.34)  0.020 (0.05) -0.525 (-0.82) -0.379 (-0.87) 
High level education   0.307 (1.03)  0.024 (0.12)  0.068 (0.22) -0.108 (-0.51) 
Self-employed  0.243 (0.32)  0.370 (0.67)  0.235 (0.29)  0.444 (0.73) 
Retired -0.102 (-0.22) -0.124 (-0.42) -0.019 (-0.04)  0.122 (0.39) 
Unemployed  0.131 (0.25)  0.041 (0.10)  0.053 (0.10)  0.113 (0.27) 
Other occupations -0.437 (-0.69)  0.476 (1.14) -0.438 (-0.67)  0.563 (1.31) 
House owners  0.221 (0.54) -0.048 (-0.18)  0.139 (0.32) -0.122 (-0.43) 
Financial assets (Q_2) -0.033 (-0.08) -0.060 (-0.23) -0.042 (-0.10) -0.042 (-0.15) 
Financial assets (Q_3)  0.359 (0.81)  0.218 (0.74)  0.093 (0.20)  0.036 (0.12) 
Financial assets (Q_4)  0.341 (0.74) -0.162 (-0.56)  0.091 (0.18) -0.251 (-0.82) 
Net worth (Q_2)  0.682 (1.55)  0.057 (0.21)  0.785* (1.64)  0.104 (0.36) 
Net worth (Q_3)  0.932* (1.89)  0.368 (1.21)  1.119** (2.13)  0.574* (1.82) 
Net worth (Q_4)  0.915* (1.64)  0.339 (0.91)  1.141* (1.92)  0.549 (1.44) 
Knowledge Level (More or Less)  1.056*** (2.59)  0.846*** (2.88)  1.249*** (2.97)  0.947*** (2.94) 
Knowledge Level (High)   1.331*** (2.78)  0.837*** (2.52)  1.376*** (2.78)  0.860** (2.40) 
Advice (Media)  0.814** (2.30)  0.300 (1.19)  0.915*** (2.46)  0.361 (1.35) 
Advice (Professional Advisor)   0.947*** (2.54)  0.196 (0.75)  1.165*** (2.97)  0.298 (1.08) 
Advice (Others)  1.010 (1.62) -0.199 (-0.43)  1.125* (1.78)  0.113 (0.23) 
Year 2005 -1.233*** (-4.79) -0.741*** (-3.97) -1.371*** (-5.01) -0.754*** (-3.73) 
Year2006  0.216 (0.76)  0.069 (0.36) -0.061 (-0.21) -0.044 (-0.22) 
Future Expectation (Stay the same) -2.385*** (-5.40)  0.062 (0.75) -2.466*** (-5.32)  0.091 (1.04) 
Future Expectation (Will deteriorate) -3.106*** (-5.20)  0.061 (0.52) -2.884*** (-4.44)  0.101 (0.82) 
Future’RA (Stay the same)  0.004 (0.01) -2.432*** (-4.66)  0.263 (0.37) -2.345*** (-4.32) 
Future’RA (Will deteriorate) -0.501 (-0.61) -3.773*** (-6.27) -0.765 (-0.87) -3.896*** (-6.20) 
Horizon (Next year)      0.490 (0.86) -0.161** (-2.06) 
Horizon (Next couple of year)      0.493 (0.99) -0.175* (-1.87) 
Horizon (More than five years)      0.549 (0.93) -0.132 (-1.25) 
Horizon’RA (Next couple of months)     -0.962 (-1.12) -1.823*** (-2.88) 
Horizon’RA (Next year)     -1.135 (-1.33) -1.225** (-1.97) 
Horizon’RA (Next couple of years)     -0.667 (-0.86) -0.649 (-1.12) 
Constant  3.345*** (3.99) -1.327*** (-2.90)  3.270*** (3.46) -1.035** (-2.16) 
F-statistics of instrument  16.74  9.89  6.48  4.58 
R-squared  0.2722  0.1876  0.2782  0.1924 
N of Observations  2939  2939  2640  2640 




In GMM (1), we include only the instrument, individuals’ expectations as to 
their own financial situations, while in GMM (2) we also include investment horizon as 
an instrument. Both GMM (1) and GMM (2) models in Panel A of Table 13 indicate 
significant and positive effects arising from stock market expectations with coefficients 
of at least five times greater than that of the OLS (1) model.  
With regard to our second hypothesis, both GMM models indicate negative 
interactions between stock market expectations and risk aversion. Although only 
significant at the 10% level (two-tailed), the results do not lead us to reject our 
hypothesis that the effect of stock market expectations on stock market participation 
decisions depends on the levels of risk aversion. This relationship is significant after 
controlling for other variables; the coefficients and significance levels of the other 
control variables in the GMM models are similar to those in the OLS (1) model, and are 
consistent with previous research findings identifying stockholders’ characteristics.  
We check the validity of our instruments following the interpretations of both 
first- and second-stage test statistics as in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). From 
the first-stage regression results shown in Panel B of Table 13, we confirm that the 
instruments have strong predictive power for each endogenous variable. Both the 
significance of the coefficients in the first-stage regressions, and the cluster robust 
Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistics, lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the endogenous variable is unidentified (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; pp. 217-18). The 
AP F-statistics for GMM (1) are 16.74 for stock market expectations, and 9.89 for the 
interaction term with risk aversion, respectively. These values are above or near to the 
‘rule of thumb’ value of 10 for rejecting weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
However, the GMM (2) AP F-statistics are lower, equalling 6.28 and 4.58 for two 
endogenous variables; expectations and interactions, respectively.  
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The under-identification test for cluster-robust standard errors based on 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics (Kleibergen-Paap, 2006),
 34
 computed from the 
second-stage regressions of both GMM (1) and (2) in Panel A Table 13, leads to us to 
reject the null hypotheses that any endogenous variable is under-identified. The under-
identification test establishes whether or not the instruments are ‘relevant’, identifying 
significant correlations with the endogenous variables (Kleibergen-Paap, 2006).  The 
over-identification test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Hayashi, 2000; pp. 227-8, 407, 417) is based on Hansen’s J statistic (Hansen, 1982). 
This test examines the validity of instruments, adopting the joint null hypothesis that 
both instruments are orthogonal, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2010). We 
confirm that the instruments included in both the GMM (1) and (2) models are relevant 
and valid as the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
We further apply both endogeneity tests to the two endogenous variables under 
the null hypothesis that the endogenous variable can actually be treated as exogenous, 
following Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2010). For each of our endogenous variables, 
the tests reject the null hypothesis confirming that we treated these variables correctly, 
confirming that the stock market expectations variable and its interactions with risk 
aversion are endogenous, and, in turn, that by applying IV estimates we obtain 
consistent coefficients. The C statistic for the orthogonality condition of instruments 
tests has the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (Hayashi, 2000; pp. 218-22 
and pp. 232-34). The orthogonality conditions of our instruments as well as the risk 
aversion dummy are confirmed as reported; all fail to reject the null hypothesis.    
                                            
34
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics (Kleibergen-Paap, 2006) are reported instead of the Anderson 
canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test (Anderson, 1984) as the standard errors in the model are not 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).   
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4.4.3 Stock Market Expectations and Investors’ Portfolio Allocation Decisions 
 
In order to test our third hypothesis, we investigate whether the effect of 
heterogeneous stock market expectations on investors’ portfolio allocation decisions 
varies as a function of their risk aversion. Only including investors in our sample, i.e. 
those individuals who hold risky financial assets in their financial portfolios, we 
develop the following model equation (4.4).   
(4.4)                 =   +  𝑥   +      +  𝑥         +        +       +     +  𝜀    
       𝜀   ~  (0  𝜀
 ) 
The dependent variable,         , is the proportion of risky financial assets in 
the total financial assets held by investor i at time t. The remaining variables and 
controls for standard errors are the same as in equation (4.2). In Panel A of Table 14, 
we compare a linear regression model, OLS (2) with two GMM models (3) and (4)35, 
using the same set of instruments as in the previous section. First-stage regressions of 
IV estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 14.  
All three models indicate that there are significant and positive influences from 
investors’ stock market expectations on the proportion of risky assets held in their 
financial portfolios, while risk aversion and the interactions between stock market 
expectations and risk aversion are not significant. Thus we reject our hypothesis 
relating to investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. Once individuals have participated 
in the stock market, risk aversion ceases to play a role. The proportion allocated to risky 
assets in investors’ financial portfolios, however, is determined by their expectations as 
to stock returns, and this positive relationship is significant. Consequently, our findings 
support Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) who finds that investors with higher stock market 
return expectations hold higher proportions of equity in their portfolios. 
                                            
35
 In GMM (3), we include only the instrument, individuals’ expectations as to their own financial 
situations, while in GMM (4) we also include investment horizon as an instrument. 
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Table 14 Stock Market Expectations and Investors’ Portfolio Allocations  
 
Panel A - Comparison between the OLS and GMM models 
 
We present an OLS (2) model and second stages of IV estimates with GMM estimators, GMM (3) and GMM 
(4). In GMM (3), we include as the only instrument, individuals’ expectation as to their own financial situations, 
while in GMM (4) we also include investment horizon as an instrument in the first-stage regressions. The 
dependent variable is investors’ allocated share of risky financial assets from the total financial assets.  In the 
report of P-value exogneity tests, Ex stands for stock market expectations, and Ex’RA stands for the interactions 
between stock market expectations and risk aversion. Our standard errors are clustered by individuals and robust 
to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is defined by the two-tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
 
  OLS (2)  GMM (3) GMM (4) 
Share of Risky Financial Assets –/+ Coef. T Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Stock Market Expectation +  0.004** (2.18)  0.022*** (2.50)  0.020** (2.34) 
Risk Aversion (1-High) –  0.002 (0.47) -0.089 (-1.24) -0.036 (-0.59) 
Risk Aversion X Expectation – -0.033 (-1.22)  0.019 (1.27)  0.006 (0.48) 
Female – -0.021 (-0.74)  0.037 (1.06)  0.005 (0.16) 
Married – -0.075*** (-2.62) -0.076** (-2.37) -0.093*** (-3.01) 
36≤ Age ≤50 –  0.005 (0.13)  0.047 (1.07)  0.053 (1.14) 
51≤ Age ≤65 – -0.006 (-0.14)  0.017 (0.38)  0.008 (0.16) 
65<Age –  0.102* (1.76)  0.171*** (2.86)  0.145** (2.37) 
High level education  –  0.019 (0.78)  0.014 (0.52)  0.021 (0.81) 
Self-employed +  0.329*** (8.32)  0.337*** (7.50)  0.362*** (8.10) 
Retired –  0.011 (0.26) -0.005 (-0.12)  0.016 (0.38) 
Unemployed –  0.088* (1.85)  0.059 (1.06)  0.100* (1.91) 
Other occupations – -0.016 (-0.32) -0.003 (-0.06) -0.011 (-0.22) 
House owners –  0.077** (2.11)  0.078** (2.02)  0.085** (2.19) 
Financial assets (Q_2) + -0.026 (-0.41) -0.011 (-0.16)  0.004 (0.06) 
Financial assets (Q_3) + -0.025 (-0.38) -0.013 (-0.19) -0.004 (-0.05) 
Financial assets (Q_4) + -0.046 (-0.67) -0.027 (-0.39) -0.010 (-0.15) 
Net worth (Q_2) + -0.143*** (-2.75) -0.170*** (-2.95) -0.138*** (-2.28) 
Net worth (Q_3) + -0.158*** (-2.70) -0.188*** (-2.91) -0.172*** (-2.60) 
Net worth (Q_4) + -0.171*** (-2.74) -0.203*** (-3.03) -0.179*** (-2.59) 
Knowledge Level (More or Less) + -0.060 (-1.62) -0.095** (-1.99) -0.067* (-1.63) 
Knowledge Level (High)  + -0.079** (-1.94) -0.118** (-2.32) -0.086** (-1.94) 
Advice (Media) + -0.046 (-1.28) -0.085** (-1.93) -0.060 (-1.48) 
Advice (Professional Advisor)  + -0.007 (-0.18) -0.037 (-0.84) -0.008 (-0.20) 
Advice (Others) + -0.002 (-0.03) -0.047 (-0.74) -0.026 (-0.43) 
Year 2005 – -0.002 (-0.13)  0.053** (1.99)  0.035 (1.42) 
Year2006 +  0.018 (1.01)  0.027 (1.25)  0.020 (1.02) 
Constant   0.566*** (7.30)  0.487*** (4.98)  0.419*** (4.31) 
R-squared   0.1694  0.6061  0.6405 
N of Observations   1013  1003  911 
N of Individuals    530  523  485 
    
Underidentification test: P-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics, Chi-sq (3)                   0.000  0.000 
Overidentification test: P-value of Hansen J-statistic, Chi-sq (2) 0.9095  0.4461 
Endogeneity test: P-value on Ex, Chi-sq (1)                   0.00  0.00 
Endogeneity test: P-value on Ex’RA, Chi-sq (1)                   0.00  0.09 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Risk Aversion, Chi-sq (1)                   0.92  0.31 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Future Expectations Instruments, Chi-sq (2)                   0.94  0.66 
Exogneity test: P-value of C statistic on Horizon Instruments Chi-sq (3)                     0.37 
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Panel B - First-Stage Regressions of GMM estimates 
 
We present first-stage regression results from the GMM (3) and GMM (4) models. F-statistics are cluster robust, 
and our standard errors are clustered by individuals and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is 
defined by the two-tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
First Stages GMM (3) – First-Stages  GMM (4) – First-Stages 
 Expectation (Ex) Interaction (Ex’RA) Expectation (Ex) Interaction (Ex’RA) 
 Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
Risk Aversion (1-High)  0.237 (0.27)  7.088*** (9.24)  0.539 (0.44)  7.747*** (7.42) 
Female -1.632*** (-2.81) -1.128*** (-2.95) -1.721*** (-2.78) -1.109*** (-2.74) 
Married  0.089 (0.15)  0.209 (0.73)  0.176 (0.29)  0.082 (0.29) 
36≤ Age ≤50 -1.344* (-1.67) -0.273 (-0.79) -1.399* (-1.63) -0.335 (-0.89) 
51≤ Age ≤65 -0.056 (-0.07) -0.300 (-0.77) -0.245 (-0.28) -0.474 (-1.19) 
65<Age -1.871* (-1.73) -1.101* (-1.91) -1.657 (-1.45) -0.967* (-1.66) 
High level education   0.149 (0.31) -0.008 (-0.03) -0.106 (-0.21) -0.070 (-0.26) 
Self-employed -0.777 (-0.94)  0.191 (0.40) -0.980 (-1.14)  0.293 (0.57) 
Retired  0.632 (0.70)  0.323 (0.75)  0.341 (0.35)  0.420 (0.97) 
Unemployed  1.751* (1.72)  0.834 (1.11)  1.727 (1.62)  1.060 (1.35) 
Other occupations -0.802 (-0.63)  0.584 (1.19) -0.955 (-0.69)  0.502 (0.97) 
House owners -0.609 (-0.78) -0.229 (-0.61) -1.054 (-1.29) -0.365 (-1.01) 
Financial assets (Q_2) -0.624 (-0.45)  0.044 (0.08) -1.353 (-0.87) -0.325 (-0.54) 
Financial assets (Q_3) -0.808 (-0.64)  0.231 (0.37) -1.839 (-1.30) -0.236 (-0.35) 
Financial assets (Q_4) -0.895 (-0.70) -0.161 (-0.26) -1.885 (-1.31) -0.689 (-1.08) 
Net worth (Q_2)  1.726 (1.53)  0.301 (0.65)  1.860 (1.44)  0.252 (0.59) 
Net worth (Q_3)  1.984* (1.64)  0.520 (1.02)  2.278* (1.69)  0.698 (1.50) 
Net worth (Q_4)  2.091* (1.63)  0.642 (1.11)  2.485* (1.77)  0.805 (1.60) 
Knowledge Level (More or Less)  1.284* (1.76)  0.746 (1.22)  1.365* (1.65)  0.630 (0.89) 
Knowledge Level (High)   1.341* (1.65)  0.767 (1.21)  1.245 (1.38)  0.624 (0.87) 
Advice (Media)  1.850*** (2.65)  0.602 (1.45)  1.313* (1.70)  0.465 (1.09) 
Advice (Professional Advisor)   1.800*** (2.60)  0.489 (1.26)  1.471* (1.91)  0.312 (0.76) 
Advice (Others)  2.735*** (2.66)  0.206 (0.46)  2.147** (2.15)  0.195 (0.41) 
Year 2005 -2.154*** (-5.12) -0.744*** (-2.87) -2.277*** (-5.14) -0.724** (-2.52) 
Year2006 -0.379 (-0.81) -0.215 (-0.80) -0.447 (-0.89) -0.318 (-1.07) 
Future Expectation (Stay the same) -2.621*** (-4.90)  0.200** (1.97) -2.537*** (-4.70)  0.194** (1.96) 
Future Expectation (Will deteriorate) -3.003*** (-3.25)  0.099 (0.66) -2.713*** (-2.85)  0.064 (0.41) 
Future’RA (Stay the same) -0.654 (-0.61) -3.123*** (-3.47) -1.048 (-0.89) -3.742*** (-3.66) 
Future’RA (Will deteriorate) -1.905 (-1.41) -4.642 (-4.39) -3.308** (-2.30) -5.931*** (-5.37) 
Horizon (Next year)      0.646 (0.79) -0.119 (-1.23) 
Horizon (Next couple of year)      1.436** (1.99) -0.059 (-0.57) 
Horizon (More than five years)      0.455 (0.59) -0.022 (-0.18) 
Horizon’RA (Next couple of months)     -0.424 (-0.31) -1.623 (-1.48) 
Horizon’RA (Next couple of year)      -0.390 (-0.30)  0.245 (0.22) 
Horizon’RA (More than five years)      2.144* (1.66)  1.414 (1.31) 
Constant  5.441*** (3.29) -0.966 (-1.16)  6.366*** (3.07) -0.048 (-0.06) 
F-statistics of instrument  11.74  6.28  6.53  5.54 
R-squared  0.4509  0.3543  0.4632  0.3770 
N of Observations  1003  1003  911  911 
N of Individuals   523  523  485  485 
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The coefficients of stock market return expectations in the GMM (3) and (4) 
models are about five times greater than that in the OLS(2) model. The exogeneity tests 
confirm that employing IV estimates results in obtaining consistent coefficients.  
We observe significant effects from the control variables which also affect 
investors’ portfolio allocations. Investors’ marital status affects their portfolio 
allocations significantly and negatively and this is consistent with the findings of 
Barber and Odean (2001). Although stock market participation is highest among 
individuals aged from 36 to 50 (not reported), those aged 65 and over hold the highest 
proportion of risky assets in their portfolios. According to Hurd (1990), this could be 
explained by different mortality rates between richer and poorer elderly individuals. He 
argues that mortality rates are associated with wealth level, and both mortality rates and 
wealth level are determined by lifetime health differences. Self-employed investors 
hold significantly more risky assets, supporting Barsky et al.’s (1997) finding that such 
individuals are more risk tolerant. Home owners hold significantly higher proportions 
of risky assets than do renters, who perhaps prioritise a need to save in order to 
purchase their houses.  
Following Cocco (2004) and Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), we control 
for the credit constraints on individuals by considering their net worth. In contrast to 
our expected direction of influence, we observe that compared to those investors in the 
lowest net worth quartile group, those in the higher quartiles hold smaller proportions 
of risky assets. These results are affected by the smaller total net worth of those 
investors in the lowest quartile group, less than half of whom own real estate. Those 
investors in the higher net worth quartiles hold comparatively smaller proportions of 
risky assets due to the high proportion of their total assets represented by real estate. 
This result is also supported by the univariate test (not reported), and adding extra 
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variables such as the real estate investment variable does not change the signs of net 
worth quartiles.   
Although we observe that individuals’ self-evaluated knowledge levels have a 
positive effect on their stock market participation decisions, when we look at investors 
only, the effect becomes negative when explaining investors’ portfolio allocations. 
Those who evaluate themselves as highly knowledgeable hold on average twice the 
total financial assets of those who assess themselves as not knowledgeable, but the 
proportions of risky assets held are smaller.  
The validity of our instruments in GMM (3) is supported by the F-statistics 
from the first-stage regressions, these are 11.74 and 6.28 for stock market expectations 
and the interaction term, respectively. Hansen (1982)’s J-statistics also support the 
validity of our instruments in GMM (3), failing to reject over-identification restrictions. 
The Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test (Anderson, 1984) rejects 
under-identification restrictions. In GMM (4), the F-statistics from the first-stage 
regressions are lower (6.53 and 5.54, respectively) due to the weak explanatory power 
of the investment horizon instrument. Additionally, under-identification restrictions are 
rejected by the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test (Anderson, 1984). 
It is well known that the performance of inferential procedures based on IVs 
relies critically on the quality of the instruments used. As discussed by Van Rooij et al. 
(2011, 2012), however, IV estimates should be interpreted with caution, and we cannot 
confirm that our instruments truly determine the direction of causality. For many 
empirical studies, finding appropriate instruments with good quality is often not 
straightforward and usually there are not many choices available. Ebbes (2007) and 
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) argue that instruments which correlate weakly with 
endogenous variables create more problems, providing large inconsistencies in the IV 
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estimates. If there are high correlations between the instruments and the endogenous 
variable, the IV estimates are more consistent; however the orthogonality of the 
instruments is often questioned. Our instruments cannot be validated as such given the 
constraints and limited alternatives. The endogeneity of stock market expectations, 
however, should be accounted for in order to correctly determine its effect on 
individuals’ stock market participation. We extend our models by robustness checks in 
order to further validate our findings.  
 
4.5 Robustness Checks   
 
We extend our GMM (1) and (2) models in order to assess the robustness of our 
findings.  We fail to reject our second hypothesis that the effect of stock market 
expectations on stock ownership decisions depends on the level of risk aversion. It is 
unclear, however, as to whether this effect remains significant after including other 
influential variables in the models. Individuals’ expectations as to their own financial 
situations as well as of the stock market are possibly affected by unobserved individuals’ 
characteristics omitted from our models.  
One possible control variable which may link stock market expectations to stock 
ownership decisions is the health status of individuals. Rosen and Wu (2004) find a 
negative relationship between poor health and both stock ownership and the share of 
financial portfolios invested in risky assets. Given the fact that individuals are unable to 
diversify their health risk, Christelis et al. (2010) emphasise that it is a particular 
concern for elderly individuals who are typically faced with higher health risk. We 
identify individuals’ perceived health status, by using the following question from the 
DHS: “Compared to one year ago, would you say your health is better now or worse?”. 
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Individuals’ responses are categorised as ‘better’, ‘about the same’, or ‘worse’ 36 . 
Appendix B presents the survey questions and the mean values of each response 
category for the additional control variable.  
We run both GMM (1) and GMM (2) models including the health control variable. 
In Table 15, in the interests of clarity, we report only the estimates of stock market 
expectations, risk aversion and their interactions, and the additional control variable. 
The effects of health status are significant in determining stock ownership only at 
the 10% level but the sign is negative as expected. The negative interactions between 
stock market expectations and risk aversion remain statistically significant with the 
incorporation of this additional control variable. The inclusion of this variable affects 
the magnitude of these coefficients to only a minor extent.  
We also undertake several robustness checks with regard to our model 
specifications. Following Kapteyn and Teppa (2011), we define investors as those who 
hold risky financial assets comprising mutual funds, individual company shares, 
options, and equities in their own business. We undertake our estimations after 
redefining risky financial assets as the sum of financial resources invested in individual 
company shares and mutual funds. Our results are unaffected by this modification. In 
particular, in explaining individuals’ stock ownership, interactions between individuals’ 
stock market expectations and risk aversion remain statistically significant.  
Thus, we conclude that although the OLS model fails to identify these interactions, 
by accounting for the endogeneity inherent in individuals’ stock market expectations, 
we observe that the interactions exist and are robust after controlling for other 
influences on stock ownership.    
                                            
36 Individuals’ responses as to health status may change over the three year period. Those who indicate 
‘better’ initially, mostly remain in the categories of ‘better’ or ‘about the same’; only a small proportion 
of those who indicate ‘about the same’ in the initial year change their status over time; and those who 
initially indicate ‘worse’ remain mostly within that category or within ‘about the same’. 
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Table 15 Robustness Checks   
 
We extend the GMM (1) and GMM (2) models with additional control variables. In GMM (1), we 
include only the instrument, individuals’ expectation as to their own financial situations, while in GMM 
(2) we also include investment horizon as an instrument in the first-stage regressions. For simplicity, we 
only report the second stages from the IV estimates and only those coefficients which are our concern. 
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if individuals own any risky financial assets; otherwise, it takes 
a value of zero. Ex stands for stock market expectations, and Ex’RA stands for the interactions between 
stock market expectations and risk aversion. F-statistics are cluster robust, and our standard errors are 
clustered by individuals and robust to heteroskedasticity. The significance level is defined by the two-
tailed p-values of 1%***, 5%**, and 10%*. 
 
  GMM (1) GMM(2) 
Stock Market Participation –/+ Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Stock Market Expectation +  0.053*** (4.34)  0.040*** (3.59) 
Risk Aversion  – -0.076 (-1.42) -0.111** (-2.37) 
Risk Aversion X Expectation  – -0.027* (-1.85) -0.023* (-1.86) 
Health condition now compared to last year      
About the same – -0.054* (-1.87) -0.044 (0.11) 
Worse – -0.034 (-0.93) -0.034 (0.33) 
R-squared 
 
 0.4197  0.5149 
N of Observations 
 
 2722  2511 
N of Individuals  
 
 1468  1361 
    
Underidentification test: P-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics, Chi-sq (3) 0.000  0.000 
Overidentification test: P-value of Hansen J-statistic, Chi-sq (2) 0.952  0.3479 
P-value exogneity test (Ex, EX’RA)   0.00  0.00 
F-statistics from first-stage regression: Ex   17.91  6.87 
F-statistics from first-stage regression: Ex’RA   11.18  5.00 
      
 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion   
 
 
Previous studies suggest that the heterogeneous stock market expectations of 
individuals may provide an answer (Hurd et al., 2011; Kezdi and Willis, 2009; 
Dominitz and Manski, 2007) to the stockholding puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). 
What truly influences individuals’ heterogeneous stock market expectations, however, 
is hard to determine. According to Dominitz and Manski (2011), individuals develop 
their expectations in many different ways, and over time they are likely to apply a 
mixture of different approaches. Despite this, however, one of the relatively constant 
behavioural features of individuals, influencing not only their stock market expectations 
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but also their portfolio allocation decisions, is their levels of risk aversion. In order to 
account thoroughly for the heterogeneity of individuals’ expectations and their portfolio 
allocation decisions, we highlight the effect of risk aversion in this chapter.  
Eliciting both individuals’ stock market expectations and risk aversion levels 
from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) over the period 2004-2006, 
we find, consistent with our first hypothesis, that there are significant and negative 
effects from individuals’ risk aversion levels which lead them to hold negative stock 
market expectations. With regard to our second hypothesis, we find that there are 
significant and negative interactions between stock market expectations and risk 
aversion levels in determining individuals’ stock ownership decisions, in addition to the 
effects of these two variables singularly. This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
additional variables to control for individuals’ health status within our models. With 
regard to our third hypothesis, concerning investors’ portfolio allocations, stock market 
expectations exhibit significant and positive influences, while risk aversion and the 
interactions between individuals’ stock market expectations and their risk aversion 
levels are no longer significant once they have become active market participants.  
In determining the effect of individuals’ stock market expectations on their 
portfolio allocation decisions, we take account of the endogeneity issue in respect of the 
expectations variable. We use instrumental variables (IV) estimations with additional 
instruments to account for the causal effect, as well as potential measurement errors and 
omitted variable bias. Thus our study contributes to the literature not only by 
addressing the effect of risk aversion in linking individuals’ stock market expectations 
with their stock market participation decisions, but also by considering the endogeneity 
issue more rigorously than does prior work. Nevertheless, Van Rooij et al. (2011, 2012) 
suggest that identifying appropriate instruments is challenging, and we do not assert 
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that our instruments provide a resolution of the causality issue in respect of individuals’ 
stock market expectations and their investment decisions. Thus, our results based on IV 
estimates should be interpreted with caution.  
In addition to supporting the previous findings in respect of the prevalent 
pessimistic views of the stock market held by individuals, our work reinforces the 
arguments that individuals’ risk aversion levels have a permanent and negative effect 
on their expectations of future stock market returns, thus preventing them from 
participating in the stock market. Although individuals’ recent stock market 
experiences are recognised as a strong influence on the determination of short-term 
changes in their stock market expectations (De Bondt, 1993, 1998; Graham and Harvey, 
2001), we argue that there are also persistent effects on expectations arising from 
heterogeneity in individual characteristics such as risk aversion. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary and Discussion  
 
Adopting a behavioural finance approach, which recognises the influence of 
cognitive psychology on individuals’ decision-making processes under uncertainty, this 
thesis investigates real individual investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. Individual 
investors are prone to judgment biases as they tend to rely on their intuitions which 
often reflect errors in their beliefs and preferences. Consequently, individuals 
experience unsatisfactory outcomes including unanticipated risks (Kahneman and 
Riepe, 1998; Kahneman, 2003).  
Furthermore, psychologists have argued that individuals’ decisions are affected 
by the frame of the problem and presentation of outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984; Loewenstein, 1988), as well as their personal characteristics, in contrast to 
expected utility theory which assumes that individuals make consistent decisions 
regardless of how relevant information is presented. Subsequently, by evaluating the 
effects of individuals’ psychological biases, this thesis aims to understand why, and to 
what extent, individual investors depart from rational or optimal investment practices. 
In particular, the thesis attempts to provide answers to two closely related 
enduring conundrums in the market. Firstly, the Equity Premium Puzzle of Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) raise a question as to why the equity premium remains so high; and 
secondly, the Stockholding Puzzle of Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) questions why so 
few individuals hold stocks despite the existence of the high equity premium. 
Subsequently, in Chapter Two of the thesis, an in-depth literature review of previous 
findings related to these two puzzles is presented and the background of psychological 
arguments is discussed. 
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Chapter Three of the thesis assesses 400 Dutch individual investors’ responses 
to the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS) and their related investment 
decisions over the period 1997-2010. Based on the predictions of Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) regarding the effects of myopic loss aversion (MLA), this study develops two 
hypotheses in respect of individuals who are less affected by MLA than other investors:  
1) these investors will invest more in risky financial assets, and 2) they will increase the 
proportion of risky financial assets in their portfolios over time. Identifying distinct 
effects from, first, the effect of myopia reflected in frequent evaluation and rebalancing, 
and, second, loss aversion, the study finds that higher levels of investors’ loss aversion 
lead to them holding a lower proportion of their investments in risky financial assets. 
The strongest effect of myopia is observed when both evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies are high, and with the combined effect of myopia and higher loss aversion 
result in a reduction over time in the proportion of risky financial assets held by 
investors. Less myopic individuals increase the proportion of their investments in risky 
financial assets held over time regardless of the level of their loss aversion.  
In response to the Equity Premium Puzzle raised by Mehra and Prescott (1985), 
the findings of Chapter Three validate the argument of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) that 
the high equity premium, to which expected utility theory fails to provide an answer, 
can be explained by the notion of myopic loss aversion. If individual investors evaluate 
their portfolios frequently, responding to short-term volatility in the market, they will 
realise frequent losses in their mental accounts; consequently, they will demand a 
substantial equity premium to compensate for those risks. If they evaluate their 
investment performance over the long-term, however, they visualise much smaller risks 
relative to returns associated with stockholding; consequently, they will be ready to 
accept a smaller equity premium (Rabin and Thaler, 2001).  
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Chapter Four investigates individuals’ stock market expectations, and their 
consequent investment decisions over the period 2004-2006, based on questions 
released by the DHS. In response to the stockholding puzzle of Haliassos and Bertaut 
(1995), the study evaluates the variations in individuals’ stock market returns 
expectations together with the levels of their risk aversion, and considers the combined 
effect of these two variables and their consequent influence.  
The findings of this study indicate that individuals’ expectations are 
significantly and negatively affected by their risk aversion. Individuals’ stock market 
participation decisions are significantly determined by the interaction between their 
stock market expectations, and their risk aversion. Additionally, there are independent 
and positive effects from stock market expectations, and independent and negative 
effects from the levels of risk aversion. Those who are highly risk averse will forgo a 
high equity premium, as their stock market return expectations are negatively 
influenced by their levels of risk aversion.  
Once individuals hold stocks, their portfolio allocation decisions, defined in 
terms of the proportion of risky financial assets in their portfolios, are only affected by 
their stock market expectations, rather than by both their levels of risk aversion and its 
interaction with their expectations.  
Previous literature in this area, such as Hurd et al. (2011) and Kézdi and Willis 
(2009), finds that individuals’ expectations of stock market returns are much lower than 
historical average market returns, inhibiting their stockholdings. In this chapter, 
individuals’ pessimistic perceptions are captured by their risk aversion levels which are 
fundamental to them forming their stock market returns expectations, and the 
systematic interaction of these two variables provides a plausible response to the 
stockholding puzzle.  
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Based on the findings, this thesis highlights the important role of psychology of 
perceptions, arguing that individuals make different investment decisions depending 
both on the manner by which they perceive the returns on their own investment 
portfolios and on stock market returns. Unlike rational investors described in standard 
economic and finance theory, real individual investors require interventions from 
financial advisors policy makers to moderate the distortion in their decision-making 
resulting from their biased risk perceptions.   
 
5.2 Significance of Research   
 
De Bondt (1998) suggests the particular importance of studying individual 
investors’ financial decisions. Given the increasing longevity of people in 
contemporary society, partly through development of medicines and treatments, the 
long-term effects of individuals’ financial decisions are assuming ever increasing 
importance, and are likely to have profound effects for their well-being in the latter 
stages of their lives. Increasingly, national social security systems are inadequate to 
cover the financial needs of the populations they are designed to serve and, individuals 
are expected to take increasing responsibility for their own financial arrangements. In 
addition, the worldwide trend, reflecting decreasing financial returns and changing 
demographics, in terms of pension provision is to forsake defined benefit plans in 
favour of defined contribution plans and this shift has exposed more individuals than 
ever before to stock market fluctuations. This, again, emphasises personal responsibility 
for, and awareness of, the consequences of individuals’ financial decision-making.  
Furthermore, economic and financial history has established that individual 
investors’ financial decisions affect the markets as a whole. Investors’ greed and fear 
were mirrored dramatically by the burst of the dot-com bubble. More recently, the 
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subprime mortgage crisis, and the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession 
to which it led, highlighted the fact that individuals are prone to judgment biases and 
mistakes, and this phenomenon has been observed to affect both professional and non-
professional market participants.  
The aim of this thesis is to deliver insights into the manner in which individuals 
tend to make suboptimal decisions, and seeks to draw attention to the role of 
institutions, policy makers, and financial advisory bodies in providing effective 
interventions and guidelines for individual investors in order to ‘nudge’ them towards 
making sound investments. Behavioural economists have been successful in attracting 
public attention with their ingenious and creative ideas. Thaler and Sunstein (2009) 
introduced the concept of ‘nudge’ as picturesque shorthand for developments which 
influence and guide individuals to make better choices without compromising their 
personal freedom.  
One of the nudge ideas is ‘Save More Tomorrow’ which was developed by 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) and which aims to increase employee saving in the US. The 
companies which participated in this experiment offer their employees an option to 
‘pre-commit’ to a program which automatically increases their saving rates whenever 
they get a salary rise. This creative idea has increased saving rates about three times in 
some companies and has been promoted effectively to thousands of employers. 
Similarly, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) argue that individuals who face important long-
term decisions, such as whether or not to join 401(K) plans in the US, tend to either 
procrastinate, as they find it hard to make decisions given an overload of information, 
or select the default option. Consequently, Thaler and Sunstein (2009) suggest that 
private and public institutions concerned with individuals’ financial decision-making 
should select the default option which serves the best interests of individuals.  
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Similarly, Dan Ariely (2010) in his book, Predictability Irrational: The Hidden 
Forces that Shape Our Decisions, highlights that it is hard for individuals to realise 
self-control due to their procrastination, which displaces high-priority goals with lower 
priority tasks. Consequently, he suggests that mechanisms such as reward substitution, 
and self-control contracts could help individuals to evade their temptations, and to 
achieve beneficial control of their decision-making in respect of their future investment 
levels. More specifically, examples such as the ‘Ulysses contract37’ suggest that if 
individuals are tied into pre-committed investment plans or strategies, they will avoid 
making intuitive or impulsive decisions each time they are faced with adverse 
movements of the market.  
Increased stockholding in many European countries is reflected by the 
introduction of new financial instruments, which have facilitated individuals 
participating in the market in indirect forms such as pension funds (Guiso, Haliassos, 
and Jappelli, 2003). Appropriate investment options should be recommended to 
improve individuals’ wealth management by taking account of the characteristics of 
each individual, and acknowledging their personal circumstances. As discussed by Van 
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011, 2012), improving individuals’ financial literacy 
through providing individuals with accessible financial information and education, is 




                                            
37 The idea derives from the story of Ulysses, in Homer’s Odyssey, on his journey back from the Trojan 
wars. Ulysses and his crews were passing by the Sirenusian islands, the home of the Sirens. Ulysses 
wanted to hear the Sirens’ song and survive; thus he asked his crews to put beeswax in their ears and tie 
him to the mast. He instructed his crews in all circumstances to ignore his request to be set free, so he 
could not jump into the sea to reach the irresistibly seductive Sirens. As he wished, Ulysses became the 
first man to survive after hearing the Sirens’ song.  
151 
 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future research  
 
 
According to the Dutch National Bank Report in March 2003, the Netherlands 
was listed as the eighth largest country in the world in terms of cross-border portfolio 
holdings which amounted to 5% (€731 billion) at 31 Dec 2004, and their value 
increased to €862 billion in the course of 2005, which indicates the economic 
importance of the Netherlands. Significant growth in the number of Dutch households 
entering and exiting mutual funds, due to comparatively lower transaction costs than 
those for individual stocks, is also observed by Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest 
(2004). Studying the financial decisions of Dutch individual investors was made 
possible by the public availability of the Dutch National Bank Household Survey 
(DHS). The DHS, as a longitudinal study, provides extensive information on the 
demographical and psychological characteristics of individuals, and detailed 
information on asset classes in individuals’ portfolios. Hurd et al. (2011) emphasise the 
advantage of employing this survey in research studies in that most members of the 
CentERdata panel are experienced survey respondents, and it is believed, therefore, that 
they provide meaningful answers.  
This thesis is, however, subject to limitations with regard to the availability of 
data. Firstly, the composition of direct investments in company stocks and mutual funds 
held by individuals is not distinguished by the DHS. Such information would allow 
studies to investigate individuals’ buying and selling decisions in more depth, and 
identify the precise levels of risk associated with individual portfolios. Secondly, the 
information on individuals’ pension wealth is not provided reliably. Given the 
mandatory pension entitlements of the Dutch households, reported financial assets from 
the DHS which are held in the form of defined benefit and contribution pensions, and 
other life insurances, are insufficiently distinguished. Thirdly, the DHS provides no 
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information on the business assets and debts held by the self-employed. Thus, the 
aggregate savings and deposit balance of the self-employed fails to exclude assets held 
for business purposes. Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2000) argue that this 
misinformation results in an over-statement of the wealth of the self-employed as 
compared to their actual position in the wealth distribution.   
With regard to the first study in Chapter Three, investors’ responses for both 
evaluation and rebalancing frequencies, which are used as measures for the effect of 
myopia, and reference points and framing patterns, are observed only once; in the year 
2003. If the data were available over the period 1997-2010, the findings of this study 
would have been enhanced in terms of accounting for time-specific effects. It is 
possible that investors learn from the market, and adopt different attitudes towards their 
investments over time; thus the treatment of those variables as time-invariant could be 
regarded as a limitation of the study. Also, the questions used to estimate individuals’ 
loss aversion coefficients, are based on their responses during the period 1997-2002, 
thus incorporating the dataset for the myopia questions of 2003 results in the sample 
size of the study reducing dramatically. To estimate investors’ portfolio rebalancing 
frequency, we asked how often they change their stock portfolios without the need for 
cash. This question is, however, developed without due consideration as to possible 
confusion with the fairly common ‘regular’ monthly investment in either equities or 
mutual funds. We acknowledge that there is room for ambiguity in responses to this 
question.  
With regard to the second study in Chapter Four, the question which measures 
individuals’ stock market expectations from the DHS is only available for the period 
2004 to 2006. If, however, a more extensive dataset was available with higher-
frequency observations, i.e. monthly or quarterly, the study would have been able to 
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compare individual investors’ stock market expectations with the short-term volatility 
of the market. Investors update their beliefs and portfolios continuously through a 
process of evaluating their own expectations and investment returns, in the context of 
realised market returns. Thus a more extensive data set would have allowed 
investigation of the question as to whether changes in individuals’ expectations lead to 
changes in asset allocation. Future studies in this area could be enhanced by the 
availability of a long-term dataset with higher frequency.  For this empirical study, we 
adopt the IV estimates to control for endogenous variables in the models. However, due 
to the constraints and limited alternatives available, we were unable to employ 
appropriate instruments of desirable quality.  
More radically, future research could employ interviews and in-depth observation 
to fully understand the motives of individuals making financial decisions. To 
understand what truly determines individual investors’ perceptions of, and motives for, 
their own financial decisions, behavioural finance researchers who incorporate 
personality studies, such as Statman and Wood (2004) and Pan and Statman (2010; 
2012) believe that understanding individuals’ personalities will improve understanding 
of their decision-making. Such work emphasises that it is important for financial 
advisors to consider not only the wealth, but also the well-being of investors. 
Understanding investors’ temperaments enables advisors to communicate better and 
design portfolios with a balance of potential and protection which reflect investors’ 
aspirations.  
Similarly, in addition to the introduction of cognitive and social psychology  to 
the fields of economics and finance, the incorporation of neuroscientific methods in 
experimental studies has led to the development of neuroeconomics, adding another 
layer to behavioural studies. Studies in this field argue that opening up the ultimate 
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‘black box’, which interconnects individuals’ brain mechanisms with their motives for 
behaviours, leads to a significant improvement in understanding human decision-
making (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005). 
Previous behavioural finance studies concentrate heavily on datasets for US 
households; however, there is a growing interest in comparing households’ 
stockholding decisions across continents. Following the studies of Guiso, Haliassos, 
and Jappelli (2002; 2003) which compare household finances mainly in European 
countries, Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2011, 2012) include many different 
countries in their analysis, and expand the research domain to take account of cultural 
and institutional effects, opening a new door to a worldwide and comprehensive review 





5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
One of the renowned behavioural proponents, Statman (2005), argues that 
individual investors were never ‘rational’ as defined by standard economic and finance 
theories, but rather that they were always ‘normal’ even before the introduction of these 
theories. Normal investors are often affected by their cognitive biases and emotional 
swings, exhibiting normal ‘human nature’. Similarly, Statman (1999) posits that 
psychological considerations have always been an element in any financial transaction, 
as behavioural finance has (re)discovered. Human decision-making processes are 
complex and determined by various reasons depending on each individual circumstance.  
When Markowitz (1952a) wrote the seminal paper on mean-variance theory 
which governs modern portfolio management, he also developed a framework for a 
utility function which shifts with the level of ‘customary wealth’ (Markowitz, 1952b). 
Distinguished from other works by Markowitz, his paper (1952b) on ‘The Utility of 
Wealth’ in the Journal of Political Economy, further develops the notion of Friedman 
and Savage (1948). Describing individuals’ utility functions when buying both lottery 
tickets and insurance, Markowitz, (1952b) contributes to the foundations of Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and Behavioral Portfolio Theory (Shefrin and 
Statman, 2000).  
Behavioural finance studies have recognised the endless anomalies and social, 
cognitive, and emotional factors which affect stock prices, corporate finance, and house 
prices, as well as individual investors’ financial decisions. Such behavioural approaches 
which have prospect theory at their heart (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), embrace the notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982). 
Individuals, who are prone to their judgment biases, are more realistically described in 
terms of their decision-making under uncertainty by these approaches.  
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The Behavioural Portfolio Theory (BPT) of Shefrin and Statman (2000), 
developed as an alternative to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 
1965), also makes a contribution to the intellectual tool-kit of behavioural finance. The 
two empirical studies of this thesis highlight and reinforce previous work finding that 
individuals’ departures from optimal or rational investment decisions are due to their 
behavioural or psychological propensities and do not always lead to decisions in their 
best interests. Real world individuals are not Mill’s homo economicus, lacking as they 
do unconditional rationality, while failing to maximise their utility, as a result of their 
often irrational preferences and constraints. After all, it seems as though it is harder for 
economists to sell their ‘ex-parrot utility theory’ despite its beautiful plumage38.  
 
  
                                            
38 This expression is from the classic comedy sketch of the Monty Python's Flying Circus. One of the 
episodes includes a story of a customer who asks a pet shop owner for a refund for the parrot, 
‘Norwegian Blue’, which was already dead when he bought it, and of the owner who insists that the 
parrot is still alive. The customer even takes the parrot out from the cage and beats it on the counter, to 
prove the parrot is dead. The shopkeeper, ignorantly points to the parrot and says “beautiful plumage”, 
and the angry customer responds that “the plumage don't enter into it.” After employing a list of different 
ways to say that the parrot is dead, the final statement he makes is, “This is an ex-parrot.” This story is 
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SRFA: The share of the total financial assets invested in risky financial assets. 
∆SRFA: The change in SRFA. 




Level of Myopia = 
HEHR: high evaluation and high rebalancing frequencies; omitted as a reference category 
HELR: high evaluation and low rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no.  
LEHR: low evaluation and high rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no.  
LELR: low evaluation and low rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Loss Aversion = coefficient of loss aversion estimated using the procedure described in 
Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010).  
Discount Rate = coefficient of discount rate estimated using the procedure described in 
Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010). 
 
Level of Risk Aversion = 1, if levels are high; 0 if levels are low.   
Level of Time preference = 1, for long-term; 0 if short-term.   
 
Reference Points = Looking at initial investment price = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                               Looking at return on savings account = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                               Looking at market return (Omitted as a reference category) 
                               Looking at other reference points = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Framing Patterns = Looking at individual shares only = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
          Looking at both individual shares and whole portfolio = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                      Looking at whole portfolio (Omitted as a reference category) 
 
Gender = 1, if male; 0 if female.  
Age = Actual age 
Marriage Status = 1, if married; 0 if single.  
Education = 1, if university or college graduate; 0 if below.  
Occupation =  Regular employment; omitted as a reference category 
                        Self-employed = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                        Retired = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                        Others = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Financial Assets = Total Financial Assets in €/100,000  







Appendix B: Survey Questions Descriptions of Behavioural Factors  
 
 
Appendix B presents the DHS survey questions and mean values over 2004-2006 are categorised as 
dummy variables which take 1 if the following definitions apply to individuals. These questions are 
included in our study as control variables, and instruments in the IV estimates.  
 
Survey Questions  Definition 2004 2005 2006 Total N 
       
Control Variables        
Financial Knowledge Level                                                                                                       
How knowledgeable do you consider  Not knowledgeable 0.140   0.142   0.131   0.138 2956 
yourself with respect to financial  More or less 0.584  0.591   0.590    0.588   
matters? Knowledgeable 0.276   0.267     0.280     0.274   
       
Source of Financial Advice        
What is your most important source  Parents, Friends, etc. 0.190 0.202 0.212   0.201   2956 
of advice when you have to make  The Media  0.459 0.454    0.467     0.459   
important financial decisions for the  Professional Advisers 0.282  0.276   0.250    0.271    
household? Others 0.069    0.068 0.072     0.069  
       
Instruments        
Expected Financial Situation       
Do you expect your financial  Improve 0.234    0.205  0.238 0.225  2939 
situation to improve or  Stay the same 0.559    0.528     0.519  0.537    
deteriorate in the coming year? Deteriorate 0.207    0.267   0.243 0.239    
       
Investment Horizon        
People use different time-horizons 
when they decide about what 
Next couple of months 0.299    0.359  0.314 0.324  2655 
part of the income to spend, and what Next year 0.235    0.194     0.221  0.217    
part to save. Which of the time-
horizons mentioned below is in your 
Next couple of years 0.316    0.292   0.321 0.309   
household MOST important with More than five years 0.150    0.155  0.144 0.150   
regard to planning expenditures and 
savings? Which of the time-horizons  
      
mentioned below is in your       
household MOST important with       
       
Additional Control Variable        
Expected Health Condition       
Compared to one year ago, would 
you say your health is better  
Better 0.127   0.113   0.108   0.117 2737 
now or worse? About the same 0.757  0.741   0.753    0.750   
 Worse 0.116   0.146     0.139     0.133   
       
 
 
 
